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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the appropriate legal principles that should inform monetary compensation for 
infringements of Aboriginal title in Canada. The research does not extend to other forms of 
remedies that may be applicable where Aboriginal title is infringed. The focus is on the unresolved 
issues of the measure of compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title. This is premised on 
the fact that Aboriginal title is sui generis and the general principles for the determination of 
compensation for infringements of real property may not readily augur well with the nature of 
Aboriginal title. The research provides scholarly insight into the possible challenges of 
determining compensation that will remedy the loss of an Aboriginal group whose land rights and 
interests are infringed. The main challenge faced in the determination of compensation appears to 
be the difficulty in the valuation of both the economic and non-economic dimensions of Aboriginal 
title which should ordinarily determine the amount of compensation payable when it is infringed. 
 
This research aims to provide innovative and original potential solutions to the issue of calculation 
of compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title. In designing the mechanism that should 
inform compensation, the work draws from the experiences in Australia, Malaysia, the 
international arena and some of the extant persuasive principles tenable in Canada. It argues that 
one of the possible solutions to the issue of compensation is the adoption of a bifurcated approach 
in the determination of compensation. This approach entails the separation of the incalculable 
component of the value of Aboriginal title from the calculable component. It contends that the 
danger of a holistic measurement of the value of the infringed rights and interests in lands subject 
to Aboriginal title is that the rights and interest may become wholly incalculable. Hence, in 
practical terms, the solution to that danger is to separate the calculable component from the 
incalculable component; calculate the value of the calculable component and award a solatium for 
the incalculable component. 
 
This thesis goes on to recommend the use of assessors with indigenous backgrounds in the 
determination of compensation. This will bring Aboriginal perspective in the determination of 
compensation. Finally, recognizing that some of the potential solutions may need legislative 
action, this thesis recommends the enactment of legislation that will set out the appropriate legal 
principles for the determination of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada. 
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction1 
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) per Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw v British Columbia affirmed 
that infringements of Aboriginal title are compensable.2 However, the court did not examine the 
appropriate legal principles for the determination of compensation for infringements of Aboriginal 
title because they received no submissions on it.3 The only clue given by the court is that “the 
amount of compensation payable will vary with the nature of the particular Aboriginal title affected 
and with the nature and severity of the infringement and the extent to which Aboriginal interests 
were accommodated.”4 The infringement of an Aboriginal title gives the Aboriginal community a 
right to be compensated, but the legal principles for the determination of the level of compensation 
are yet to be determined. Thus, the decision of the SCC in Delgamuukw may have added even 
more uncertainty to an uncertain economic climate.5  
 
The expectation was that the SCC would bring clarity to the broader issue of choice and quantum 
of remedies due to an Aboriginal group whose land rights are infringed when the opportunity 
presents itself. The right opportunity arguably came up in the case of Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia.6 However, it appears that Tsilhqot’in Nation increased the uncertainty. In that case, 
McLachlin C.J. held that:  
 
“[O]nce [Aboriginal] title is established, it may be necessary for the Crown to 
reassess prior conduct in light of the new reality in order to faithfully discharge its 
fiduciary duty to the title-holding group going forward.  For example, if the Crown 
begins a project without consent prior to Aboriginal title being established, it may 
                                                          
1 This Chapter briefly sets out some of the complexities with the calculation of compensation for infringement of 
Aboriginal title. Hence, some of the points made at this stage shall be further explored in the main body of the thesis. 
2 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997) 3 S.C.R. 1010 at para 166. 
3 Ibid at para 169. 
4 Ibid at para 169. 
5 J Keith Lowes, “Questions of Compensation: An Overview of Economic Impacts” in Owen Lippert, ed, Beyond the 
Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme Court’s Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 
2000) at 424. 
6 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia [2014] 2 SCR 256. 
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be required to cancel the project upon establishment of the title if continuation of 
the project would be unjustifiably infringing.” 7 
 
The SCC did not explain the particular remedies applicable in a situation where a Crown’s project 
which infringes Aboriginal title is allowed to go on in spite of the establishment of the title.8 In 
general terms, the SCC held that “the usual remedies that lie for breach of interests in land are 
available [to infringement of Aboriginal title], adapted as may be necessary to reflect the special 
nature of Aboriginal title and the fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to the holders of 
Aboriginal title.”9 The different options of remedies that may come to mind include restitution of 
land, reallocation of a different land (with similar quality, size, and location), injunction and 
compensation. One may argue that the most appropriate remedy that may not adversely affect third 
parties in such a situation is the compensation of the Aboriginal community. However, the SCC in 
that case neither commented on compensation nor determined the appropriate legal principles that 
will inform same.   
 
This thesis explores the appropriate legal principles for the determination of compensation for 
infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada, as considered within the existing judicial approach to 
Aboriginal title. The scope of the work is restricted to compensation for two reasons. First, the 
thesis strives to build on the work the SCC started in Delgamuukw when they held that 
infringements of Aboriginal title are compensable without giving the mechanism for the 
determination of compensation. Second, compensation is arguably a remedy that may balance the 
interest of the affected Aboriginal group(s), the Crown and third parties. This thesis does not argue 
that other forms of remedies are not viable.  
 
The remainder of this chapter surveys the existing literature on the point, the general interests 
remedies seek to protect, and the general nature of Aboriginal title to set the thesis up for the rest 
                                                          
7 Ibid at para 92 (Emphasis added). 
8 Dwight Newman, “The Top Ten Uncertainties of Aboriginal Title after Tsilhqot’in” (2017) Online: Fraser Institute. 
Available at https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/top-ten-uncertainties-of-aboriginal-title-after-
tsilhqotin.pdf at 32.  
9 Tsilhqot’in Nation , supra note 6 at para 90. 
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of the argument.  The remaining chapters turn to various contexts for persuasive ideas that might 
be used in assessing compensation. 
 
Owing to the gap in the compensation regime for infringements on Aboriginal title in Canada, 
there have been suggestions in the existing literature as regards the appropriate mechanism that 
will make compensation meet the honour and good faith of the Crown.  Sam Adkins and others 
contend that compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title may uphold the honour of the 
Crown where Aboriginal perspectives are taken into account.10 Consequently, an approach that 
will require the active participation of Aboriginal groups in the formulation and modification of 
principles as well as deep consultation with an Aboriginal community during the valuation of 
compensation.11  
 
The scholars further submit that modern treaties give some insight of how Aboriginal perspectives 
could be assessed and valued.12 An example is the Inuvialuit Final Agreement13 where monetary 
compensation for expropriation is a secondary option.14 The primary obligation of the Crown in 
that agreement is to provide alternative lands that are suitable in the Western Arctic Region in 
place of expropriated lands.15 Where replacement of land becomes impossible, monetary 
compensation as contemplated by the Expropriation Act16 of Canada can be explored.17 However, 
higher valuation can be agreed by parties.18 The Inuvialuit Final Agreement is just an example of 
many other modern treaties that have different principles as regards compensation. Some other 
scholars oppose the use of principles drawn from the Expropriation Act for measurement of 
compensation where it concerns Aboriginal title.19 
                                                          
10 Sam Adkins et al, “Calculating the Incalculable: Principles for Compensating Impacts to Aboriginal Title” (2016) 
54 Alta. L. Rev. 351 at 360. The submission of the scholars here comes with the presumption that for compensation 
to be deemed appropriate and fair with respect to infringement of Aboriginal title, it must uphold the honour of the 
Crown. The basis of this contention may be traced to several paragraphs of the decision of the SCC in Delgamuukw. 
This will be explored further at a later part of this section. 
11 Ibid at 360. 
12 Ibid at 365. 
13 Inuvialuit Final Agreement, 18 August 1979, (entered into force 25 July 1984). 
14 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 365. 
15 Ibid at 365. 
16 Expropriation Act, RSC 1985 at s 26 (2). 
17 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 365. 
18 Ibid at 365. 
19 Robert Mainville, An Overview of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and Compensation for their Breach (Saskatoon: 
Purich Publishing, 2001). Robert Mainville as at the time of writing this thesis is a judge in the Court of Appeal of 
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Robert Mainville proposes six principles that should inform compensation for infringement of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights as follows:20 
 
1. Compensation should take into account the principles of fiduciary law.21 
2. Impacts on the Aboriginal community concerned and the benefits derived by the Crown 
and third parties from the infringement should be determined.22 
3. Compensation should be determined by uniform rules across Canada in accordance with 
federal common law.23 
4. Although Compensation is the duty of the Crown, it may be assumed by third parties in 
some circumstances.24 
5. Compensation may be provided through structured compensation schemes.25  
6. Compensation should be awarded for the benefit of the affected Aboriginal community as 
a whole.26 
After assessing the frailties of expropriation law in dealing with land that has no ascertainable 
market value, Mainville proposes that compensation for breaches and infringements of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights, including Aboriginal title, should be based on the principles governing damages 
for breach of fiduciary duty rather than principles of fair compensation for expropriation.27 The 
fiduciary law approach of Mainville is worth exploring because it recognizes the sui generis nature 
of Aboriginal title. This is because the fiduciary law approach has the potential to go beyond the 
“market value” of the infringed Aboriginal title to other considerations like the nature of the 
Aboriginal title, nature of the infringement, the severity of the infringement and the extent to which 
the rights and interests of the affected Aboriginal group have been accommodated. It is therefore 
pertinent to look into the fiduciary law approach to see the different circumstances that may arise 
                                                          
Quebec. Before his elevation to the Bench in 2009 (Federal Court), he practiced law in Montreal and represented First 
Nations for several years. This particular book addresses the intricate question of compensation for infringement of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights.   
20 Ibid at 104-121. 
21 Ibid at 104. 
22 Ibid at 109.  
23 Ibid at 115. 
24 Ibid at 116. 
25 Ibid at 124. 
26 Ibid at 125. 
27 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 361. See also Mainville, supra note 19 at 105. 
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as a result of using it as one of the principles for the determination of compensation. However, 
basing compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title on the “fiduciary law approach” may not 
in itself provide practical explanation with respect to the mechanism for calculation of 
compensation for both the tangible and intangible losses occasioned by an infringement. This 
thesis proposes a mechanism for the calculation of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal 
title in Canada in practical circumstances.  
 
Although the SCC has not extensively determined the appropriate legal principles to inform 
compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title, the court may have set the acceptable legal 
standard for such compensation. The acceptable standard for compensation to be deemed 
appropriate may be said to be the “honour of the Crown.” This assumption is deducible from 
several paragraphs of the decision of the SCC in Delgamuukw.28 While clarifying the likely 
quantum of appropriate compensation, the SCC held that compensation for infringement of 
Aboriginal title should not be equated with the price of a fee simple rather it “must be viewed in 
terms of the right and in keeping with the honour of the Crown.”29 This standard employed by the 
SCC may not have in anyway made the quantum of compensation clearer because what will 
amount to the fulfillment of the honour of the Crown in practical circumstances may vary. It is a 
fluid concept which may mean different things in different practical circumstances. 
In principle, the honour of the Crown has been discussed by courts and jurists. First, it is pertinent 
to note that the honour of the Crown is always at stake whenever the Crown is dealing with 
Aboriginal peoples.30 Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 contemplates that the Crown is to 
be held accountable to a high standard of honourable dealing where Aboriginal and treaty rights 
are concerned.31 Historically, the concept of the honour of the Crown evolved in Britain, and it 
was invoked to give protection against the Crown from inadvertently and unduly using its powers 
to the detriment of private parties.32 Thus, the principle presupposes that the servants of the Crown 
must conduct themselves with honour while acting on behalf of the Crown.33 
                                                          
28 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 169 & 203. 
29 Ibid at para 203. 
30 R. v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 at para 41. 
31 Jack Woodward, Native Title (Toronto: Carswell Thompson Professional Publishing, 1989) at 74. 
32 Jamie D. Dickson, The Honour and Dishonour of the Crown: Making Sense of Aboriginal Law in Canada 
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2015) at 27. 
33 Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 at para 65. 
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In Aboriginal law in Canada, the principle of honour of the Crown arises from “the Crown’s 
assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that 
were formerly in the control of that people.”34 Consequently, in all dealings of the Crown with 
Aboriginal peoples, “from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the 
implementation of treaties, the Crown must act honourably.”35 
 
In Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) the SCC held that the duty that comes 
with the honour of the Crown depends on the circumstances of the case.36 For instance, a fiduciary 
duty accrues where the Crown assumes discretionary control over Aboriginal interests.37 The 
honour of the Crown gives rise to different kinds of duties in treaty making and interpretation. The 
Crown has a duty to act with integrity and avoid “sharp dealing.”38 Likewise, the honour of the 
Crown gives the Crown the duty to consult an Aboriginal group where the decision of the 
government might have an impact on their rights.39 In fact, the concept of reconciliation which has 
been established to be the fulcrum of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was held in Haida 
Nation to flow from the principle of the honour of the Crown.40   
 
In the context of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title, the SCC held in Delgamuukw 
that “in keeping with the duty of honour and good faith on the Crown, fair compensation will 
ordinarily be required when [A]boriginal title is infringed.”41 Thus, the duty of the Crown to 
compensate an Aboriginal group whose interest in their land has been impaired by the Crown also 
flows from the honour of the Crown. That said, it goes without saying that the quantum of 
compensation and the principles that inform same should ordinarily flow from the honour of the 
Crown. This happens to be the view of the SCC as regards the standard of compensation.42 
 
                                                          
34 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 at para 32. 
35 Ibid at para 17. 
36 Ibid at para 18. 
37 Ibid at para 18. See also Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245, 2002 SCC 79, at para 79. 
38 Badger, supra, note 30 at para 41. 
39 Dwight G Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples, Revised ed (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 
2014) at 15. 
40 Haida Nation, supra note 34 at para 32.  
41 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 169. 
42 Ibid at para 203. 
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In R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard43 the SCC held that to uphold the honour of the Crown in 
consideration of issues arising from Aboriginal title, both the Aboriginal perspective and the 
common law perspective must be considered.44 Flowing from this, one may argue that for 
compensation to be consistent with the honour of the Crown, both Aboriginal and common law 
perspectives should be considered. 
 
The principle of the honour of the Crown (as briefly set out above) is not very clear. This gives an 
insight into the complex circumstances that may arise where the concept is applied as the 
appropriate standard for compensation in practical circumstances. What will be the test to evaluate 
whether or not compensation is in line with the Crown’s duty to act honourably? A plausible 
answer to this question may be that the compensation should be just and stand as a recompense as 
far as money can go for the economic and non-economic losses of the Aboriginal group affected. 
This thesis proposes the principles that should be adopted to arrive at such compensation.45   
 
1.2 The Nature and Theoretical Basis of Remedies  
Before delving into the issue of the appropriate legal principles for the determination of 
compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title in Canada, it is pertinent to broadly examine 
the underlying aim of remedies. The fundamental objective that remedies are meant to fulfill 
should ordinarily determine the choice and quantum of remedies. Hence, the discussion here will 
show that the various interests remedies seek to protect determine the choice and quantum of 
remedies. 
 
The principle of ubi jus, ibi remedium is to the effect that for every right, there must be a remedy.46 
Consequently, the need for a remedy arises upon the infringement of a right by another. One can 
argue that although rights and remedies mean different things (and they may receive different 
                                                          
43 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard [2005] SCC 43. 
44 Ibid at para 46. 
45 For the avoidance of repetition the methodology and structure that this work adopts to arrive at the proposed 
principles in this work has not been set out yet. It is set out in the final section of this chapter.  That section will explain 
the methodology that this work adopts and will give a broad overview of the different chapters and the proposal made 
thereafter.   
46 Ted Sampsell –Jones, “The Myth of Ashby v. White” (2010) 8:10 University of St. Thomas Law Journal 40. See 
also Ashby v. White (1703) 92 ER 126. The principle of ubi jus, ibi remedium emanated from Roman law, but now 
known to common law and equity. 
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emphasis), the two concepts are intrinsically linked.47 This is because remedies emerge as a result 
of infringements of rights and the value of rights may reflect in the choice and quantum of remedies 
given for their breach. Also, remedies appear to be legal protection for the existence of rights. This 
view presupposes that rights and remedies as inseparable concepts.48 
 
However, in order not to delve into the argument of whether or not the two concepts are 
inseparable, it is my view that they are at least complementary principles. The necessity for 
remedies springs from the existence of rights; and the nature, value, and measure of rights may 
reflect in the type and measure of remedies granted for the rights.  
 
Remedies can be argued to play different roles in different circumstances of infringements, 
depending on the rights at stake and the interests sought to be protected. Hence, an examination 
of the different possible interests that may arise to be protected in different circumstances seems 
to be the best approach towards the discovery of the nature and basis of remedies in law. Over the 
years, scholars have examined the different interests that can inform the basis, choice, measure, 
and extent of remedies in different circumstances of infringements. Some of these interests 
include:  
 
1. The reliance interest 
2. The restitution interest 
3. The expectation interest 
4. The retribution interest49 
 
1.2.1 The Reliance Interest 
Remedies based on the reliance interest reflect the principle of corrective justice.50 The Aristotelian 
principle of corrective justice is to the effect that a person who is responsible for a wrongful loss 
                                                          
47 Ken Cooper-Stephenson, “Holism and Harmony in the Law of Remedies” in Jeff Berryman and Rick Bigwood, The 
Law of Remedies: New Directions in Common Law, eds. (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2010) at 257. 
48 Jeffery Berryman, The Law of Equitable Remedies (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2000) at 9. 
49 Jamie Cassels & Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Remedies: The Law of Damages, 3rd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2014) at 
50. 
50 Ibid at 50. 
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has an obligation to make good that loss to its sufferer.51 This has been accepted by some scholars 
to be the rationale for remedies in tort, contract (in some cases), and unjust enrichment.52 Aristotle 
submits that where injustice occurs, it creates an inequality which gives the infringer an advantage 
or gain of some sort and a disadvantage or loss on the victim.53 Therefore, the principle of 
corrective justice uses remedies to restore equality between the infringer and the victim. For there 
to be equality (perhaps, fairness), the judge has to rectify the situation by imposing the loss on the 
wrongdoer through the nullification of his gain and restoration of the victim’s loss.54 Corrective 
justice sees the parties as equals, and for there to be justice, there should be a restoration of their 
equality.55 That said, the aim of remedies by reliance interest is to restore the victim of 
infringement to the position he would have been had the wrong not been done.56  
 
Although remedies by reliance interest reflect the principle of corrective justice, it only pays 
attention to the loss of the victim of wrong and not the gain of the infringer. Thus, remedies based 
on this interest can be summed up in the maxim; restitutio in integrum. This principle “looks back” 
to restore the victim of infringement to the position he would have been had the wrong not 
occurred.57 
 
1.2.2 The Restitution Interest 
This interest is similar to the reliance interest to the extent that they are both backward looking. 
However, instead of looking at the loss of the victim of wrong, it considers the gain of the 
infringer.58 Although, there may be a likelihood of restoring the victim to his earlier position, the 
goal of remedies based on restitution is not necessarily to put the victim of an infringement back 
                                                          
51 Zoë Sine, “Concerns about Corrective Justice” (2013) XXVI: 1 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 137. 
52 Ibid at 137. See also Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at 50. The reliance measure of damages is only resorted 
to in contract in circumstances that damages based on expectation interest are not available. There is predominance of 
expectation measure of damages in contract because by the nature of contract, the act or promise of an infringer in a 
contract creates an expectation on the mind of the victim of loss which remedy seeks to protect. The “Expectation 
Interest” section below will explain further. 
53 Thomas C Brickhouse, “Aristotle on Corrective Justice” (2014) 18 J Ethics 187 at 188. 
54 Ibid at 188. 
55 Douglas Sanderson, “Redressing the Right Wrong: Argument from Corrective Justice” (2012) 62:1 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 93 at 105. 
56 L. L. Fuller & William R. Jr. Perdue, “Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (1)” (1936) 46 Yale L. J. 52 at 54. 
57 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at 60. 
58 Ibid at 7. 
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to the position he would have been had the wrong not occurred.59 It aims to take away the gain on 
the infringer as a result of his wrongdoing (unjust enrichment).60 Thus, remedies based on this 
interest are not compensatory but rather aimed to prevent unjust enrichment.61 This approach to 
remedies is also in line with the principle of corrective justice as it aims at taking away the gain of 
the infringer and giving back to the victim. To a very great extent, it may restore balance in the 
relationship between the victim and the wrongdoer. However, heavy reliance on restitution interest 
in some circumstances may either leave the victim in a better situation than he was before the 
wrong or not restore him to the position he would have been had the wrong not occurred. For 
instance, in a situation where the gain of the infringer as a result of his wrong outweighs the loss 
of the victim; stripping the infringer’s gain and giving same to the victim may put him (the victim 
of wrong) in a better position than he would have been absent the wrong. Conversely, where the 
loss of the victim outweighs the gain of the infringer, striping the infringer of the gain and giving 
same to the victim may not restore the victim to the original position before the wrong. A practical 
example may help illustrate the point. For instance, if a victim of wrong has a real property which 
he plans to lease (for rent) but his interest in the property was deprived by an infringer who takes 
control of the property without putting it up for rent. In the event that it is determined that the 
infringer is liable of infringement and remedies based on restitution interest is resorted to, the 
probable consequence is that the victim of wrong’s interest would be restored to him without more 
(being the only gain made by the infringer). The restoration of his rights and interest in the property 
in this instance does not cover his loss of rent for the period of deprivation. This can also be the 
case in the opposite direction where the infringer makes a gain that outweighs the victim of 
wrong’s loss. The obvious explanation for these plausible circumstances is that in many cases, the 
victim’s loss and the defendant’s gain may not be equal.62 
 
1.2.3 The Expectation Interest 
Remedies based on expectation interest considers that the infringer’s action (express or implied) 
before the wrong has given the victim of wrong an expectation (which may be called a right). 
                                                          
59 Ibid at 7. 
60 Ibid at 7. 
61 Ibid at 7. 
62 Sam Doyle & David Wright, “Restitutionary Damages – The Unnecessary Remedy” (2001) 25 Melb. U. L. Rev. 1 
at 2. 
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Hence, in the absence of the wrong of the infringer, the victim of the wrong would have ordinarily 
attained the position of his expectation. Expectation interest is usually used as the basis of remedies 
for breach of contract actions as remedies in these kinds of actions secure the benefits of the 
contract for the victim of the breach.63  Remedies of this perspective represent the principle of 
distributive justice.64 With these kinds of remedies, the wealth of the parties are redistributed to 
meet the expectation of the victim of wrong; which expectation was aroused by the action or 
promise of the wrongdoer.65 
 
1.2.4 The Retribution Interest 
Sometimes, the goal of remedies is neither to compensate the victim of wrong for his injury nor to 
strip the infringer of his gain. Remedies based on retribution aims at punishing the infringer for 
his wrong.66 These kinds of remedies are called punitive or exemplary remedies.67 The interest 
protected here is a larger interest of the public and not the private interests of the victim of wrong 
and the wrongdoer.68 This approach reflects the principle of retributive justice.69 The theory of 
retributive justice is always linked to criminal wrongs where a desire to punish the offender has 
been argued to be the intuitive response of the public.70 However, there are instances in civil 
wrongs that based on moral outrage or the nature of infringement; it may become pertinent to 
punish the wrongdoer for his wrong. A good example could be where the act of the wrongdoer is 
exceptionally reprehensible, and there is a need to pass a message of denunciation, retribution, and 
deterrence.71 Punitive remedies may be awarded in addition to the remedies pursuant to any of the 
interests earlier discussed. 
 
*********** 
The above can be said to be the major interests that remedies seek to protect. Of course, there are 
other interests that are worthy of protection depending on the circumstances of a particular case. 
                                                          
63 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at 18. 
64 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 56 at 56. 
65 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at 8. 
66 Ibid at 7. 
67 Ibid at 7. 
68 Ibid at 7. 
69 Ibid at 8. 
70 Jan-Willem Van Prooijen, “Retributive Versus Compensatory Justice: Observers’ Preference for the Punishing in 
Response to Criminal Offences” (2010) 40: European Journal of Social Psychology 72 at 73. 
71 Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co. (2002) 1 SCR 595 at para 43. 
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A good example is what I may call the protection of the res interest. The interest to protect the res 
(the subject matter of a case) may even come up before the determination that there is an 
infringement (wrong) in the first place.72 A good illustration of this point could be seen in a real 
property trespass case where the infringer is already developing a property which the victim of 
wrong asserts rights and interests. The victim of wrong can file an application in court for an 
injunction restraining the infringer from further developing the property pending the determination 
of the case. This application will have the effect of protecting the res (the property) pending the 
determination of the case. This interest informs remedies like interim and interlocutory injunctions 
(equitable remedies) for parties to a suit to maintain status quo pending a specified period or the 
determination of the case.73 That said, there may be other interests that can inform remedies, 
however, my subsequent analysis will be based on the four major interests discussed above. 
 
How do these interests affect remedies? Each of these interests sought to be protected tends to 
reflect a certain kind of justice.74 The justice (s) sought to be reflected in determining the remedy 
for a particular wrong may determine the choice and measure of remedy in that case.  Thus, these 
interests appear to be the determinants of choice and quantum of remedies. Although the quantum 
of remedies may seem more intricate than the choice, the choice of remedies possesses its peculiar 
complications. Hence, the choice of remedies needs to receive considerable attention. 
 
The choices available in remedies can be broadly categorized into compensatory and non-
compensatory remedies.75 Compensation is an award of money which as far as money can go is 
equivalent to the loss or expectation of the victim of wrong.76 The goal of compensation is to 
provide for the victim of wrong something equivalent in value to that which has been lost due to 
                                                          
72 A good illustration of this point could be seen in a real property trespass case where the infringer is already 
developing a property which he victim of wrong asserts rights and interests. The victim of wrong can file an application 
in court for an injunction restraining the infringer from further developing the property pending the determination of 
the case. This application will have the effect of protecting the res (the property) pending the determination of the 
case. 
73 Berryman, supra note 48 at 13 and 33. 
74 It is also pertinent to state that some of the remedial mechanisms discussed so far are more applicable to some areas 
of law. For instance, remedies based on the reliance interest are primarily used in tortuous actions as opposed to actions 
of breach of contract that predominantly rely on remedies based on the expectation interest.  
75 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at 3. 
76 Andrew Burrows, Remedies for Tort and Breach of Contract 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 29. 
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the actions or omissions of the infringer.77 Compensation, therefore, puts the victim of wrong in a 
position he would have occupied had the wrong not been done (reliance interest) or in a position 
he reasonably expects to occupy had the wrong not been done (expectation interest). Consequently, 
compensation reflects the justices seen in the protection of two of the interests earlier analyzed. 
Further, one may conclude that the interests (s) sought to be protected informs the choice of 
compensatory remedies.  
 
The second category of the choice of remedies is non-compensatory remedies. These kinds of 
remedies are still largely determined by some of the interests earlier analyzed. Non-compensatory 
remedies, unlike the compensatory ones, do not seek to put the victim of loss in a position he ought 
to have been, or he expects to be had the wrong not been done. Rather, these kinds of remedies 
seek to do other things like striping the infringer of his gain (restitution interest) or punishing the 
wrongdoer (punitive interest). There are other kinds of non-compensatory remedies such as 
equitable remedies of specific performance and injunctive relief.78 Again, the determinant of the 
choice of non-compensatory remedies appears also to be the interest sought to be protected.  
 
After a choice of remedy has been made, the more complicated issue may be its measurement. For 
compensatory remedies, the general rule seems to be the assessment in a lump sum of all the loss 
or expectation of the victim of wrong, depending on the interest sought to be protected.79 Different 
factors may make the assessment of compensation complex. The degree of complexity will depend 
on the type of loss or expectation sought to be assessed. For example, economic losses or 
expectations may have their complexities; but intangible losses or expectations may even prove to 
be more complex. On the other hand, restitutionary remedies are measured by the wrongful gain 
of the infringer regardless of the loss of the victim of wrong.80 Ascertaining the actual gain of the 
infringer for the purpose of restoration to the victim may also be intricate in some circumstances, 
especially circumstances whereby the gain of the infringer is intangible. For punitive remedies, 
                                                          
77 Rodney C. Roberts, “The Counterfactual Conception of Compensation” (2006) 37: 3-4 Metaphilosophy at 414. 
78 Burrows, supra note 76 at 10. Andrew Burrows in his book makes a distinction between compensatory remedies 
and remedies that seek to compel a performance or prevent a wrong. For instance, the aim of the equitable remedy of 
specific performance is not to compensate the victim of the wrong, but to compel the infringer to do what for instance 
by a contract he has the obligation to do. Likewise, the underling aim of mandatory injunction in some circumstances 
is to compel the infringer to do a thing and in other instances may restrain him from doing something. 
79 Ibid at 175. See also Fitter v. Veal (1701) 12 Mod Rep 542. 
80 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at 282. 
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there is no scientific method for the determination of its measurement.81 However, the punitive 
damages should be able to achieve its purpose of punishment and deterrence.82 
 
Trespass to real property, negligence causing damage to the property or expropriation of property 
are generally compensable.83 Of course, the interest sought to be protected, which should 
eventually determine the quantum of compensation may vary depending on the circumstances 
surrounding the case. However, the general trend in trespass or negligence on property cases is 
that the courts award the diminishing value of the property or the cost of repair.84 This trend 
appears to be compensation based on the reliance interest. In other circumstances, for instance, 
where the victim of wrong intends to use the property (for instance where he intends to rent it), the 
court may award damages for lost use of the property.85 This appears to be more in line with the 
protection of expectation interest.  
 
In cases of expropriation of fee simple estate, the general trend is award of compensation based on 
the market value of the property which would ordinarily be paid by a willing purchaser to a willing 
vendor.86This seeks to reproduce in monetary form the value of the property of the victim of 
expropriation. This also appears to be more in line with the reliance interest. Thus, the focus on 
the determination of damages for an infringement of real property is the loss of the victim of wrong 
and not necessarily the gain of the infringer.87 Therefore, compensation for the loss in property 
infringements may protect the reliance interest or expectation interest, depending on the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the case. 
 
Further to the above analysis, the goal, nature, choice, and quantum of remedies may be said to 
revolve around the interest (s) sought to be protected. Hence, it appears that the most convenient 
place to start in the determination and assessment of remedies for infringements is to ascertain the 
interest sought to be protected. What could be the determinant of the interest sought to be 
                                                          
81 Ibid at 337. 
82 Ibid at 337. 
83 Ibid at 89. 
84 Ibid at 90. See also Rossiter v Swartz, 2013 ONSC 159 at para 26. 
85 Ibid at 90. 
86 Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418 at 432. 
87 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at 90. 
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protected? The possible factors that could determine the interest sought to be protected may be the 
nature of the rights infringed, the nature of the infringement, the degree of infringement and 
perhaps the relationship between the infringer and the victim of wrong.  
 
The nature of rights infringed and the nature of infringement play a very big role in the 
determination of the interest sought to be protected. For instance, the preceding analysis shows 
that remedies based on the reliance interest are usually adopted in tort while that of expectation 
interest is predominant in contract.88 Also, the appraisal above shows that there is a trend where 
the infringement sought to be remedied concerns real property. Furthermore, the nature of 
infringement can work together with the degree of infringement to protect an entirely different 
interest. For instance, I earlier submitted that there are civil wrongs that based on moral outrage, 
the nature of the infringement and the degree of infringement; it may become pertinent to punish 
the wrongdoer for his wrong. Remedies to be awarded in such a situation may seek to protect the 
general interest of the public and not the private interests of the victim of wrong and the 
wrongdoer.89 Also, the relationship between the infringer and the victim of wrong may determine 
the interest sought to be protected. The relationship could be contractual, fiduciary or the general 
“neighbor relationship” demonstrated in the tort of negligence. 
 
By extension, for one to determine the remedial interest (s) to be protected upon the infringement 
of Aboriginal title, it may be pertinent to ascertain the nature of the Aboriginal title, the nature of 
infringements and the relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown in relation to 
Aboriginal title.  These factors will be considered in detail in the next chapter. At this juncture, it 
is a convenient starting point to examine the nature of Aboriginal title and the right it confers. 
Since rights and remedies are intrinsically linked, the understanding of the nature of Aboriginal 
title and the rights it confers will give an insight on the choice and quantum of remedies. 
 
 
 
                                                          
88 This does not imply that in appropriate circumstances remedies based on expectation interest are not used in tort or 
reliance interest in contract.  
89 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at at 7. 
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1.3 Nature of Aboriginal Title and the Rights it Confers 
…[A]boriginal title encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation 
of the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need 
not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which 
are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures; and second, that those 
protected uses must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the group’s 
attachment to that land. 
  Lamer CJ90 
 
Before delving into the examination of the nature of Aboriginal title, it is pertinent to state that 
there is a divergence of scholarly views on the propriety or otherwise of the concept. While some 
scholars acknowledge the legal concept, other scholars contend that it is a common law concept 
and therefore incompatible with indigenous legal traditions.91 That said, this section explores the 
nature of Aboriginal title as has been developed by the Supreme Court of Canada without getting 
into the arguments of the suitability of the concept. 
 
Aboriginal title is a sui generis interest in land which can only be held communally by Aboriginal 
nations.92  Lamer CJ expressly identifies the three facets of Aboriginal title that makes it sui generis 
as follows: its inalienability, source, and communal nature.93 First, lands held under Aboriginal 
title are inalienable to third parties in the sense that they cannot be sold, surrendered or transferred 
to any person other than the Crown.94 Further, the source of Aboriginal title makes it unique. It 
arises as a result of the prior occupation of land before the assertion of British sovereignty as 
                                                          
90 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 117. 
91 For criticism of the doctrine of Aboriginal title, see John Borrows, Sovereignty's Alchemy: An Analysis of 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L. J. 537 at 562-563. John Borrows argues that 
“Sovereignty's incantation is like magic. Its mantra is ‘Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown's underlying title.’ 
This mere assertion is said to displace previous Indigenous titles by making them subject to and a burden on, another's 
higher legal claims…Is the mere assertion of sovereignty an acceptable justification for the Crown's displacement of 
Indigenous titles? It does not make sense that one could secure a legal entitlement to land over another merely through 
raw assertion…It is even less of a ‘morally and politically defensible’ position when this assertion has not been a 
neutral and noble statement, but has benefited the Crown to the detriment of the land's original inhabitants. As such, 
‘it does not make sense’ to speak of Aboriginal title as being a ‘burden’ on the Crown's underlying title. As "it does 
not make sense to speak of a burden on the underlying title before the title existed…"  See also John Borrows, “The 
Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia” (2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev. 701 at 725.  
92 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 115. 
93 Ibid at para 113-115. See also Thomas Isaac, Aboriginal Title (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2006) at 12. 
94 Ibid at para 113. 
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opposed to normal fee simple estates which arise afterward.95 Finally, Aboriginal title is communal 
because it can only be held collectively by Aboriginal nations and not individually by Aboriginal 
persons.96 
 
Therefore, an Aboriginal title is based on the prior occupation of land before colonization.97 In 
order to establish Aboriginal title, such occupation must be “sufficient; it must be continuous 
(where present occupation is relied on), and it must be exclusive.98 
 
An examination of Delgamuukw shows that Aboriginal title can be divided into two components: 
economic and non-economic components. The economic component reflects the tangible 
dimension of Aboriginal title and extends to the uses in which an Aboriginal title can be put to.99 
On the other hand, the non-economic component shows the intangible spiritual and cultural aspect 
of Aboriginal title, exhibited by an Aboriginal group’s unique connection and relationship with 
their land.100 
 
From the discussion so far, Aboriginal title is different from other types of interest in land like fee 
simple estate. If that is the case, the next thing would be to decipher the rights that Aboriginal title 
confers that makes it different. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) per McLachlin C.J. held as 
follows: 
 
Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated with fee 
simple, including:  the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of 
enjoyment and occupancy of the land;  the right to possess the land; the right to the 
economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage the 
land.101 
 
                                                          
95 Ibid at para 114. 
96 Ibid at para 115. 
97 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 25. 
98 Ibid at 25. 
99 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 166. 
100 Ibid at para 129. 
101 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 73. 
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The SCC likened Aboriginal title to fee simple for the purpose of explaining the rights it confers. 
It is pertinent to state that the SCC has made it clear that Aboriginal title is not to be equated with 
fee simple or other traditional property law concepts.102 However, inferences from those property 
law concepts may be used to explain the concept of Aboriginal title.103 That said, the above rights 
that McLachlin C.J. outlined as the rights Aboriginal title confers arguably relate to the economic 
component of Aboriginal title and not the non-economic component. The first basis for this view 
is that the rights outlined are the exact rights tenable in fee simple, and fee simple does not 
contemplate non-economic component of Aboriginal title. Secondly, those rights are quite tangible 
and do not allude to the intangible aspect of Aboriginal title. Hence, simply put, the rights outlined 
by McLachlin C.J. are not the only sets of rights that Aboriginal title confers; they are rights that 
the economic aspects of Aboriginal title confer. McLachlin C.J. held that “Aboriginal title confers 
ownership rights similar to that of a fee simple.” Perhaps, it could have been different if she held 
that “the only sets of rights Aboriginal title confers are the rights similar to that of a fee simple.” 
 
The rights set out by McLachlin C.J. come with some restrictions which are predicated on the non-
economic component of Aboriginal title. The restrictions include: 
 
1. It can only be held communally, not only for the present generation but also for all 
succeeding generations.104  
2. It is inalienable except to the Crown105  
3. It cannot be developed, used or misused in a way that would prevent the future generation 
from using and it.106 
 
The above restrictions are predicated on the relationship and connection Aboriginal peoples have 
with their land (non-economic component).107 It is by virtue of the relationship indigenous peoples 
have with their land that it cannot be alienated to a third party other than the Crown and it cannot 
be used in a manner that will preclude a future generation from enjoying that relationship and 
                                                          
102 Ibid at para 72. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 190. 
103 Ibid at para 72. 
104 Ibid at para 74. 
105 Ibid at para 74. 
106 Ibid at para 74. 
107 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 128-129. 
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connection with the land.108 This shows that the intangible aspect of Aboriginal title is in itself a 
right and also security to the continued existence of other rights that Aboriginal title confers as 
outlined by McLachlin C.J. for the future generation. The rights conferred by the intangible 
component of Aboriginal title have not been outlined by the SCC, probably because they vary 
according to the particular nature of Aboriginal title. 
 
The inherent limit of Aboriginal title was indicated differently in Delgamuukw. Lamer C.J. held  
that “lands subject to [A]boriginal title cannot be put to such uses as may be irreconcilable with 
the nature of the occupation of that land and the relationship that the particular group has had with 
the land…”109 He gave two illustrations: 
 
“…if occupation is established with reference to the use of the land as a hunting 
ground, then the group that successfully claims [A]boriginal title to that land may 
not use it in such a fashion as to destroy its value for such a use (e.g., by strip mining 
it).  Similarly, if a group claims a special bond with the land because of its 
ceremonial or cultural significance, it may not use the land in such a way as to 
destroy that relationship (e.g., by developing it in such a way that the bond is 
destroyed, perhaps by turning it into a parking lot).”110 
 
Dwight Newman argues the applicability of this restriction may be uncertain even before the 
decision of the SCC in Tsilhqot’in Nation.111 He further contends that Tsilhqot’in Nation may have 
made the situation even less clear as there is uncertainty as regards whether the inherent limit on 
Aboriginal title continues to apply.112 This argument is based on the variety of approaches the SCC 
used in representing the limits of Aboriginal title in the two decisions.113 Thus, Delgamuukw and 
                                                          
108 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 74. 
109 Ibid at para 128. 
110 Ibid at para 128. The procedure to be adopted by the doctrine of the duty to consult does not necessarily address 
the issue of remedies for infringement of Aboriginal title. 
111 Newman, supra note 8 at 12. Dwight Newman is a Professor of Law and Canada Research Chair in Indigenous 
Rights in Constitutional and International Law at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. In this particular piece he 
examines top ten uncertainties of Aboriginal title three years after the SCC decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation. One of the 
uncertainties outlined by the legal jurist (although ranking the least in his order) is the “applicability of the cultural 
limit on the use of Aboriginal title lands”. 
112 Ibid at 12. 
113 Ibid at 12. 
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Tsilhqot’in Nation, with respect to the inherent limit of Aboriginal title may be said to be 
ambiguous.114 This is because it is uncertain whether Tsilhqot’in Nation replaces Delgamuukw in 
that aspect or not.115 
 
A contrary argument would be that although there may be uncertainty as regards the scope of the 
inherent limit of Aboriginal title, there is no ambiguity between Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in 
Nation in that respect. The uncertainty persists because Tsilhqot’in Nation did not make clear the 
uncertain illustrations given in Delgamuukw to show the scope of the inherent limit of Aboriginal 
title. However, there appears to be no ambiguity as regards whether or not the inherent limit still 
applies.  Tsilhqot’in Nation reproduces the inherent limits in Delgamuukw in another language, 
but they are invariably the same thing. In Tsilhqot’in Nation, it was held that the land cannot “be 
developed or misused in a way that would substantially deprive future generations of the benefit 
of the land.”116 The choice of language of McLachlin C.J. for indication of the inherent limit of 
Aboriginal title may not have been the best, but the restriction on use or misuse that will deprive 
future generation of the “benefit to the land” in that decision implies cultural, economic and non-
economic benefits that give the Aboriginal title its nature. What remains uncertain is the scope of 
this limitation. Perhaps, this was deliberately left uncertain in Tsilhqot’in Nation, so that it will be 
decided as cases arise. This can be deduced where the SCC further held that “whether a particular 
use is irreconcilable with the ability of succeeding generations to benefit from the land will be a 
matter to be determined when the issue arises.”117 
 
Another aspect of the restriction that is still uncertain and which directly has a nexus with the 
context of this thesis is the implication it has on the value of Aboriginal title. Do the restrictions 
of Aboriginal title as outlined in Tsilhqot’in Nation reduce its value? In other words, are the 
restrictions of Aboriginal title discounting factors where there is a need to calculate in monetary 
terms the value of Aboriginal title? Some arguments suggest that the restrictions are discounting 
factors while some literature, especially from other jurisdictions argue otherwise.118 I would argue 
                                                          
114 Ibid at 12. 
115 Ibid at 12. 
116 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 74. 
117 Ibid at para 74. 
118 For this, see Isaac, supra note 93 at 47-48; See also the  majority decision of Gonthier, Major, Binnie and LeBel JJ 
in Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 633 at para 53 which tends to suggest that restrictions on 
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that the restrictions should not be discounting factors in the determination of the value of lands 
subject to Aboriginal title and consequently compensation. This point will be explored further in 
the later part of this thesis. 
 
That said, in considering the nature of Aboriginal title and the right it confers, it is important to 
point out that the Crown has an underlying title (radical title). This underlying title was gained by 
the Crown at the assertion of British sovereignty.119 It is pursuant to this underlying title that 
Aboriginal title can only be surrendered to the Crown.  By virtue of the underlying title also, the 
Crown can also justifiably dispossess or deprive (wholly or partly) an Aboriginal group their land 
rights and interest in a land that is held under Aboriginal title. For this to be valid, it must be 
justifiable. To justify an infringement of the rights and interests of an Aboriginal group in land 
held under an Aboriginal title, the following test must be met:   
 
1. The Crown must show that it has discharged its procedural duty to consult and 
accommodate.120 
2. The action of the Crown must be backed by a compelling and substantial objective.121 
3. The governmental action is consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to the 
group.122 
 
The Crown’s fiduciary obligation is a broader discussion that will be explored in Chapter two 
especially as it relates to compensation. Based on the nature of Aboriginal title and the radical title 
of the Crown, the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is that of a fiduciary.123 
That said, the fiduciary obligation of the Crown encompasses a lot of factors including the 
obligation to give redress to an indigenous group whose interest in land which is held pursuant to 
Aboriginal title is deprived or dispossessed. The SCC recognized this in  Delgamuukw where it 
                                                          
indigenous land rights are discounting factors to their value. See also Anuar Alias & Md Nasir Daud, Saka: Adequate 
Compensation for Orang Asli Native Land (Johor: Pejabat Penerbit) at 99 where the jurists argued that inalienability 
of the native title in Malaysia should not be a discounting factor to its value. 
119 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 145. 
120 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 77. 
121 Ibid at para 77. 
122 Ibid at para 77. 
123 Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 R.C.S. 335 at 349. See also R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1108. 
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was held that for the Crown to fulfill its fiduciary obligation, fair compensation will ordinarily be 
required where an Aboriginal title is infringed.124 
 
1.4 Non-Economic Component of Aboriginal Title 
Indigenous peoples in different societies have explained that the relationship they have with their 
land forms the core of their existence.125 United Nations Special Rapporteur José Martínez Cobo 
reflects on this point in his study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous 
populations.126  He submits that: 
 
It is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual relationship between 
indigenous peoples and their land as basic to their existence as such and to all their 
beliefs, customs, traditions and culture. For such peoples, the land is not merely a 
possession and a means of production. The entire relationship between the spiritual 
life of indigenous peoples and the Mother Earth, and their land, has a great many 
deep implications. Their land is not a commodity which can be acquired, but a 
material element to be enjoyed freely.127 
 
Different international law instruments recognize the need for the respect of the deep spiritual and 
cultural connection indigenous peoples have with their lands as it is basic to their essence.128 This 
deep spiritual and cultural connection appears to be intangible and may not readily have a monetary 
value as it is equated with the very essence of indigenous peoples. 
 
                                                          
124 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 169. 
125 Erica-Irene A. Daes, Indigenous Peoples and their Relationship with Land, UNCHR, 53rd Session, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, (2001) at para 13. See also Brenda L. Gunn, “More than Money: Using International Law of 
Reparations to Determine Fair Compensation for Infringements of Aboriginal tile (2013) 46:2 UBC L Rev. at 299. 
126 José Martínez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations: Chapter XXI-XXII 
Conclusions, Proposals and Recommendations, UN Doc E/CN. 4. Sub 2/1983/21/Add.8 (1983) at paras 196-97.  
127 Ibid at paras 196-97. See also Gunn, supra note 125 at 299. 
128 See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 13 September 2007, 
A/RES/61/295 Art 25; International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples, 27 June 1989, C169 (entered into force 5 September 1991) at Art. 13. 
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In a Canadian context, the importance of the deep spiritual connection of Aboriginal peoples and 
their lands is well captured in Gisday Wa and Delgam Uukw’s Spirit in the Land.129   The book 
contains the statements of the Hereditary Chiefs of the Gitksan and Wet’suet’en people in the 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, 1887-1990. The Chiefs together governed 22, 000 square 
miles of Gitksan and Wet’suet’en territories located in the province of British Columbia.130 
Delgam Uukw, a Giksan Chief stated that: 
 
For us, the ownership of territory is a marriage of Chief and the land. Each Chief 
has an ancestor who encountered and acknowledged the life of the land. From such 
encounters come power. The land, the plants, the animals and people all have spirit- 
they all must be shown respect. That is the basis of our law. The Chief is responsible 
for ensuring that all the people in his House respect the spirit in the land and in all 
living things.131 
 
From the statement of Chief Delgam Uukw, the land and everything that is on it possess a spirit. 
The spirit also gives the land life. Although the spirit in the land may not be visible to the eyes and 
intangible to be touched, its existence and essence are real to Aboriginal peoples. It is pertinent to 
note that the discussion in that book represents one particular indigenous context. Although 
different indigenous communities may have similarities in their spiritual connection to land, it is 
important not to homogenize all indigenous cultures.   
 
Some Aboriginal groups may hold the view that except for restitution of the land itself, it might 
be impossible to accommodate or remedy the loss of their spiritual connection to land upon 
infringements of their land rights. This may be because of the complexity of valuation of the said 
spiritual connection and the difficulty in determining what may be used to replace or recompense 
the deprivation or violation of the relationship with the land. For instance, in Ktunaxa Nation v. 
British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations)132 the government of British 
                                                          
129 Gisday Wa and Delgam Uukw, The Spirit in the Land: Statements of the Gitksan and Wet’suet’en Hereditary Chiefs 
in the Supreme Court of British Columbia 1887-1990 (British Columbia: Reflections, 1992). See also Antonia Mills, 
Eagle Down is Our Law: Witsuwit’en Law, Feasts, and Land Claims (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994). 
130 Ibid at 7. 
131 Ibid at 7. 
132 Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations) [2017] SCC 54. 
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Columbia approved a ski resort in spite of the claim by First Nation that development would breach 
religious rights.133 The place the ski resort was sought to be built is Qat’muk, a place of religious 
significance.134 There was a consultation of the Ktunaxa, but at a point, they were of the view that 
accommodation was impossible because the project would drive Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk 
and therefore irrevocably impair their religious beliefs and practices.135 
 
The contention by the First Nation in Ktunaxa Nation appears to give credence to the statement of 
Chief Delgam Uukw. Thus, for many Aboriginal peoples in Canada, their lands go beyond the 
tangible economic benefits that come as a result of the use and occupation of the lands. There 
exists another element which may even be more important than the economic dimension as it 
defines their essence. That dimension is intangible and non-economic but has value to Aboriginal 
peoples that may be complex to determine or difficult to compensate with money at all.  
 
In Delgamuukw, although the SCC recognized the non-economic dimension of Aboriginal title as 
an important and unique component, it was held that such “inherent value of that land should not 
be taken to detract from the possibility of surrender to the Crown in exchange for valuable 
consideration.”136 The question of the possible figure that may be a valuable consideration for the 
non-economic component of Aboriginal title remains uncertain as the SCC is yet to address it. 
 
1.5 Choice and Quantum of Remedies for Infringement of Aboriginal Title  
The possible remedies for infringements of the broader land rights and interests of indigenous 
peoples are set out in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
(UNDRIP).137   Remedies may take the form of restitution of land, reallocation of lands, territories 
or resources; equal in size and quality with the deprived land right or monetary compensation.138  
Infringements of Aboriginal title in Canada may take different forms; examples include 
expropriation and grants of tenures by the Crown that are inconsistent with continuing Aboriginal 
interests. Such tenures might be in the form of a fee simple grant to a third party, a grant of a lease, 
                                                          
133 Ibid at paras 1-10. 
134 Ibid at paras 1-10. 
135 Ibid at paras 1-10. 
136 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 129 & 131. 
137 UNDRIP, supra note 129 at Art 28. 
138 Ibid at Art 28. 
25 
 
license or permit. Also, the act of the government that adversely impact Aboriginal title may be 
justifiable or not. There appears to be no guideline for redress for the infringement of Aboriginal 
title, especially for retrospective infringements.  The doctrine of the duty to consult as was 
expounded in Haida Nation appears to give a guideline as regards the procedure to be adopted for 
future infringements.139 This doctrine is to the effect that the Crown has the duty to consult an 
Aboriginal community where it has knowledge (real or constructive) of the potential existence of 
Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that adversely affects it.140 The duty upon the 
Crown becomes stricter where the title has been established.141 Notwithstanding this doctrine, the 
form and quantum of remedies available to an Aboriginal community where the Crown fails to 
meet the duty to consult are uncertain. For instance, it was held in Tsilhqot’in Nation that “if the 
Crown begins a project without consent prior to Aboriginal title being established, it may be 
required to cancel the project upon establishment of the title if continuation of the project would 
be unjustifiably infringing.”142 The fact that the Crown “may be required to cancel the project,” 
where the duty to consult has not been met implies that the Crown “may also not be required to 
cancel” depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. The court did not go further to 
highlight the appropriate remedies that the affected Aboriginal community will be entitled to.143 
Thus, the uncertainty in Canada extends to the choice of remedies. 
 
Some scholars suggest that it might be better for the courts to attempt to device practical remedies 
that would take into contemplation of the need to also protect third party rights.144 Such means 
may be a better fulfillment of the underlying purpose of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
which is “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of [A]boriginal societies with the sovereignty of 
the Crown.” 145 Some jurists further suggest that in practical terms, the most appropriate remedy 
for the infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada is compensation.146 This is because 
                                                          
139 Haida Nations, supra note 34 at para 35. 
140 Ibid at para 35. 
141 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 80. Upon establishment of Aboriginal title, the duty on the Crown appears 
to be to obtain “consent” and not just to “consult”. 
142 Ibid para 92 (Emphasis  Added). 
143 Newman, supra note 8 at 15. 
144 Ibid at 15. See also Malcolm Lavoie, Aboriginal Title Claims to Private Land and the Legal Relevance of 
Distributive Effects” in Dwight Newman, ed, Business Implications of Aboriginal Law (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2018) 
at 133; Isaac, supra note 93 at 47. 
145 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para 31. 
146 Isaac, supra note 93 at 47. 
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compensation may be better suited for balancing of interests of an Aboriginal group and third 
parties who may have come upon the land as bona fide purchasers for value without notice. While 
making a case for compensation, Isaac argues as follows: 
 
When dealing with the transfer of private rights on Crown land, an entitlement to 
injunctive relief will be difficult to establish... Moreover, remedies grounded in 
trust and fiduciary will only be available in rare circumstances, if at all. 
Accordingly, notwithstanding certain decisions, it appears that compensation will 
continue to be the appropriate remedy for infringments of proven Aboriginal title 
on the Crown land in most circumstances.147 
 
Furthermore, several paragraphs of Delgamuukw shows that infringements of Aboriginal title are 
compensable and this gives the suggestion that compensation is the appropriate choice of remedy 
for infringements of Aboriginal title.148 
 
Malcolm Lavoie contends in support of the above view that the clearest way to vindicate 
Aboriginal title claims while protecting third-party interests in the same land is through monetary 
compensation.149  He argues that monetary compensation should not be seen as overriding 
Aboriginal interest with private third-party interest, rather it is a better way to ensure legal order.150 
His argument is with respect to Aboriginal claims of privately owned lands in Canada. These 
private interests arose as a result of government grants of fee simple interests that are inconsistent 
with Aboriginal title.151 In his view, remedies that fundamentally undermine existing rights have 
a strong tendency to disrupt the existing legal order.152 Since the Crown is responsible for the 
wrong by granting tenures that are inconsistent with Aboriginal title to innocent third parties, it 
should be liable to redress the Aboriginal group affected through the award of damages for breach 
of fiduciary duty or wrongful appropriation of land.153 
                                                          
147 Ibid at 47. 
148 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 203, 169, 166, 145. 
149 Lavoie, supra note 144 at 133. 
150 Ibid at 134. 
151 Ibid at 136. 
152  Ibid at 154. 
153 Ibid at 155. 
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That said, this thesis does not extend to discussions on other forms of remedies like restitution of 
lands, reallocation of similar lands, injunctions, etc. This is because the scope of this work is 
limited to compensation. This, of course, does not mean other forms of remedies are not viable 
remedies. They may be in appropriate circumstances. For instance, Richtersveld Community in 
South Africa succeeded in a claim of restitution of land against the government.154 Unlike the 
situation in Canada, there is an enabling statute for restitution of land in South Africa.155 Also, 
UNDRIP recognizes these remedies as viable remedies. However, if compensation is arguably the 
most practical remedy upon the infringement of Aboriginal title, then there is a crucial need to 
explore the subject in order to determine the appropriate legal principles that should inform a fair 
and adequate compensation that will recompense the loss of an affected Aboriginal community.  
 
The quantum of compensation should ordinarily reflect the rights infringed. Having explored the 
nature of Aboriginal title and the rights it confers, the measure of compensation for the 
infringement of Aboriginal title should ordinarily reflect both the economic and non-economic 
components of Aboriginal title. Delgamuukw which emphasized that infringements of Aboriginal 
title are compensable did not go further to explain the appropriate legal principles that will be 
adopted for the determination of compensation. 
 
Hence, this thesis explores the appropriate legal principles that should be used for the 
determination of compensation upon the infringement of Aboriginal title. 
 
1.6 Methodology and Structure  
The methodology this research employs is doctrinal. It involves a legal survey of the legal 
principles that inform the valuation of compensation for the infringement of the rights and interest 
in lands that are subject to Aboriginal title in Canada from different varying sources. Further, the 
                                                          
154 Alexkor Ltd. and Another v. Richtersveld Community and Others 2003 (12) BCLR 1301 (CC) (South African 
Constitutional Court). 
155 The Richterveld Community relied on section 2 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 1994 which provides that 
“A person shall be entitled to restitution of a right in land if … (d) it is a community or part of a community 
dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices; and (e) 
the claim for such restitution is lodged not later than 31 December 1998.” 
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research extends to the analysis of the legal trends and practices in Australia, Malaysia and the 
international arena as regards valuation of compensation for infringement of the land rights of 
indigenous peoples. The experiences of those jurisdictions are compared with that of Canada. 
Some of the principles deduced from these jurisdictions form part of the proposals made at the 
concluding chapter for the development of the compensation regime concerning the infringement 
of Aboriginal title lands. This part gives a summary of the structure of the research. A detailed 
analysis of the summary made below will be found in the main body of the thesis.  
 
The next chapter examines extant principles of compensation for the infringement of Aboriginal 
title lands in Canada. These principles are deducible from several sources that are saying different 
things. The situation makes the regime susceptible to variabilities and same perpetuates 
uncertainty. Some of the sources that are examined in that chapter are binding while others are 
appraised for the purpose of deducing principles that may be persuasive to the courts in the 
determination of compensation. The appraisal begins with the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which 
has been held by the SCC to contemplate fair compensation for an Aboriginal group that surrenders 
their interest in their land.156  This legal document however does not provide for a mechanism for 
the determination of fair compensation. Further, the chapter examines relevant provisions of the 
Indian Act157 on the determination of compensation upon surrender or expropriation of an Indian 
band’s rights and interests in their reserve.158 This Act gave a strong legal basis for the decision of 
the SCC in Guerin v. The Queen which is to the effect that the mechanism for the determination 
of compensation for the infringement of Indian reserves should employ the fiduciary principles for 
determination of compensation where a fiduciary breaches his duties.159 The discussion in that 
chapter extends to the four variabilities noted by the SCC in Delgamuukw that may affect the 
amount of compensation.160 
 
                                                          
156 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 203. 
157 Indian Act, RSC 1985. 
158 Ibid at ss 18 & 35. See also Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 R.C.S. 335. 
159 Guerin, supra note 123 at 357. 
160 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 169.These variabilities include the nature of Aboriginal title, the nature of 
infringement, degree of infringement and extent to which Aboriginal interest is accommodated. The SCC did not 
explain the possible implications of these variabilities. This research analyses the possible implications these 
variabilities might have on compensation for the infringement of Aboriginal title.   
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The modalities employed for cases of infringement of indigenous land rights in modern treaties 
are also examined. The principles in some modern treaties may be persuasive to the courts in the 
broader context of the determination of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title. Further, 
that chapter examines the relevant provisions of the Specific Claims Tribunal Act (SCTA).161 The 
SCTA establishes the Specific Claims Tribunal (SCT) to decide cases of “validity and 
compensation” concerning the specific claims of First Nations identified in the legislation.162 The 
Act only affects the rights of a First Nation where the First Nation chooses to file a claim in the 
Tribunal.163 The last sections of the chapter examine the Expropriation Act, the First Nation Land 
Management Act (FNLM)164 and the Métis Settlement Act (MSA).165 
 
It is a truism that compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title is not to be equated with the 
market value of a fee simple.166 Thus, the principles for the determination of compensation as 
enshrined in the Expropriation Act are not applicable where Aboriginal title lands are the subject 
of infringement. However, the principles in the Expropriation Act may be appropriate persuasive 
principles where they are adapted to suit the peculiarities of Aboriginal title.167 Also, the 
application of FNLMA and MSA are restricted to lands specified in the Acts. However, the 
compensation mechanism in those Acts is worthy of exploration to draw persuasive principles 
which may be relevant for a broader application. 
 
Chapter three is dedicated to the appraisal of the experiences in Australia, Malaysia and under the 
UNDRIP. Canada is not the only country that contends with issues relating to compensation for 
the infringement of indigenous land rights.168 Unlike Canada, Australia has a comprehensive, 
mandatory statutory regime; the Native Title Act (NTA)169 for native claims and the determination 
                                                          
161 Specific Claims Tribunal Act, (SCTA) S.C. 2008, c. 22. 
162 Kitselas First Nation v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2013 SCTC 1 at para 26. See also SCTA, supra 
note 150 at s 3. 
163 SCTA, supra note 161 at s 5. 
164 First Nation Land Management Act S.C. 1999, c. 24. The Act ratified the Framework Agreement on First Nation 
Land Management between the Crown and a specified group of First Nations in relation to their land. 
165 Métis Settlement Act, RSA 2000, c M-14 (MSA). The primary purpose of the Act is to enhance Métis identity, 
culture, and self-governance by creating a land base for Métis in Alberta, Canada. 
166 For this see Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at paras 203. 
167 Chapter two suggests ways in which the principles in the Expropriation Act could be interpreted to suit Aboriginal 
title.   
168 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 371. 
169 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA). 
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of compensation for infringement of their native title.170 This thesis draws from some of the 
principles enshrined in the NTA as has been explored in some of the cases by Australian Courts.171 
The research also extends to the mechanisms for determination of compensation for infringement 
of native title in Malaysia. The choice of Australia and Malaysia is primarily based on the 
similarities between the nature of indigenous land rights and interests in those states with 
Aboriginal title in Canada.172 Hence, the purpose of the comparison is to draw lessons from their 
experiences and make proposals to both policymakers and the courts for implementation in 
Canada.  
 
Other jurisdictions may have the indigenous land rights similar to that of Canada, however I 
restricted my comparison to Australia and Malaysia.173 The principles developed so far in those 
jurisdictions and the existing literature there helped to deal with some conceptual issues raised by 
this thesis. The proposals made in this research to both policymakers and the courts for the 
development of the existing legal regime on compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title 
are drawn from these jurisdictions. 
 
Furthermore, the relevant provisions of UNDRIP are examined. This is motivated by the ongoing 
debate on the propriety or otherwise of the full implementation of UNDRIP in Canada. The 
examination answers the question; whether the full implementation of UNDRIP will fill the gap in 
the compensation regime for infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada? 
 
Finally, the last chapter brings in original and innovative proposals that may be potential solutions 
to the issues raised by the measurement of compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title in 
Canada. That chapter advocates for a legislative framework that will set out the principles for the 
                                                          
170 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 372. 
171 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3) [2016] FCA 900 at para 197; Northern Territory of Australia v 
Griffiths [2017] FCAFC 106. 
172 The examination of the nature of native title in Australia and Malaysia shows similarities between their native land 
rights and Aboriginal title in Canada.   
173 The preliminary research before the decision to restrict the comparison to Australia and Malaysia explored other 
jurisdictions like New Zealand, the United States of America, South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. I found the framework 
in Australia and Malaysia more helpful as some of the principles applied in those jurisdiction answers some of the 
complex questions about determination of compensation in the context of my contentions more than other 
jurisdictions.      
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determination of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title. Further, it proposes principles 
that should be the content of such legislation.  
 
Apart from the proposal for legislative action, some of the mechanisms set out in that chapter 
portray principles that may be persuasive authorities to the courts in the determination of 
compensation. The core of the principles proposed in that chapter is the adoption of a bifurcated 
approach of calculation of compensation. This mechanism for calculation of compensation is 
drawn from the approach adopted by the Federal Court of Australia in Griffiths while applying the 
provisions of NTA. It entails the separate calculation of the economic and non-economic losses 
that may be occasioned by the infringement of Aboriginal title. I argue that the adoption of this 
approach separates the incalculable component of the value of Aboriginal title from the calculable 
component. The danger of a holistic measurement of the value of the infringed rights and interests 
in land subject to Aboriginal title is that the rights and interest become wholly incalculable. This 
shall be explored further in that chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPLES FOR THE 
DETERMINATION OF COMPENSATION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF ABORIGINAL 
TITLE IN CANADA. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter shows that infringements of Aboriginal title are compensable. This implies 
that compensation may be important to questions of justification of infringement of Aboriginal 
title.174 Equally, in cases of unjustified infringements, compensation may be an appropriate remedy 
to recompense for the wrong done to an Aboriginal group whose interest in land has been infringed.  
The appropriateness of compensation either as an element for justifying an infringement or as a 
remedy for unjustified infringement is highly dependent on the principles relied upon for 
determination of same.  The actions of the Crown that may constitute an infringement vary. 
However, it may come in the form of expropriation and grants of tenures by the Crown that is 
inconsistent with continuing Aboriginal interests. Such tenures might be in the form of a fee simple 
grant to a third party, a grant of a lease, license or permit.   
 
It has long been held by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) that as far as the relationship between 
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is concerned, the principle that should be used to measure and 
regulate the action, decision, omission, and conduct of the government with respect to the rights 
of Aboriginal peoples is the honour of the Crown.175 Accordingly, the target for fair compensation 
upon an infringement of Aboriginal title is to meet the honour of the Crown.176 This broad 
measurement is uncertain and may mean many things in different circumstances. Hence, the real 
complication is to decipher the principles to be relied upon in order for compensation to fulfill the 
underlying aims of remedies in practical circumstances where an Aboriginal title land is infringed. 
 
Canada has not developed a legislative scheme that formally addresses the issue of compensation, 
and no case law has formally examined the principle for determination of compensation with 
                                                          
174 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 169. 
175 J. Timothy S. McCabe, The Honour of the Crown and its Fiduciary Duties to Aboriginal Peoples (Ontario: 
LewixNexis, 2008) at 53.  
176 Kindly see the introductory section of chapter one of this work where the honour of the crown is briefly explored 
as the standard of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title. 
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respect to Aboriginal title. However, it will be wrong to say that Canada is totally bereft of such 
principles. These principles may be deduced from different legislative instruments and case laws. 
The adequacy of these principles is entirely a different question altogether which will ultimately 
be addressed in a later part of this thesis. 
 
Further to the above, the discussion in this chapter focuses on the doctrinal analysis of the existing 
principles for the determination of compensation where Aboriginal title is infringed. These 
principles can be deduced from several sources in Canada. Such sources include the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, Indian Act, Expropriation Act, case laws, modern treaties and other 
legislative instruments. Some of the sources discussed in this chapter are not binding on cases of 
infringement of Aboriginal title, but they may be persuasive to the courts while determining 
compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title. 
 
This chapter finds that the focal point for the determination of compensation is the fiduciary 
obligation owed to Aboriginal peoples by the Crown. The attempt has been to balance the interest 
of Aboriginal peoples with that of the Crown and other societal perspectives. However, in practical 
terms, the challenge has been to find that balance. Thus, as the compensation principles that can 
be gleaned from these sources are examined, insight is also given on how to attain the desired 
balance the sources tend to address. 
 
2.2 Royal Proclamation of 1763 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (the Proclamation) which was issued by King George III of Great 
Britain was the Crown’s formal attempt to recognize Indian interest in their land.177 It has initially 
been thought that the source of Aboriginal title was the Proclamation.178 However, it is now settled 
that the document affirms the existence of Aboriginal title, but it does not create it.179 Aboriginal 
title exists independently of the Proclamation as it arises from the occupation of land by Aboriginal 
peoples before the establishment of European sovereignty in Canada.180 What did the 
Proclamation do? Although it has been established that the Proclamation is not the source of 
                                                          
177 Isaac, Aboriginal Title, supra note 93 at 4. 
178 St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen (1888), 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 1.  
179 Ibid at 5. See also Delgamuukw, supra, note 2 at para 114. 
180 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 114. 
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Aboriginal title, its implication on the Aboriginal peoples has received diverse comments over the 
years.  
 
Some scholars contend that the Proclamation gives the Aboriginal peoples a right to self-
government.181 On the other hand, other scholars argue that while the Proclamation gives 
Aboriginal peoples some inherent rights, there is no such basis in the document for their self-
government.182 The latter view appears to be the position of the SCC in R. v. Sparrow183 where it 
was held that the Proclamation bears witness that the sovereignty, legislative power and 
underlying title to lands is vested in the Crown.184 Thus, the Proclamation may be said not to 
strictly recognize Aboriginal title as it was before the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty. This is 
because notwithstanding that it stands as protection for Aboriginal title, the Crown still has an 
underlying title.  
 
The underlying title of the Crown does not negate customary native systems of land use; however, 
it comes with some restrictions as Aboriginal peoples cannot cede their territory to any other state 
or person (s) other than the Crown.185 The underlying title of the Crown extends to the right of the 
Crown to acquire lands by purchase or in appropriate circumstances by justified infringments. If 
the Crown acquires Aboriginal title lands, the protection given by the Proclamation ordinarily 
entitles the Aboriginal group affected to just compensation.186 The excerpt of the Proclamation 
usually quoted as the basis of compensation upon acquisition of an Aboriginal title by the Crown 
is as follows: 
 
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security 
of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are 
connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed 
in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having 
                                                          
181 John Borrows, “Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation” 
(1994) 28:1 UBC Law Review 1 at 25. 
182 Thomas Isaac, “Discarding the Rose-Coloured Glasses: A Commentary on Asch and MacKlem” (1992) 30:2 
Alberta Law Review 708 at 711. 
183 R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Canadian Bar Review 727 at 742. 
186 Ibid at 752. 
 35 
 
been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them or any of them, as their 
Hunting Grounds…if at any Time any of the Said Indians should be inclined to 
dispose of the said Lands, the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, 
at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be held for that Purpose 
by the Governor or Commander in Chief of our Colony…187   
 
The above excerpt affirms that Aboriginal title is a valuable interest in land and can be acquired 
by purchase.188 Brian Slattery contends that the same excerpt is a strong basis for just compensation 
if an Aboriginal title is expropriated by the Crown where parties fail to reach a mutually agreed 
price for the acquisition.189Also, a critical interpretation of the excerpt may show underlying 
protection that may be the basis for compensation for other types of infringements of Aboriginal 
title that are not necessarily expropriation. It provides that Indians (Aboriginal peoples) “should 
not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, 
not having been ceded to or purchased by Us.”190 Acts of infringements like grants of leases, 
permits, or licenses of native lands not purchased or ceded to the Crown should ordinarily qualify 
as molestation or disturbance, and same under the common law also qualifies as interference that 
is ordinarily compensable. The Proclamation does not only protect Aboriginal peoples from third 
parties; it is also a protection from unjustifiable interference of the Crown. 
 
In Delgamuukw the SCC held that the above excerpt of the Proclamation contemplates 
compensation in cases of expropriation of Aboriginal title.191 If one can imply compensation for 
expropriation from that excerpt; one can also imply compensation for grants by the Crown that 
interferes with the peaceable enjoyment of Aboriginal title. Further, it is safe to conclude that the 
Proclamation is a basis for the compensation for any form of interference, action or decision of 
the Crown that molests or disturbs the use and enjoyment of Aboriginal title. It is pertinent to state 
at this juncture that the Proclamation is not an extinct historical document. It has been held to be 
                                                          
187 Royal Proclamation 1763. See also Slattery, supra note 185 at 751-752. 
188 Slattery, supra note 185 at 752. 
189 Ibid at 752. 
190 Royal Proclamation 1763. 
191 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 203. 
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“an Executive order having the force of law and effect of an Act of Parliament.”192 More so, it 
expressly recognized in section 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms.193 
 
That said, the missing piece appears to be the principles that should be considered in the valuation 
of fair compensation for interference with the use and enjoyment of Aboriginal title. One possible 
argument one could make is that even though the Proclamation protects Aboriginal title, the 
compensation implicit in the protection given is not necessarily an “Aboriginal land right” and 
thus should be governed by the principles of compensation at common law for infringements on 
the property by the Crown.194 Therefore, the valuation of compensation should follow the 
principles tenable at common law for infringement of real property rights. It may not absolutely 
be discredited that the presumption of compensation from the Proclamation is a presumption 
rooted in common law, however, at common law also; the right to compensation is not a right that 
emerges on its own.  
 
Remedies at common law are products of rights. This simply explains why the principles 
considered for infringement of contractual rights are different from those considered for breach of 
tortuous rights. As the rights are different, the interests sought to be protected consequently 
become different, and these inform the choice and quantum of remedies. As Aboriginal title and 
fee simple give different kinds of rights to the holders, the factors to be considered for their 
compensation upon infringement should ordinarily be different even at common law.  This seems 
to be the position of the SCC where Lamer CJ held that “…the Proclamation contemplated that 
[A]boriginal peoples would be compensated for the surrender of their lands…It must be 
emphasized, nonetheless, that fair compensation in the present context is not equated with the price 
of a fee simple.  Rather, compensation must be viewed in terms of the right and in keeping with 
the honour of the Crown.”195  
 
                                                          
192 Calder and others v. Attorney-General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313 at 352. See also Isaac, Aboriginal 
Title, supra note 93 at 4. 
193 Isaac, Aboriginal Title, supra note 93 at 4. See also Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. 
194 Brian Slattery, “The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (1982) 8 Queen's Law Journal 232 
at 273. 
195 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 203 (Emphasis added). 
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Since the Proclamation leaves much to be presumed as regards the scope and content of its 
protection, the most convenient place to start in the determination of compensation for 
infringements pursuant to the Proclamation is to ascertain the interest that the document seeks to 
protect. The interests sought to be protected when viewed through the lens of rights are the 
Aboriginal interests in their territory and the underlying interest of the Crown to the title.  On the 
other hand, when viewed through the lens of remedy, the interest sought to be protected could be 
said to be a creation of common law and not necessarily an Aboriginal right: a presumption that 
that for every right that is breached, there must be a remedy.  
 
Which right is breached here? The right that is infringed is the Aboriginal interest in their land, 
which is not a product of common law. Since rights and remedies are intrinsically linked, the 
choice and quantum of remedy should reflect the particular nature of the right sought to be 
protected. In this particular context, the quantum of compensation should meet the honour of the 
Crown. In R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard196 the SCC held that to uphold the honour of the Crown 
in consideration of issues arising from Aboriginal title, both the Aboriginal perspective and the 
common law perspective needs to be considered.197 “Aboriginal perspective” in this context is 
simply the particular interest of the Aboriginal group involved which is deducible from the 
particular nature of the Aboriginal title. Accordingly, compensation for infringement of 
Aboriginal title should be of such value that will remedy the interest sought to be protected by the 
Proclamation. Hence, although the presumption of compensation may be said to be a creation of 
common law, its measure is dependent on the right protected. Therefore a synergy of Aboriginal 
perspective and the common law perspective may give birth to a sui generis principle of 
compensation.     
 
Indigenous legal traditions may have principles concerning compensation which may be different 
from common law principles of compensation.198 However, this research does not investigate 
                                                          
196 R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard [2005] SCC 43. 
197 Ibid at para 46. 
198 For instance, see Timothy L. McDaniels & William Trousdale, “Resource Compensation and Negotiation Support 
in an Aboriginal Context: Using Community-Based Multi-Attribute Analysis to Evaluate Non-Market Losses” 
Timothy L. McDaniels & William Trousdale through the use of a case study in Métis settlements in Alberta illustrate 
how  “a multi-attribute value assessment” is the basis for characterizing the significance of resource damages that 
affect the settlements when viewed from the settlements’ perspectives. Their study was conducted within a series of 
group workshops involving a panel of community representatives. Although their research does not provide the exact 
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indigenous patterns of compensation. The work proposes a sui generis mechanism of 
compensation that is expected to balance the interests of Aboriginal peoples with that of the Crown 
and other societal perspectives. 
 
At common law, the focus on the determination of damages for an infringement of real property 
is the loss of the victim of wrong and not necessarily the gain of the infringer.199 Consequently, in 
extreme cases of loss of property, the courts look at the value of the land to the owner.200 This 
reflects the principle of restitution in integrum. Hence, the interest sought to be protected by the 
Proclamation through the lens of remedy (being a product of common law) may be said to be 
reliance interest. However, protection of reliance interest for a fee simple land and that of an 
Aboriginal title may have different outcomes because the nature of the rights of both land interests 
is different. Compensation in the two cases would reflect the rights protected. 
 
Having shown the interest sought to be protected by the Proclamation in the lens of remedy which 
is a creation of common law, the next task is to decipher how to determine the actual measure of 
compensation due to an Aboriginal group whose interest in their land is infringed. Unfortunately, 
the Proclamation is silent on this.  The best clue to this in my view (for now) can be found in 
Delgamuukw where the SCC held that “the amount of compensation payable will vary with the 
nature of the particular [A]boriginal title affected and with the nature and severity of the 
infringement and the extent to which [A]boriginal interests were accommodated”.201 These 
variabilities outlined by the SCC will be considered at a later part of this Chapter. 
 
 
                                                          
mechanism for compensation in the perspective of the Métis settlements, they concluded that the communities seek 
to protect four fundamental values which in the view of the communities, remedies should reflect: “traditional values 
(traditional knowledge and skills, traditional sites, spiritual values); bush values (all plants especially berries, all 
wildlife,  especially moose, respect for the land); community values (health and safety; community cohesion); 
economic values (financial income to the settlement as part of the new Métis settlements legislation payments related 
to historical rents).” It is important to state that the research of McDaniels & Trousdale exists within one particular 
indigenous context of Métis settlements in Alberta. Also, the scholars are outsiders to the tradition seeking to decipher 
the basis for compensation using indigenous legal tradition and there may be more work to be done on the point by 
indigenous scholars.  
199 Cassels & Adjin-Tettey, supra note 49 at 90. 
200 Isaac, Aboriginal Title, supra note 93 at 48. See also Wickham Holdings Ltd. V. Brooke House Motors [1967] 1 
WLR 295. 
201 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at 169. 
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2.3 Indian Act, RSC 1985202 
An appraisal of the extant legal principles for the determination of compensation for infringement 
of Aboriginal title may not be complete without a survey of some relevant provisions of the Indian 
Act203 that bear on compensation for infringement of Indian reserves. The implications of some of 
these provisions have received judicial interpretation. This section shall first show the relationship 
between Indian reserves and Aboriginal title and thereafter, examine the judicial approach to 
compensation upon infringement of an Indian Reserve. 
 
The Indian Act regulates “Indian Territories.” These territories for the purpose of the Indian Act 
may be broadly categorized into two: Reserve Lands and Surrendered Lands.204While a Reserve 
Land means a tract of land set apart by the Crown for the use and benefit of a particular Indian 
band, a Surrendered Land means an Indian Reserve that has been released or surrendered to the 
Crown by the Indian band whose use and benefit it is set apart.205 Attempts have been made to 
classify Indian Reserves into different categories. One of such attempts is the division of Indian 
Reserves into Aboriginal Reserves and Granted Reserves.206 The former is said to be traceable “to 
[A]boriginal lands in the Indian Territories,” which derive their form from Aboriginal title.207 On 
the other hand, the latter are derived from statutory provisions or Crown grant and not from 
Aboriginal title.208 
 
It is submitted however that the sub-classification of Indian Reserve into Aboriginal Reserves and 
General Reserves may not be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining the interest or rights of a 
particular Indian band in their Reserve. This is because it has long been held by the SCC that Indian 
                                                          
202 The examination of the Indian Act is very essential as it regulates Indian reserves. The Act has provisions that 
touch upon the compensation for infringements of the rights and interests of Indian bands in their reserve. This Act 
gave a strong legal basis for the decision of the SCC in Guerin v. The Queen which is to the effect that the mechanism 
for the determination of compensation for the infringement Indian reserves should employ the fiduciary principles for 
determination of compensation where a fiduciary breaches his duties. For this See Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 
R.C.S. 335 at 357 and ss 18, 23, 25, 35, 50 and 65 Indian Act. See also Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001] 
3 S.C.R. 746, 2001 SCC 85; Semiahmoo Indian Band v. Canada, [1998] 1 FC 3, 1997 CanLII 6347(FCA). 
203 Indian Act, RSC 1985. 
204 Ibid at s 2. 
205 Ibid at s 2. 
206 Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 185 at 770. 
207 Ibid at 770. 
208 Ibid at 770. 
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reserves flow from Aboriginal title.209 This is deducible from the judgment of Dickson J in Guerin 
where he held as follows: “It does not matter, in my opinion, that the present case is concerned 
with the interest of an Indian band in a reserve rather than with unrecognized [A]boriginal title in 
traditional tribal lands. The Indian interest in the land is the same in both cases…”210 
 
The Indian Act has several provisions that bear on the compensation for Indian bands whose 
interest in their reserve has been breached, surrendered, taken, used, or in circumstances where 
they are removed from their reserve.211 First of these provisions and perhaps the one that has 
received the most attention is Section 18 (1) of the Act. Section 18 (1) of the Act provides as 
follows: 
 
Subject to this Act, reserves are held by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of 
the respective bands for which they were set apart, and subject to this Act and 
to the terms of any treaty or surrender, the Governor in Council may determine 
whether any purpose for which lands in a reserve are used or are to be used is 
for the use and benefit of the band. 
 
The above suggests that the Crown has broad discretion in dealing with a surrendered reserve land; 
however, the implication of the section has been streamlined in Guerin.212 Before I proceed to 
examine Guerin, it is pertinent to make two important observations about this provision. First is 
that the provision shows the two categories of interests on an Indian reserve: The underlying title 
of the Crown and the beneficial interest of the Indian band to which the land was reserved. This 
reflects the two interests in the Proclamation when viewed through the lens of rights.  
 
The second vital observation to be made about the provision is that it neither expressly mentions 
compensation nor the method for the measurement of compensation in dealing with the land or 
upon breach of the section. It is pertinent to state however that sub-section (2) of the provision 
                                                          
209 Ibid at 771. See also Guerin, supra note 123 at 379. 
210 Guerin, supra note 123 at 379. See also Attorney-General for Quebec v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1921] 
1 A.C. 401, at pp. 410-411. 
211 Indian Act, supra note 203 at ss 18, 23, 25, 35, 50 and 65. 
212 Guerin, supra note 123 at 336. 
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alludes to compensation for a special case whereby upon surrender of an Indian reserve for a 
specified Indian project, “an individual Indian” was entitled to the possession of those lands.213 
Hence, such compensation is to recompense a particular individual who would suffer a peculiar 
disadvantage (because of the deprivation of his entitlement to possess) for a project that will be 
beneficial to all the members of the band. Apart from that special case, Section 18 of the Act does 
not “expressly” provide for compensation. Again this is akin to the Proclamation which gives a 
right and does not expressly provide for compensation.  
 
In Guerin, an Indian band surrendered approximately 162 acres of their reserve lands to the Crown 
for lease to a golf club. However, the terms obtained by the Crown were much less favourable than 
those approved by the Band at the surrender meeting.214 Consequently, the band filed the action 
against the Crown for breach of trust/ fiduciary obligation under Section 18 (1) of the Indian Act. 
The trial judge found the Crown liable for breach of trust and awarded damages to the Band on the 
basis of loss of income (valued as of the date of the trial).215 The Crown’s appeal to the Federal 
Court of Appeal was allowed, and the Band’s cross-appeal seeking more damages was 
consequently dismissed. The Band further appealed to the SCC. The two principal questions that 
came up before the SCC (amongst other issues) are: what is the implication of Section 18 of the 
Indian Act and the principles for the measurement of damages for the breach of the duty owed the 
Indian band for their loss of income. 
 
As regards the implication of section 18, Wilson J. held that although the section does not expressly 
create a fiduciary obligation, such obligation has its roots in the Aboriginal title.216 Thus, Indian 
bands have a beneficial interest in their reserves, and the Crown has a responsibility to protect that 
interest.217 He further held that section 18 is a statutory acknowledgment of that obligation and 
does not necessarily create it. The SCC justices seem to agree on the existence of a fiduciary 
obligation upon the Crown in dealing with the reserve of an Indian band which is traceable to 
Aboriginal title.  However, they seem to differ on the particular type of fiduciary obligation 
                                                          
213 Indian Act, supra note 203 at sections 18 (2). 
214 Guerin, supra note 123 at 335. 
215 Ibid at 335. 
216 Ibid at 349. See also Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313. 
217 Ibid at 349. 
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created. Wilson J. held that in that particular case, the fiduciary obligation of the Crown became 
an express trust upon surrender.218 Dickson J., on the other hand, held that although the Crown 
owes the Indian band an enforceable duty rooted to Aboriginal title, the Crown’s obligation to the 
Band cannot be called trust.219 Rather, he held that the fiduciary obligation owed to the Indians is 
sui generis.220 Finally, Estey J. held that the fiduciary relationship created in that case was a simply 
agency.221 
 
The nature of the duty owed the Band is crucial to the quantum of damages. This is because the 
type of fiduciary relationship created ordinarily determines the obligation owed by the Crown 
which equally determines the principles for the determination of damages upon breach of the 
obligation. For the measure of damages, Wilson J. did not find it difficult to streamline the 
principles for the determination of same having held that the fiduciary relationship, in that case, 
was an express trust. Consequently, the principles for the valuation of damages for breach of trust 
should hold sway.222  Generally, in property trust relationships, the measure of damages for breach 
of trust is the actual loss caused to the trust estate.223 In Guerin, one would have expected the 
valuation of damages to be the difference in value between the lease as expected by the Band and 
as obtained from the golf club. On the contrary, the trial court having been satisfied by witness 
testimony that the golf club would not have entered the lease in the terms approved by the Band 
declined to use that approach.224 Thus, the learned trial judge awarded a global assessment of $10 
Million to the Band. He did this considering the amount of loss that would have been suffered by 
the Band on the basis that a golf course lease would probably not have been entered.225   
 
The obvious problem with the assessment method of the trial court was that it comfortably assessed 
the loss of the Band on speculation of what they might have suffered in a hypothetical situation 
rather than what they actually suffered in reality. Perhaps, the learned trial judge did not appreciate 
                                                          
218 Ibid at 355. 
219 Ibid at 375. 
220 Ibid at 388. 
221 Ibid at 391. 
222 Ibid at 357. 
223 Fales v. Canada Permanent Trust Co. [1977] 2 SCR 302 at 320. See also David Hayton, Paul Matthews and Charles 
Mitchell, Underhill and Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees, 18th ed. (London: LexisNexis, 2010) at 1113. 
224 Guerin, supra note 123 at 357. 
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the fact that the loss of the Band was directly linked to their expectation which was aroused as a 
result of the fiduciary relationship with the Crown and the particular circumstance of the surrender. 
In that particular situation, the Band surrendered their land to the Crown on specified terms which 
the Crown did not follow. The approach of the trial court also seems to pay attention to the 
principles of causation, remoteness, and foreseeability. These principles are necessary for the 
determination of damages in tort and contract but not for breach of trust.226 The determination of 
damages in cases of breach of trust measures actual loss caused to the trust estate and do not inquire 
about whether the loss flows from the breach.227 
 
The SCC was urged by the Band to review the damages. Wilson J. held that the principle for 
determination of damages in trust and that of contract are different as there is no need to prove 
causation and foreseeability.228 Also, she relied on English and Australian cases to support her  
position.229 However, she still found no error in principle in approaching the damages “on the basis 
of lost opportunity for residential development.”230 Why base damages on a hypothetical 
circumstance of residential purposes whereby the loss of the Band can be gleaned from their 
expectation as clearly communicated to the Crown upon surrender? Dickson J. who earlier found 
that the surrender does not amount to trust, further held that the measurement of damages should 
be akin to that of trusts. He also found no error in the approach adopted by the trial court.231 Finally, 
Estey J. adopted the same approach even though he held that the surrender gave rise to simple 
agency and not trust. 
 
Guerin recognizes the general fiduciary obligation the Crown owes Indian bands concerning their 
reserves. Same transcends the Proclamation and receives its source from the nature of Aboriginal 
title.  The type of fiduciary relationship now depends on the nature of a particular relationship, 
treaty, agreement, transaction or circumstances of surrender between the Crown and the Band. The 
different kinds of fiduciary relationships that can arise from section 18 of the Act may vary, 
depending on the circumstance of the case and expectation created by the Crown. However, the 
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case leaves much to be desired where it comes to the principles for the determination of 
compensation.  
 
Generally, where there is a breach of fiduciary duty, the principles for the determination of the 
choice and quantum of remedies depend on the type of the fiduciary relationship and the 
circumstances of that case. The general options available may be the implementation of a 
constructive trust, monetary restitution, an award of equitable damages or an accounting for profits 
(or a combination thereof).232 For instance, where a fiduciary makes a wrongful gain as a result of 
his position, the victim of wrong may claim for restitutionary remedies, even where he suffers no 
loss.233  
 
However, breach of property trust is ordinarily compensable on the basis of the actual loss caused 
to the trust estate even where the trustee makes no profit.234 It has already been emphasized that 
there is no need to show a causal link between the breach and the loss. The trust estate just need to 
prove that there was a trust relationship, a breach of that duty and a loss. In my view, the Band in 
Guerin established this, and the SCC appears to have agreed with them. However, they did not 
apply the principles that they espoused. The error came in the evaluation of a hypothetical loss as 
opposed to an actual loss. In this particular relationship, the actual loss of the Indian band is 
decipherable from the particular expectation created by the Crown’s promise which was breached. 
Hence, instances where there is an express or implied promise by the Crown which creates an 
expectation, compensation should ordinarily aim to recompense the loss of expectation because 
therein lies the actual loss.  
 
Other instances of infringements may arise without the Crown specifically creating an expectation. 
A good instance may be cases of expropriation and grants of tenures in a reserve by the Crown 
that are inconsistent with continuing Indian interests without consultation or consent. In such a 
case, a good starting point for the valuation of loss in monetary terms is the determination of the 
value of the rights and interests infringed. This is because as has earlier been contended in the 
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previous chapter, compensation for the loss should as far as money can go reflect the value of the 
loss. There is little specific literature in Canada with respect to the appropriate approach for the 
valuation of an Indian reserve. However, the SCC has given an insight on what the proper 
approaches might be in the case of Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass.235 It is important to briefly 
comment on this case before proceeding to other provisions of the Indian Act that bear on 
compensation. 
 
In Musqueam Indian Band, the SCC was invited to interpret the meaning of “the current land 
value” on a lease agreement. However, their interpretation touches upon the broader context of the 
valuation of an Indian reserve.236 In that case, the Crown entered a 99 years lease agreement with 
a company further to the surrender of an Indian reserve by the Musqueam Indian Band.237 Pursuant 
to the agreement, the rent payable for the first 30 years was specified. But there was a rent review 
clause for every subsequent 20 years. According to the agreement, the rent payable upon review 
shall be the fair rent for the land representing 6 percent of the “current land value.”238 
 
The trial court held that the current value of land is the hypothetical fee simple value of land 
discounted by 50 percent to take into consideration the long-term leasehold interest and Indian 
reserve features.239 The Federal Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and held 
that the current land value is the fee simple value without a 50 percent deduction on account of 
Indian reserve features.240 The leaseholders appealed to the SCC. The SCC justices were divided 
in their judgement and reasonings. However, a majority of the SCC upheld the decision of the trial 
court. Gonthier, Major, Binnie and LeBel JJ conceded that there is nothing like the “fee simple 
value of an Indian reserve”, but held that such term could be used hypothetically for the purpose 
of rent review calculation.241 They held that since the legal restrictions on land use affect the 
                                                          
235 See Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 633.  
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market value of a freehold property, the legal restrictions on an Indian reserve should ordinarily 
affect its value.242 They found that the market value of the Musqueam lands was 50 percent of the 
comparable off-reserve slots.243 
 
Bastarache J agreed with the above decision but for different reasons.244 He held that the land 
should not be treated as fee simple or valued as such. Rather the current land value should be 
calculated as leasehold land, including its value as an Indian reserve.245 He further held that “the 
relevant market here is not market for the sale of unencumbered land held at fee simple.”246  
 
McLachlin C.J. and L'Heureux-Dubé, Iacobucci and Arbour JJ., dissenting, held that the majority 
position was wrong because fee simple is inconsistent with reserve status and thus “it must be 
wrong to devalue fee simple for factors related to reserve status.”247 However, they held that in the 
particular context of the agreement, the parties intended that the “current land value generally 
means fee simple value, and common industry practice is to value land by assessing what land 
would be worth on the open market.”248 Consequently, they held that no discount should be applied 
merely because an Indian reserve is the subject of the land.249 
 
The concern here should not be the final figures arrived at by the different decisions of the SCC in 
that case. In my view, the reasoning behind the final decision matters the most.250 This is why I 
will dwell more on the reasoning of Bastarache J. Although he did not seem to expound on what 
the “relevant market” for an Indian reserve might be, his reasoning seems to capture the appropriate 
approach to be adopted for the valuation of the economic dimension of lands subject to Aboriginal 
title. The majority contemplates a comparison of two dissimilar variables and superimposing the 
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characteristics of one variable over the other. They compared an Indian reserve with fee simple 
and arrived at the value of the former by discounting from the value of the latter. These are two 
different types of land interests with different rights and restrictions. It might be good to compare 
indigenous land rights with fee simple if the comparison is made in order to draw from the 
experiences in fee simple for adaptation to the sui generis nature of indigenous land rights. 
Anything less would mean admitting only in principle that indigenous land rights are sui generis 
but denying same upon practical applications. I shall demonstrate later in this chapter in the 
discussion of principles for determination of compensation in fee simple expropriation cases how 
fee simple principles applied for valuation compensation upon expropriation of fee simple might 
be adapted to the sui generis nature of Aboriginal title.  
 
Bastarache J’s approach, although inchoate is a better view because at least it sets the framework 
that Indian reserves exist in a different market which should be taken into consideration in the 
valuation. His opinion is respectfully incomplete because he leaves no clue on where the market 
is or the principles applied in the market.  These are some of the points I will expand in the later 
part of this chapter under the discussion of expropriation principles. 
 
That said, the Indian Act has other provisions that bear on compensation and the principles for 
determining the quantum. Where those sections come up for interpretation, one should always bear 
in mind that Guerin is an authority that the basis of the relationship between Crown and the Indian 
bands concerning their reserves is that of a fiduciary which is traceable to the nature of Aboriginal 
title. Sparrow251 has bound the fiduciary obligation of the Crown to Section 35 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982.252 This should always be the underlying principle for the evaluation of compensation in 
the context of Aboriginal title. Measurement of compensation from the lens of a fiduciary 
relationship will take into consideration the actual loss of the Band which may vary depending on 
the peculiarities of the case.  
 
Section 35 of the Indian Act empowers the Crown to take or use an Indian reserve for public 
purposes compulsorily. It also provides that upon the compulsory acquisition or use, compensation 
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is payable to a Receiver General for the benefit of the Band.253 Even though the section is silent 
about the principles to be considered for the determination of compensation, by Guerin, it may not 
strictly follow the principles of compensation for expropriation of a fee simple. Of course, section 
35 of the Indian Act may not give rise to a trust or agency relationship as section 18 may allow. 
However, the fiduciary obligation of the Crown in dealing with an Indian reserve is intrinsic in the 
reserve. It is an underlying obligation of the Crown, and it should be the foundation upon which 
compensation for compulsory use or acquisition should be based.  
 
In Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town)254 the Attorney General argued that the fiduciary 
obligations expounded in Guerin only apply to surrender and not expropriation of Indian reserve 
land.255 However, the SCC per McLachlin C.J. disagreed with that contention and held that in the 
event of expropriation of an Indian reserve for a public purpose under Section 35 of the Indian 
Act, the Crown owes the affected Band a fiduciary obligation, to ensure a minimal impairment of 
their use and enjoyment of land.256 Although the quantum of compensation was not an issue, in 
that case, one can infer that the same fiduciary obligation owed during surrender holds sway during 
expropriation. Accordingly, the principle of compensation employed in Guerin should be applied 
in expropriation cases. Basing compensation on fiduciary principles should ordinarily consider the 
Indian perspectives. Their perspectives in any particular circumstance are deducible from their 
interest in that circumstance. For instance, in Guerin, the perspective of the Band is clearly seen 
through the expectation created by the Crown. In line with this approach, La Forest J. while 
addressing the issue of compensation held that “…the [A]boriginal peoples must not be forgotten 
in this equation.  Their legal right to occupy and possess certain lands…mandates basic fairness 
commensurate with the honour and good faith of the Crown.”257  
 
The SCC seems to suggest in Sparrow that in all circumstances, the relationship between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples is trust-like just as held by Dickson J. in Guerin.258 Unlike in 
Guerin, the SCC in Sparrow did not distinguish the peculiar circumstances a trust-like relationship 
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could arise. Pursuant to Sparrow, one could argue that in any given circumstance of infringement, 
the principles for determination of compensation should strictly follow the principles for 
determination of compensation in trust. However, it is difficult to see characteristics of trust in 
expropriation cases where an Aboriginal community did not surrender their land. Or does “trust-
like” in the context of Sparrow mean a sui generis kind of trust that is presumed in any situation 
due to the nature of an Aboriginal title? These are questions I may not have the answers. However, 
one principle is clear from these jurisprudences: the relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples is a fiduciary one.  
 
The SCC in Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)259 makes a distinction 
between a general fiduciary relationship and the accrual of a fiduciary obligation. In that case, it 
was held that generally the relationship between the Métis and the Crown is fiduciary in 
nature.260  However, not all dealings between the Métis and the Crown in a fiduciary relationship 
are governed by fiduciary obligations.261 Consequently, the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown may not automatically impose a fiduciary obligation 
on the Crown in all the dealings between the parties.  
 
In that case, the Métis sought a declaration that in implementing the Manitoba Act, 1870, the 
federal Crown breached fiduciary obligations owed to the Métis. The court held that “although the 
Crown undertook discretionary control of the administration of the land grants under ss. 31 and 32 
of the Manitoba Act, the Métis are Aboriginal, and they had an interest in the land, the first test for 
fiduciary duty is not made out because neither the words of s. 31 nor the evidence establish a 
pre-existing communal Aboriginal interest held by the Métis.”262 
 
A clear instance where the fiduciary obligation of the Crown will arise is where there is a specific 
or cognizable Aboriginal interest and there is an undertaking of discretionary control as in 
Guerin.263 This does not foreclose other instances. The obligation ordinarily arises when the Crown 
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assumes a sufficient amount of discretion over a cognizable Aboriginal interest.264  Such instances 
should include expropriation and grants of tenures by the Crown that are inconsistent with 
continuing and cognizable Aboriginal interests in land. 
 
Having determined that the relationship between an Aboriginal community and the Crown as 
regards an Aboriginal title is that of a fiduciary, it is now pertinent to examine in a Canadian 
context how an Aboriginal perspective might be considered alongside the underlying interest of 
the Crown in the valuation of compensation. This may be seen in the four variabilities set out in 
Delgamuukw. 
 
2.4 Delgamuukw: “Variabilities” that Determine Compensation for Infringement of 
Aboriginal Title. 
Compensation will always depend on the nature of a breach, the nature of the relationship between 
the infringer and the victim of wrong, the degree of infringement and other factors that may in 
certain circumstances mitigate the liability of the infringer. Thus, absolute certainty in the field of 
compensation may be impossible. The best approach towards certainty as regards the principles 
for the determination of compensation seems to be to take note of the factors that may vary in 
different cases of compensation and design an approach that is malleable to those different 
circumstances and can be used in determining compensation as cases of breach arise. 
  
Further to the above and in application to infringement of Aboriginal title, Lamer CJ held that 
“[t]he amount of compensation payable will vary with the nature of the particular [A]boriginal title 
affected and with the nature and severity of the infringement and the extent to which [A]boriginal 
interests were accommodated.”265 The SCC did not however analyze these factors and their role 
in the determination of compensation. Being the best guidance so far by the SCC as regards the 
principles for determination of compensation, it is important to put some flesh to these factors to 
see the possible implications they might have. 
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These factors should ordinarily determine the quantum of compensation. Hence, an insight into 
the possible implications of these factors will show how the quantum of compensation may vary 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. These factors may also reflect the degree of 
loss caused by an infringement which the compensation seeks to remedy. For instance, the nature 
of an Aboriginal title land encompasses the particular components of the land and the value of 
those components which should invariably determine the quantum of compensation to remedy the 
loss caused to those components.   The degree of infringement reflects the extent of harm done to 
the components of the land which also shows the diminished value or losses occasioned by the 
infringement. The extent of accommodation of Aboriginal interest shows the steps taken by the 
Crown to recompense for their act or omission which may have met some of the underlying aims 
of compensation. An increase in the extent of accommodation should ordinarily reduce the loss of 
an Aboriginal group affected, which consequently reduces the quantum of compensation.  
 
This section further explores these factors to examine the possible implications they might have in 
the determination of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title.  
 
2.4.1 Nature of Aboriginal Title  
The nature of Aboriginal title can be viewed through two broad perspectives:  The general nature 
of an Aboriginal title and the particular nature of Aboriginal title. The general sui generis nature 
of Aboriginal title has been examined in chapter one. This applies to all Aboriginal title lands, 
irrespective of location, size, and content.   It is based on the general nature of Aboriginal title that 
the Crown has been held to be a fiduciary and therefore the measurement of the award of 
compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title should generally follow fiduciary principles.266 
It is also based on the general nature of Aboriginal title that the usual (fee simple) expropriation 
principles may not be exclusively relied upon in the valuation of compensation for infringement 
of Aboriginal title. The defense to this submission is seen in Delgamuukw where La Forest J 
emphasized that fair compensation for Aboriginal title is not to be equated with the price of a fee 
simple.267 
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It may be argued that the nature of Aboriginal title referred to by Lamer CJ in Delgamuukw does 
not mean the general nature of Aboriginal title. This is because, upon establishment of Aboriginal 
title, the general nature of Aboriginal title ceases to be a variable. At that point, it can be said to 
be fixed and constant. Therefore, the application of compensation principles based on fiduciary 
principles should ordinarily be the basis for all the determination of compensation upon an 
infringement of Aboriginal (as the underlying relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples as regards Aboriginal title is that of a fiduciary). Thus, it should be applied in all cases of 
infringements of Aboriginal title, and its implication will consequently be dependent on the 
variables referred to by Lamer CJ. It is important to make this distinction because some scholars 
have treated the general nature of Aboriginal title as a variable, which is arguably not what Lamer 
CJ meant.268 The general nature of Aboriginal title is the essence of the title and the foundation 
upon which all dealings with the title stands. Hence, the application of the principles drawn from 
it is not on case to case bases; rather it may be said to be constant in all dealings with Aboriginal 
title including the determination of compensation. 
 
What then did Lamer CJ mean when he mentioned the nature of Aboriginal title as a variable? He 
held specifically that “[t]he amount of compensation payable will vary with the nature of the 
particular [A]boriginal title affected…”269  Lamer CJ was referring to the particular nature of 
Aboriginal title. The particular nature of Aboriginal title signifies the peculiarities of a specific 
Aboriginal title land that makes it different from another Aboriginal title land.  Hence, the 
particular nature of Aboriginal title varies from case to case. For instance, the degree of Aboriginal 
peoples’ connection with their land may vary (but this does not affect the general nature of 
Aboriginal title).270  
 
The things that make a specific Aboriginal title different from the other need not necessarily be 
intangible and may also not necessarily be linked to the traditional use of the land. For instance, 
the Indian Oil and Gas Act271 “presumes that the Aboriginal interest in reserve land includes 
                                                          
268 Michael J. McDonald & Thomas Lutes, “Compensation after Delgamuukw: Aboriginal Title’s Inescapable 
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mineral rights.”272 Also, “on the basis of Guerin, [A]boriginal title also encompass mineral rights, 
and lands held pursuant to [A]boriginal title should be capable of exploitation in the same way, 
which is certainly not a traditional use for those lands.”273 If a certain Aboriginal title, for example, 
possesses some minerals and it is infringed for exploration/mining of the resources, the existence 
of the minerals should ordinarily be put into consideration in the calculation of compensation. This 
falls under the purview of the particular nature of Aboriginal title. Thus, depending on the 
peculiarities of a particular Aboriginal title, extraneous principles could be introduced for assessing 
compensation for the purpose of those peculiarities.  
 
For instance, the Indian Oil and Gas Regulation274 has some provisions that relate to negotiated 
compensation for exploration licenses, lease, permits, and request for entry of an Indian reserve in 
advance of surface lease.275 Under the Regulation, a prospective oil exploration licensee must 
undertake to pay to an Indian Band an amount equivalent to the compensation received by other 
Bands in the locality for similar operations conducted on similar lands.276 Also, the licensee 
undertakes to pay for any damaged caused by the exploration work.277 Also, a person who proposes 
to engage operations in Indian lands for exploration of oil has to negotiate compensation for any 
anticipated incidents of damage or nuisance.278 Compensation for damage caused in the land seems 
to bring in principles of causation which may not be ordinarily considered in cases of infringement 
of Aboriginal title because of the compensation principles in fiduciary relationships, but because 
of the particular nature of the Aboriginal title in such circumstance, the principle of causation may 
be brought in only for the purpose of determining compensation for the damage caused by the 
exploration. 
It is important to state at this juncture that the particular nature of Aboriginal title does not negate 
its underlying nature (the general nature of Aboriginal title) and the rights given therein. Thus, 
the variations in the particular nature of Aboriginal title does not affect the constant fiduciary 
obligation owed the Aboriginal peoples by the Crown. This seems to be the implication of 
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Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada where the principal issue was the surrender of mineral 
rights in an Indian reserve. The SCC held that the Indian Band might recover for losses due to the 
Crown’s breach of its fiduciary duties.279 Gonthier J further held that “…when determining the 
legal effect of dealings between [A]boriginal peoples and the Crown relating to reserve lands, the sui 
generis nature of [A]boriginal title requires courts to go beyond the usual restrictions imposed by the 
common law, in order to give effect to the true purpose of the dealings.”280 The issue in that case was 
not the measurement of damages, however from the judgement, one would only expect that fiduciary 
principles of calculation of compensation as found in Guerin (although it was strictly not followed) 
would ordinarily apply to determine the actual loss of the Indian band. 
The use of mineral rights for the illustration of the point here may actually not be the most appropriate 
choice. This is because it is not settled whether or not Aboriginal title includes mineral rights. While 
some scholars argue that the status of mineral rights on Aboriginal title lands may be uncertain, others 
challenge that position.281  That said, arguments along these lines are beyond the scope of this 
research. The mineral rights illustration is just used to explain the meaning of the particular nature of 
Aboriginal title. 
 
Factors that may constitute the particular nature of Aboriginal Title may not be exhaustive. Other 
factors that come to mind are factors like the size of the land and location. These factors should 
ordinarily contribute to the evaluation of compensation in any property infringement. Of course, the 
particular nature of Aboriginal title does not act alone in the determination of compensation. It will 
be considered hand in hand with other variabilities to be considered.282   
 
 
                                                          
279 Blueberry River Indian Band, supra note 272 at para 23. 
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2.4.2 Nature of Infringement 
Compensation may also vary depending on the particular nature of the infringement. To properly 
understand the nature of infringement of an Aboriginal title, it is important to first understand the 
general nature of the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. It has been settled 
and also emphasized in different parts of this thesis that the nature of the relationship between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples is that the Crown acts in a fiduciary capacity.283 Some cases have 
given the impression that the fiduciary capacity of the Crown gets activated upon the happening 
of an event (e.g., upon surrender of land). For instance, in Semiahmoo Indian Band v. Canada,284 
the Federal Court of Appeal held that “surrender requirement is the source of Crown’s fiduciary 
obligation.”285 This appears not to be the correct position of the law. In addressing the relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown, the SCC (per Dickson CJ and La Forest J) in Sparrow 
held as follows: 
 
The sui generis nature of Indian title, and the historic powers and responsibility 
assumed by the Crown constituted the source of such a fiduciary obligation.  In our 
opinion, Guerin, together with R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360, 
ground a general guiding principle for s. 35(1) .  That is, the Government has the 
responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to [A]boriginal peoples.  The 
relationship between the Government and [A]boriginals is trust-like, rather than 
adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must 
be defined in light of this historic relationship.286  
 
The above confirms and perhaps gives more flesh to the earlier position of the SCC in Guerin. 
Thus, contrary to the impression in Semiahmoo Indian Band and some other cases, the Crown’s 
fiduciary obligation to the Aboriginal peoples does not accrue upon the happening of a 
contingency, because the nature of the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples in 
all their dealings is that of a fiduciary. Whether or not there is a breach of that fiduciary relationship 
is what is contingent on the action of the Crown, and that is another issue altogether. Therefore, it 
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is submitted that the obligation of the Crown in dealing with Aboriginal title in whatever 
circumstance and for whatever purpose is that of a fiduciary.  
 
Furthermore, one may therefore contend that the nature of any infringement of Aboriginal title by 
the Crown is to be viewed as a breach of the Crown’s fiduciary obligation. This may not also be 
an accurate position. The accuracy of that contention would depend on whether the infringement 
is justified or not. If the infringement is unjustified, then the Crown has breached its fiduciary 
obligations. On the other hand, a justified infringement presupposes that the Crown has met its 
fiduciary obligations. One of the tests for justification of infringement is that the act of the Crown 
is consistent with the special fiduciary relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.287 
The standard for the evaluation of the fiduciary obligation of the Crown is the honour of the 
Crown.288Of course, it is trite that in keeping with the duty of honour and good faith on the Crown, 
compensation valued in line with fiduciary principles may ordinarily be required when Aboriginal 
title is infringed.289 
 
What then does the nature of infringement mean in the context it was used in Delgamuukw and 
how does it affect compensation? Nature of infringement should ordinarily encompass the nature 
of a particular relationship between the Crown and a particular Aboriginal group and the nature 
of the action, decision or omission of the Crown that results to a breach of the fiduciary obligation 
owed. Breach of fiduciary obligations may take different forms, and such may consequently make 
the appropriate remedial considerations vary.290 “An innocent and honest bit of bad advice”, “a 
failure of a timely warning” and “an action akin to deceit or theft” may all amount to a breach of 
fiduciary obligation but may result in different awards of compensation.291 The majority decision 
in Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co.292 made this distinction. In that case, a fiduciary (a 
solicitor preparing a conveyance) failed to advise clients (purchasers of property) about secrete profits 
made on a flip. When the appellants (clients) invited the court to calculate damages using the trust 
principles as expounded in Guerin, the majority of the SCC held as follows:  
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The appellants urged us to accept the manner of calculating compensation adopted by 
the courts in trust cases or situations akin to a trust, and they relied in particular on 
the Guerin case, supra.  I think the courts below were perfectly right to reject that 
proposition.  There is a sharp divide between a situation where a person has control of 
property which in the view of the court belongs to another, and one where a person is 
under a fiduciary duty to perform an obligation where equity's oncern is simply that 
the duty be performed honestly and in accordance with the undertaking the fiduciary 
has taken on…293 
 
It is a basic principle of fiduciary relationships that a fiduciary must not make secret profits.294 In 
such a situation, remedies may follow the principle of restitution of the profits made, even where 
the victim of wrong does not suffer loss.295 Therefore, the damages will be calculated on the basis 
of the gain of the infringer and not the loss of the victim of wrong. Whereas for other forms breach 
of fiduciary relationships, even where the infringer makes no gain as in Guerin but the victim of 
wrong suffers loss, the principle of calculation of damages will vary to address the particular nature 
of the breach. The principle in Guerin shows that the actual loss of the victim of wrong is the basis of 
calculation.  
 
What amounts to the actual loss of the victim will depend on the circumstances surrounding a case 
and considering other variabilities as well. For instance, in Guerin the Crown raised the hope of the 
Indian band by giving them a “particular expectation”; compensation for the actual loss of the Band 
should ordinarily consider the particular expectation of the Band, even if the expectation is more than 
the fair value of other reserves around the Band’s title.  
 
Even where a fiduciary makes no particular promise to the beneficiary, the law expects a particular 
standard of conduct from the fiduciary to put the beneficiary in a favourable position. In Whitefish 
Lake Band of Indians v. Canada296 an Indian band surrendered the timber rights of their reserves 
                                                          
293 Ibid at 578. 
294 Semiahmoo Indian Band, supra note 232 at 25. 
295 Ibid at 25. 
296 Whitefish Lake Band of Indians v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ONCA 744 (CanLII). 
 58 
 
to the Crown; however, the Crown breached its fiduciary duty by failing to obtain a fair value of 
the timber rights. Although the Band had no particular expectation, the Court of Appeal of Ontario 
held that equity presumes that a fiduciary should account to a beneficiary on the basis most 
favorable to the beneficiary, discounting realistic contingencies.297 Again, what amounts to “realist 
contingencies” would depend on the circumstances of the case. In that case, while considering one 
of the “realistic contingencies” to be deducted, it was held that “over the years, the [B]and would 
have spent some of the interest earned on the capital investment…” With respect, as realistic as 
that might seem, at best, it is in my view a “speculative contingency.” The court did not take into 
cognizance of the fact that it is also a “realistic contingency” that the Band could have decided to 
save over the years. All these factors are speculative and should not be ordinarily factored in the 
determination of compensation unless in a particular case there is a compelling fact (as opposed to 
speculation) to base such. 
 
Succinctly, three points can be made about the principles that inform compensation. First, the 
general nature of an unjustifiable infringement of Aboriginal title by the Crown is that it is a breach 
of a fiduciary obligation. This particular point does not vary. Hence, the foundation for the 
valuation of damages for infringement in such circumstance is fiduciary principles. However, the 
particular approach that would be employed for the determination of compensation depends on the 
particular nature of the infringement. The particular nature of infringement varies and depends on 
the circumstances surrounding the case. Finally, the principle for the determination of 
compensation to justify an infringement in order to meet the honour and good faith the Crown still 
flows from the principles of fiduciary relationship of the Crown and the Aboriginal peoples. The 
valuation formula here would still vary, depending on the nature of the particular infringement and 
other variabilities.        
 
2.4.3 Severity of Infringement 
The severity of the action, decision or omission of the Crown that amounts to an infringement of 
the fiduciary obligation owed Aboriginal peoples is a crucial factor to be considered for the award 
of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title. Generally, the actual loss of a victim of 
wrong upon an infringement may be said to be directly proportional to the degree of infringement 
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which is as a result of the action, decision or omission of the infringer. Thus, the actual loss of the 
victim should therefore be a reflection of the degree of infringement. Consequently, the higher the 
degree of infringement, the higher the compensation of the victim of wrong.  
 
The assessment of infringement may not pose so much of a problem where the loss of the victim 
of wrong is tangible or pecuniary. In such a circumstance, the actual loss of the victim will be the 
value of the “tangible property.” However, there may be some complications as regards the 
assessment of the actual loss of the victim of wrong in cases of intangible losses. The courts have 
developed a functional approach for the award of damages in such circumstances.298 The amount 
of the damages is gotten by the examination of the seriousness of injuries suffered by the victim 
and assessing the physical and other arrangements that money may be spent on to assuage the 
feelings of the victim.299  
 
The SCC also held in Lindal v. Lindal,300 that the amount of compensation should not only be 
based on the seriousness of the injury but should extend to its capacity to ameliorate the condition 
of the victim of wrong in a particular circumstance.301 What this decision might mean was 
illustrated in Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. In that case, it was held that the loss of a finger 
for an amateur pianist and that of a professional pianist should be valued differently.302 This is 
because the finger is of more value to the amateur and greater compensation would be required to 
put things together that will make him function and make up for his losses.303 Thus, the idea of the 
award of compensation is to alleviate the disaster faced by a victim after the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case are considered.304 
 
Analogizing from the loss of finger illustration, the degree of infringement of Aboriginal title 
depends on the nature of the particular Aboriginal title infringed and the particular action of the 
Crown. Thus, an infringement that seriously damages an Aboriginal community’s connection to 
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the land and affects their culture adversely should result to a higher compensation than an 
infringement that mildly affects same.305 Another important consideration is the duration of such 
infringement. A one-time infringement will certainly be in a different realm of compensation than 
an infringement of years of deprivation of an Aboriginal community of their lands.306  
 
For instance, in Semiahmoo Indian Band where the Crown deprived an Indian band of their reserve 
for more than 40 years, the Federal Court of Appeal held that “a monetary award simpliciter would 
be an inadequate remedy for the respondent's actionable breach of fiduciary duty…it is appropriate 
in these circumstances for the Court to create a beneficial interest in the surrendered land for the 
Band by imposing a constructive trust.”307 Although the court did not address compensation that 
is due to the Band, it referred the matter back to the trial court for assessment. However, they gave 
the trial court a guide on how to go about the assessment considering the gravity of the 
infringement.308 The Crown’s defense that the land was not used the whole time was held to be 
immaterial.309 Relying on the SCC decision in Hodgkinson v. Simms310 the Court further held that 
fiduciary law contains within it an element of deterrence.311 This appears to be compensation based 
on the retributive interest as examined in the previous chapter. Thus, a remedy based on the 
principles of a constructive trust for the period of deprivation even though the Crown made no 
pecuniary gain will signal to the Crown that it should have due regard to the interest of Indian 
Bands.312 This case illustrates how the gravity of infringement is to be put into consideration while 
accessing compensation. 
 
Another question that flows from the above analysis especially as it relates to infringement for a 
lengthy period is: what value of land would the court rely on in determining the actual loss of the 
Aboriginal community, because the “value” of the land may have changed over time. In Guerin, it 
was held that “[t]he lost opportunity to develop the land for a lengthy period was to be compensated 
as at the date of trial notwithstanding the fact that market values may have increased since the date 
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of the breach.”313 This is because equity presumes that the Aboriginal community would have 
intended to develop their land in the most advantageous way possible during the time covered by 
an unauthorized lease, license or sale of land.314  
 
2.4.4 Accommodation of Aboriginal Interest  
Compensation payable for the infringement of Aboriginal title may be mitigated by the extent to 
which the Aboriginal interests at issue are accommodated.315 Therefore, the higher the 
accommodation, the lesser the compensation payable.316 This is because compensation seeks to cover 
the actual loss of the Aboriginal group whose title is infringed and accommodation may be said to 
have reduced the actual loss depending on the extent. The level to which accommodation can mitigate 
infringement depends on the severity of infringement and the extent of accommodation, having regard 
to the nature of the particular Aboriginal title. 
 
There are several ways by which the Crown may accommodate the interest of a particular Aboriginal 
group. The general rule remains that the Crown owes Aboriginal peoples a fiduciary obligation 
measured by the honour and good faith of the Crown. The implication of this, of course, depends on 
the circumstances of the case. For instance, in expropriation cases, the Crown owes the affected 
Aboriginal group a fiduciary obligation, to ensure a minimal impairment of their use and 
enjoyment of land.317 
For there to be a reasonable accommodation of the interest of an Aboriginal group, the first step is 
to consult them for the purpose of their participation in the decision taken concerning their lands. 
This was what Lamer CJ meant when he held as follows: 
 
This aspect of [A]boriginal title suggests that the fiduciary relationship between the 
Crown and aboriginal peoples may be satisfied by the involvement of aboriginal 
peoples in decisions taken with respect to their lands.  There is always a duty of 
consultation.  Whether the aboriginal group has been consulted is relevant to 
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determining whether the infringement of aboriginal title is justified, in the same 
way that the Crown’s failure to consult an aboriginal group with respect to the terms 
by which reserve land is leased may breach its fiduciary duty at common law.318  
 
It is upon proper consultation that the Crown would know how to accommodate their interests. 
Accommodation in the context of proven Aboriginal title may arguably work differently from the 
accommodation expounded in the modern doctrine of the duty to consult. The modern doctrine of 
the duty to consult deals with asserted Aboriginal rights (including asserted Aboriginal title).319 
The whole idea in Haida v. Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) which established the 
modern doctrine of the duty to consult is that the Crown has the duty to consult an Aboriginal 
group where the decision of the government might have an impact on their asserted rights and if 
appropriate accommodate their interest (perhaps upon assessment of the potential impacts of the 
governmental decision and the strength of the interest).320An established Aboriginal title may have 
a different standard as regards consultation and accommodation. This is deducible from the 
decision of the SCC in Tsilhqot’in Nation where it was held as follows: 
 
The right to control the land conferred by Aboriginal title means that governments 
and others seeking to use the land must obtain the consent of the Aboriginal title 
holders.  If the Aboriginal group does not consent to the use, the government’s only 
recourse is to establish that the proposed incursion on the land is justified under s. 
35  of the Constitution Act, 1982.321 
 
 Further to the above, accommodation of the interest of an Aboriginal group with respect to an 
established Aboriginal title intended to be used by the Crown should ordinarily be always 
applicable as opposed to the accommodation for asserted rights pursuant to the modern doctrine 
of the duty to consult where the circumstance of the case determines whether or not 
accommodation is applicable. This is because, for an established Aboriginal title, the government 
has a duty to get the consent of the Aboriginal group involved if it seeks to use the land. Even if 
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the government opts to use the route of justified infringement, it still has a duty to accommodate 
the interests of the Aboriginal group involved in order to uphold the honour of the Crown.  
 
Thus, where there is no accommodation of the Aboriginal group whose title has been infringed, 
they will be entitled to the highest level of compensation payable which an accommodation may 
have achieved.  
 
The plausible ways to accommodate the interest of an Aboriginal group after consulting them 
include: 
1. Accommodation of the participation of an Aboriginal group in the development of the 
resource on their land.322 
2. Reduction of economic barriers to Aboriginal uses of their lands (e.g., licensing fees).323 
3. Negotiated compensation. 
4. Revenue sharing. 
5. Provision of suitable alternative land etc.324 
 
2.5 Specific Claims Tribunal Act 
The Specific Claims Tribunal Act (SCTA)325 is very pertinent to this research as it establishes the 
Specific Claims Tribunal (SCT) to decide cases of “validity and compensation” concerning the 
specific claims of First Nations identified in the legislation.326 The Acts further provide the 
approach to be adopted by the Tribunal while determining compensation for valid claims. 327The 
Act only affects the rights of a First Nation where the First Nation chooses to file a claim in the 
Tribunal.328 The specific claims that the Act contemplates are chiefly old historic claims that may 
be precluded from adjudication in the superior courts due to the passage of time.329 Before the 
establishment of the Tribunal, such claims were adjudicated upon by the Minister without any 
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binding or independent mechanism.330 Consequently, the fundamental purpose of the Tribunal 
which consists of superior court judges from across Canada is to determine such claims by the Act, 
without considering any doctrine that would preclude the claim because of lapse of time or 
delay.331 
 
The mandate of the Tribunal is in two dimensions one of which directly bears on the discussion in 
this chapter.  First, the Tribunal judge must determine the validity of the claim.332 Second, upon 
the determination that the claim is valid, the judge must determine the appropriate level of 
compensation owed the First Nation in accordance to section 20 of the Act.333 Thus, the Tribunal 
is set up with a mandate to award monetary compensation for claims of a First Nation arising from 
the Crown’s breach of its duties to them.334  
 
Section 20 of the Act provides a framework for the determination of the appropriate level of 
compensation. Some of the mechanisms that section 20 provides are as follows: 
1. Compensation must be monetary.335 
2. The Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to grant compensation in excess of $150 
Million.336 
3. The compensation shall be based on the principle of compensation applied by the courts.337 
4. Compensation is for only tangible losses. Intangible losses that have cultural or spiritual 
nature are not compensable under the Act.338 
5. Compensation is calculated based on the market value of the First Nation’s reserve at the 
time they were taken brought forward to the current value of the loss in accordance with 
legal principles by the courts.339 
                                                          
330 Ibid at para 26. 
331 Ibid at para 26. 
332 Ibid, at para 27. What constitutes grounds for valid claim is contained in s 14 of SCTA. 
333 Ibid at para 27. 
334 Williams Lake Indian Band v. Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2018 SCC 4. 
335 SCTA, supra note 325 at s 20 (1) (a). 
336 Ibid at s 20 (1) (b). 
337 Ibid at s 20 (1) (c). The Act does not specify the particular principles applied by the courts which it contemplates. 
338 Ibid at s 20 (d) (ii). 
339 Ibid at s 20 (e). 
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6. Where a third party causes or contributes to the acts of infringement, the award of 
compensation against the Crown shall only be to the extent that the Crown is at fault for 
the loss.340 
 
The above principles show that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to the award of 
compensation for economic losses on the reserves of First Nation due to the acts or decisions of 
the Crown. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal does not extend to non-economic or intangible losses 
of culture or spirituality. Also, in the determination of the quantum of compensation, the Act 
mandates the Tribunal to follow the principles of compensation applied by the courts. This 
provision in itself may be problematic because the superior courts are yet to develop precise legal 
principles to be used for determination of compensation for infringement of indigenous rights and 
interests in land.341  
 
The Tribunal through their decisions has interpreted section 20 of the Act, especially what the 
drafters of the Act may have contemplated as “principles of compensation applied by the courts.342 
The jurisprudence show that where the claim of a First Nation has been determined to be valid 
under the Act (which precedes the determination of compensation), it presupposes that the act, 
omission or decision of the Crown is a breach of its fiduciary obligation as expounded Guerin.343 
Further, in Popkum First Nation v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development) the 
Tribunal held that “where the fiduciary breach has resulted in a lost opportunity to use the lands, 
the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated for that loss of use based on the presumption that those 
lands would have been put to the “most advantageous” use.”344What may constitute the “most 
advantageous” use would be dependent on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. This 
is the same principle that was expounded in Guerin.  
 
                                                          
340 Ibid at s 20 (i). 
341 The reliance on the principles adopted by the courts may be a huge gap in the administration of the Act because 
there is yet to be developed by both the Parliament through legislative action and the superior courts through decisions 
comprehensive legal principles that contemplate the sui generis nature of the indigenous land rights in the award of 
compensation for infringements in practical circumstances. 
342 See Popkum First Nation v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCTC 12; Huu-Ay-Aht First 
Nations v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCTC 14. 
343 Williams Lake Indian Band, supra note 334 at para 48. 
344 Popkum First Nation, supra 342 at para 70. 
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According to the Tribunal, the aim of the remedy is to put the First Nation in a position they would 
have been had the breach not occurred.345 To achieve this, the Tribunal held that the monetary 
compensation provided in section 20 (1) (a) of the Act has to be restitutionary.346 The approach of 
the Tribunal appears to be a conflation of the protection of both the reliance and restitution 
interests, and this may appear confusing. This is because for a First Nation to be put in a position 
they would have been had the infringement not occurred, the monetary compensation has to be of 
such that as far as money can go should cover the actual loss of the First Nation. On the other hand, 
if the monetary compensation is to be restitutionary, then the focus shifts from the actual loss of 
the First Nation to the gain of the Crown. The Tribunal’s decision gives the impression that the 
gain of the infringer and the actual loss of the victim of loss are always equal. It is arguably not 
always the case.   
 
2.6 Modern Treaties 
Some jurists contend that modern treaties give an insight on how to balance the interest of the 
Aboriginal peoples with that of the Crown in the determination of compensation while also 
fulfilling the underlying aim of compensation.347 Examination of the approach adopted in some of 
the modern treaties is therefore necessary to possibly draw from them for a broader application. It 
is worthy of note that these treaties do not necessarily present binding principles in a broader 
context of Aboriginal title. They are specifically negotiated instruments that are meant to address 
specific issues concerning the parties and the circumstances surrounding the agreement. That said, 
these approaches are examined only to deduce principles which may be persuasive to the courts 
for the determination of compensation where Aboriginal title is infringed. 
 
One of the attempts that have been made to further the objective of reconciliation between the 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples and to foster a positive long-term relationship between Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal communities is the making of modern treaties.348 These treaties tend to balance 
the interests of the Crown, Aboriginal peoples and non-Aboriginal peoples, which is the 
                                                          
345 Ibid at para 69. The Tribunal relied on Guerin, supra note 123 at 362, Blueberry River Indian Band, supra note 
272 at para 103. 
346 Ibid at para 71. 
347 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 365. 
348 Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 at para 10. 
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“fundamental objective of the modern law of [A]boriginal and treaty rights.”349Section 35 of the 
Constitution Act has been held to provide a constitutional basis for further negotiations and perhaps 
further treaties between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples.350 The SCC per Lamer CJ held that 
“the Crown is under a moral, if not a legal duty to enter into and conduct those negotiations in 
good faith.”351  
 
Some scholars submit that compensation frameworks in modern land claim agreements give a clue 
on how to assess Aboriginal perspectives.352 Perhaps, this is because these agreements were 
negotiated for years between the Crown and Aboriginal groups.353 Accordingly, it is pertinent to 
examine the compensation frameworks expounded in some of these agreements. 
 
The Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement354 is the first multi-nation treaty under the British 
Columbia Treaty Commission process between the governments of Canada, British Columbia, and 
the five Maa-Nulth First Nations.355 The Agreement acknowledges that where it is reasonable to 
use other means, expropriation of Maa-nulth First Nation Lands should be avoided.356 However, 
any interest in Maa-nulth First Nation Lands may be expropriated pursuant to a provincial 
legislation with the consent of the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council.357 
 
The Agreement makes a copious provision as regards the factors to be considered for the total 
value of compensation upon expropriation of their land. The Agreement provides as follows: 
 
                                                          
349 McCabe, supra note 175 at 85. See also Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 at para 1. 
350 Sparrow, supra note 251 at 1105. 
351 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 186. 
352 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 365. 
353 Ibid at 365. 
354 Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement, 9 April 2009 (entered into force 1 April 2011). 
355 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Maa-nulth First Nations Final Agreement Implementation: Report 
2013–2014” online: < https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1494511760118/1494511856157 >. The five Maa-nulth 
First Nations are Huu-ay-aht First Nations, Ka:’yu:’k’t’h’/Che: k’tles7et’h’ First Nations, Toquaht Nation, 
Uchucklesaht Tribe, and Yuułuʔiłʔatḥ. 
356 Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement, supra note 354 at s 2.11.1. 
357 Ibid at 2.11.1. 
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The total value of compensation for an Interest in Maa-nulth First Nation Lands 
expropriated by a Federal Expropriating Authority in accordance with this Chapter 
will be determined by taking into account the following factors:  
a. the fair market value of the expropriated Interest or of the Maa-nulth First Nation 
Lands in which an Interest has been expropriated;  
b. the replacement value of any improvement to the Maa-nulth First Nation Lands in 
which an Interest has been expropriated;  
c. any expenses or losses resulting from the disturbance directly attributable to the 
expropriation;  
d. any reduction in the value of any Interest in Maa-nulth First Nation Lands that is 
not expropriated which directly relates to the expropriation;  
e. any adverse effect on any cultural or other special value of Maa-nulth First Nation 
Lands in which an Interest has been expropriated to the applicable Maa-nulth First 
Nation, provided that the cultural or other special value is only applied to an Interest 
in Maa-nulth First Nation Lands recognized in law and held by that Maa-nulth First 
Nation, and provided that there will be no increase in the total value of 
compensation on account of any Aboriginal rights, title or interest; and  
f. the value of any special economic advantage arising out of or incidental to the 
occupation or use of Maa-nulth First Nation Lands to the extent that the value is 
not otherwise compensated.358 
 
Although different in wording, the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement,359Westbank First 
Nation Self-Government Agreement,360 Sioux Valley Dakota Nation Governance Agreement and 
Tripartite Governance Agreement,361 and some other modern treaties adopt a similar approach for 
the determination of compensation in cases of future expropriation.362 
                                                          
358 Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement, supra note 354 at s 2.12.11. 
359 Land Claims Agreement Between the Inuit of Labrador, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and 
Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,22 January 2005 (entered into force 1 December 2005) 
[Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement].  
360 Westbank First Nation Self-Government Agreement, 3 October, 2003 (entered into force 1 April 2005).  
361 Sioux Valley Dakota Nation Governance Agreement and Tripartite Governance Agreement, 30 August 2013 
(entered into force 30 August 2013). [Sioux Valley Dakota Nation Governance Agreement]. 
362 Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, supra note 359 at s 4.18.7; Westbank First Nation Self-Government 
Agreement, supra note 342 at s120; Sioux Valley Dakota Nation Governance Agreement, supra note 343 at s. 43.04. 
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The factors to inform compensation as set out in the Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement 
seem to “attempt” the balanced approach envisaged in R. v. Van der Peet.363 In that case, it was 
held that “[A]boriginal right must, if it is truly to reconcile the prior occupation of Canadian 
territory by [A]boriginal peoples with the assertion of Crown sovereignty over that territory, take 
into account the [A]boriginal perspective, yet do so in terms which are cognizable to the non-
[A]boriginal legal system.” The approach largely adopts the usual expropriation principles for the 
determination of compensation, and at the same time, it takes into cognizance that Aboriginal title 
has cultural, economic or other special values.  
 
Even though the approach takes into consideration the cultural or other special values that the First 
Nation may have on their land, the agreement seems to take away with the left hand that which it 
gives with the right by adding a proviso. The first limb of the proviso says; “…provided that the 
cultural or other special value is only applied to an Interest in Maa-nulth First Nation Lands 
recognized in law and held by that Maa-nulth First Nation…”364 The intended meaning of this 
proviso is with respect confusing. However, it places an onerous obligation on First Nation to 
prove that the special culture or value on their lands has been recognized in law. It is also not clear 
what the Agreement might mean by “recognized.” Does it imply that such special interest must 
have been recognized specifically as opposed to the general recognition given by the Section 35 
of the Constitution Act?   The second limb of the proviso gives another limitation. It reads as 
follows; “…and provided that there will be no increase in the total value of compensation on 
account of any Aboriginal rights, title or interest…”365 This raises the question: if the consideration 
of the special cultural or other interests does not affect the total value of compensation, why is it 
considered in the first place?  
 
Also, under the Agreement, the value of special economic advantage arising (or incidental) to the 
occupation or use of Maa-nulth First Nation Lands is one of the factors to be considered.366 This 
                                                          
363 R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para 49. 
364 Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement, supra note 354 at s 2.12.11 (e). 
365 Ibid at s 2.12.11 (e). 
366 Ibid at s 2.12.11 (f). 
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provision also comes with the proviso that the value of the said special economic advantage is not 
to be compensated. 
 
The Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement’s approach to compensation may not be the best 
standard to draw from for adoption in a broader context in Canada. This is because the approach 
in that Agreement may not be able “to attempt” to capture the actual loss of an Aboriginal group 
upon an infringement which seems to be the primary goal for compensation when fiduciary 
principles are applied as has been submitted earlier in this work. Also, the approach adopted in 
that Agreement appears not to portray the kind of balance envisaged in Van der Peet where equal 
weight is to be placed both for the interests of the Crown and that of the Aboriginal group.367 
Perhaps, there may be no certain framework for the assessment of an intangible interest like the 
cultural, religious or spiritual connection to the land; but it should not be considered just for the 
purpose of mere “consideration” and left “not remedied.”  
 
Of course, Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement is a specifically negotiated agreement that 
potrays the intentions of the parties in the particular circumstances surounding the agreement. 
Thus, this agreement may be a good standard for the purpose in which it is made in the first place. 
However, the approach adopted in that agreement may not be an ideal approach in a broader 
context. 
 
The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement may be said to have a similar but a more acceptable 
approach when compared with Maa-Nulth First Nations Final Agreement because it does not 
contain provisos. The Agreement provides as follows: “An Arbitration Panel shall consider the 
following matters when making an award in respect of a Dispute referred to in section 4.18.6: any 
particular or special value to Inuit of the Expropriated land.”368 This is akin to the consideration of 
the particular nature of the land that has been examined earlier in this Chapter. Of course, this 
does not in any way exclude the fact that the Crown has a constant and consistent fiduciary 
obligation to Aboriginal groups. Perhaps, the approach adopted in the Labrador Inuit Land Claims 
Agreement may be more consistent with the duty of honour and good faith of the Crown. 
                                                          
367 Van der Peet, supra note 363 at para 50. 
368 Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, supra note 359 at s 4.18.7 (g) (Emphasis Added). 
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Also, in Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement and some other modern treaties like the Inuvialuit 
Final Agreement369 monetary compensation is of the final resort where suitable alternative lands 
considered to be satisfactory in place of the expropriated land cannot be provided.370 
 
Obviously, not all modern treaties provide an indication of the best approach for the determination 
of compensation in a broader context in Canada. The agreements that may be said to have a more 
balanced approach leave much to be desired with respect to the method for the calculation of 
compensation intangible special interests are considered. 
 
2.7 Expropriation Act 
The Expropriation Act applies to cases of expropriation that are unrelated to Aboriginal and Treaty 
rights.371 Thus, the principles for the determination of compensation for expropriation under this 
Act are not legally binding to cases of infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada. However, there 
are two principal reasons why it is pertinent to examine the principles enshrined in the Act for the 
determination of compensation for privately owned properties. First is that in Tsilhqot’in Nation 
the SCC held that “the usual remedies that lie for breach of interests in land are available [to 
infringement of Aboriginal title], adapted as may be necessary to reflect the special nature of 
Aboriginal title and the fiduciary obligation owed by the Crown to the holders of Aboriginal title.” 
372This implies that the SCC envisages the possible application of general property law principles 
(expropriation law principles inclusive) in the determination of the choice and quantum of 
remedies where Aboriginal title is infringed (monetary compensation inclusive). This approach 
will be adopted only if it is done with adaptations as may be necessary to suit the sui generis nature 
of Aboriginal title. 
 
                                                          
369 Inuvialuit Final Agreement, 18 August 1979 (Entered into force 25 July 1984). 
370 Adkins and others, supra note 10 at 365. See also Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, supra note 360 at s 
4.18.5 and Inuvialuit Final Agreement, supra note 369 at s 7(51). 
371 Aboriginal title is constitutionally protected. Thus, Aboriginal title is protected from legislative interference except 
through justifiable infringement which was examined briefly in the third part of chapter one.  For this see Kent McNeil, 
“Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property Right” in Owen Lippert ed, Beyond the Nass 
Valley:National Implications of the Supreme Court’s Delgamuukw Decision (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2000) 
55. See also Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 72. 
372 Tsilhqot’in Nation , supra note 6 at para 90. 
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Second, it appears that expropriation law principles are gradually being adopted in some 
instruments for the determination of compensation for breach of indigenous land rights. Some of 
these can be found in different modern treaties and Acts that affect Aboriginal land rights.373 
 
Further to the above, it is expedient to examine the principles of expropriation law for the 
determination of compensation where private land rights are expropriated. My examination will 
first show that the undiluted approach for the determination of compensation under the Act is not 
suitable for determination of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title. Subsequently, I 
will demonstrate how the principles under the act may be adapted to suit the sui generis nature of 
Aboriginal title. This may be persuasive to the courts where issues of compensation for 
infringement of Aboriginal title cases arise. 
 
One of the primary aims of expropriation law is to compensate private parties when their property 
is forcibly taken.374 Although the principle for the determination of compensation developed under 
the expropriation law may be difficult to be applied in cases of expropriation of Aboriginal title, 
such principles may serve as a reference point to consider compensation where Aboriginal title is 
justifiably infringed.375 This approach is validated by Tsilhqot’in Nation where it was held that 
comparisons to other types of land ownership (e.g., fee simple) might be useful in the 
understanding of aspects of Aboriginal title.376 However, the essence of the comparisons with the 
approaches used in other forms of land holding is just to draw analogies and not as a means of 
equating the principles applicable to other forms of land holdings to that of Aboriginal title.377    
 
The focal point for the determination of compensation upon expropriation of interest in land in 
Canada pursuant to the Expropriation Act is the market value of the property.378 Market value is 
defined as “…the amount that would have been paid for the interest or right if, at the time of it 
                                                          
373 For instance see Inuvialuit Final Agreement, supra note 369 at para 7 (53); Métis Settlement Act, RSA 2000, c M-
14 (MSA) at s 113 (c) and  First Nation Land Management Act, SC 1999, c 24 (FNLMA) as s 31 (3). 
374 Mainville, supra note 19 at 105. See also Toronto Area Transit Operating Authority v. Dell Holdings Ltd., [1997] 1 
S.C.R. 32. 
375 Ibid at 106. 
376 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 72. 
377 Ibid at para 72. 
378 Expropriation Act, RSC 1985 at s 26 (2). 
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taking, it had been sold in an open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer.”379 This definition 
presupposes that the land should be of such that is sellable in an open market by any willing buyer.  
 
Whether or not the market value principle is ideal for the valuation of compensation with respect 
to the expropriation of Aboriginal title may largely depend on the definition of market value. In 
the Expropriation Act, market value is defined with reference to the amount a willing seller might 
be willing to pay for such property in the open market. Before I even delve into what might be the 
difficulty in the evaluation of the market value of Aboriginal title, the obvious challenge of 
applying the market value principle as per Expropriation Act to Aboriginal title is that it comes 
with restrictions.380 First, it is collectively held not only for the present generation but the future 
generation of a particular Aboriginal group, and also it cannot be alienated except to the Crown.381 
This restriction makes Aboriginal title not to be available in the open market to a willing buyer, 
and consequently, there will be a difficulty in the application of market value in an open market as 
envisaged in the Expropriation Act. 
 
Assuming in “practical terms” and “for the sole purpose of determining compensation” Aboriginal 
title is deemed to be sellable in an open market; the next challenge will be how to determine the 
market value of Aboriginal title considering that the restrictions on Aboriginal title may ordinarily 
affect its value. Whether the restrictions make Aboriginal title of more value when compared to a 
fee simple or of less value is not clear. It has been argued that since Aboriginal title is subject to 
“material impediments” (perhaps restrictions), the amount of compensation payable upon 
infringement must be much less than the current value of the land in “purely economic and modern 
usage and terms.”382 This appears to be the possible implication of the decision of Gonthier, Major, 
Binnie and LeBel JJ in Musqueam Indian Band earlier considered in this chapter. 
 
A counter-argument will be that the restrictions placed on Aboriginal title show how special it is 
and thus increase its value. Aboriginal title may be said to be everything fee simple is when viewed 
in the perspective of usage (even modern usage). By virtue of Tsilhqot’in Nation “Aboriginal title 
                                                          
379 Ibid at s 26 (2). 
380 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 74. 
381 Ibid at para 74. 
382 Isaac, Aboriginal Title, supra note 93 at 47-48. 
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confers ownership rights similar to those associated with fee simple, including:  the right to decide 
how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land;  the right to possess 
the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage 
the land.”383 The argument that the inalienability of Aboriginal title except to the Crown makes it 
of less market value in “practical terms” when compared to fee simple may not be correct. On the 
contrary, the restriction of Aboriginal title could be argued to increase its value. This is because 
Aboriginal title’s inalienability except to the Crown only emphasizes the Crowns radical title in 
the land subject to Aboriginal title. This radical title gives birth to a fiduciary duty on the part of 
the Crown, which is consequentially a right which is of value to Aboriginal groups.384  
 
Another “material impediment” that is argued (albeit erroneously) to make Aboriginal title to be 
much less than the current value of the land in “purely economic and modern usage and terms” is 
the extent to which it can be used.385 On the contrary, Aboriginal title holders of modern times can 
use their lands in modern ways (including non-traditional uses), just like fee simple provided that 
such uses are not incompatible with the communal and nature of the groups’ attachment to the 
land.386 Thus, in “purely economic terms” Aboriginal title may not be subject to such “material 
impediments” as presupposed by some scholars. 
 
Having examined the plausible challenges that will arise upon application of the market value 
principle as defined by the Expropriation Act, it is safe to conclude that the usual principles of 
compensation as in expropriation law is inadequate to address the issues that will arise upon the 
infringement of Aboriginal title.387 This position is confirmed in Delgamuukw where it was held 
that fair compensation in the context of expropriation of Aboriginal title is not to be equated with 
the price of a fee simple.388 
 
What then can be drawn from the market value principle of expropriation law? The market value 
principle may not be totally useless in Aboriginal title context if the definition of market value 
                                                          
383 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 73. 
384 Ibid at para 69. 
385 Isaac, Aboriginal Title, supra note 93 at 47. 
386 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 67 & 75. 
387 Mainville, supra note 19 at 106. 
388 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 203. 
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adapts to the peculiarities of Aboriginal title. For instance, the real market value of Aboriginal title 
could be said to be the best use the Crown in fulfilling her fiduciary obligation could have put a 
land subject to Aboriginal title assuming if it is surrendered by the group involved. This is because 
the Crown is the only channel by which an Aboriginal title can get to any market and the Crown 
is ordinarily placed with the obligation to get the best deals available for the Aboriginal group. 
Hence, this may be a unique principle that is a product of the synergy between the application of 
expropriation law principles and fiduciary principles. This makes a lot of sense because Aboriginal 
title gives an Aboriginal group rights akin to that of a fee simple (in terms of use) plus rights based 
on the fiduciary obligation of the Crown. Consequently, the expropriation of interest in Aboriginal 
title should ordinarily combine the principles of expropriation law applicable to fee simple in 
combination with the fiduciary principles in order to uphold the honour and good faith of the 
Crown. 
 
Furthermore, the Expropriation Act mandates the Minister to make an offer of compensation to 
the private person (s) whose interest in land is expropriated within 90 days of approval of the 
expropriation.389 This presupposes that compensation is not supposed to be unilaterally decided. 
Where the Minister and the person entitled to compensation are unable to agree the amount of 
compensation, either the Minister or the person is to within 60 days serve the other a notice to 
negotiate a settlement of compensation.390 A negotiator may be appointed, whose duty will be 
amongst others to inspect the land, receive and consider any appraisal, oral evidence, etc.391 One 
of the principal reasons for negotiation is to take into consideration the perspectives of the person 
(s) sought to be compensated as regards the value of their interest in land. It is only fair to give the 
person an opportunity to be heard, and to double check, the offer made by the Minister and further 
evaluation of the particular nature of the land sought to be expropriated. Another important factor 
to be observed in the foregoing provision of the Expropriation Act is the timelines given for series 
of events as regards valuation of compensation. These kinds of timelines become tenable where a 
legislative framework regulates a particular set of activities. 
 
                                                          
389 Expropriation Act, supra note 378 at s 16. 
390 Ibid at s 30. 
391 Ibid at s 30 (4). 
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The negotiation style and the timelines therein is worthy of emulation in the context of Aboriginal 
title where the Crown intends to justifiably infringe an interest of an Aboriginal group to their land. 
However, one would only expect that the choice of negotiator (s) in this context should take into 
consideration the appointment of a person who is versed in the knowledge of the nature of the 
particular Aboriginal title which is sought to be expropriated.  
 
Further to the above, developing a legislative scheme (for the purpose of compensation) that will 
take into cognizance of the nature of Aboriginal title upon expropriation may be desirable.392An 
insight into what this might look like can be seen in the context of Métis Settlement Act393 and 
First Nation Land Management Act.394 
 
2.8 Métis Settlement Act (MSA) 
The MSA is one of the modern statutory regimes for the protection of Métis rights in Alberta.395 
The primary purpose of the Act is to “enhance Métis identity, culture, and self-governance by 
creating a land base for Métis.”396 Further to the purpose of MSA, it makes provisions as regards 
the procedure by which surface access may be provided to existing mineral leaseholders and some 
operators to carry out projects in oil and gas, electricity and mining.397 The Act gives the occupants 
of land required for an authorized project or existing mineral lease the right for their interest to be 
considered and to be given fair compensation and interest as a result of use, entry or damage to 
their land.398 Where a right of entry order is made in favor of an operator, the Land Access Panel 
or the Existing Leases Access Panel399 has a mandatory duty to inform the occupants of the land 
of the date, place and time for the valuation of compensation and identification of the person (s) 
                                                          
392 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 380. 
393 Métis Settlement Act, RSA 2000, c M-14 (MSA). 
394 First Nation Land Management Act, SC 1999, c 24 (FNLMA). 
395 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 367. 
396 Ibid at 367. See also Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670 
at para 3. 
397 Ibid at 367. See also MSA, supra note 393 at s 113.  
398 MSA, supra note 393 at s 113 (c).  
399 These bodies established by sections 186 and 187 of MSA respectively for the purpose of enhancing Metis culture 
and identity and furthering the attainment of self-governance by Metis settlements under the laws of Alberta and the 
settlement of disputes arising under the Act. 
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who will receive the compensation.400 In the determination of compensation, the Land Access 
Panel or the Existing Leases Access Panel may consider the following: 
 
the value of the parcel of land affected, including (i) the cultural value for 
preserving a traditional Metis way of life, (ii) the economic value as an asset, and 
(iii) the productive value; (b) damage in the specific existing mineral lease or 
authorized project area, including (i) the effect of the lease or project on the present 
and planned use of the parcel and surrounding area, (ii) the special damages to 
improvements, crops, wildlife, livestock, trap lines and natural vegetation resulting 
from the lease or project, and (iii) the amount of the lease or project area that the 
existing mineral leaseholder or operator may damage; (c) the impact of the lease or 
project on other areas, including (i) disturbance to the physical, social and cultural 
environment, (ii) location of the lease or project in relation to existing or planned 
community uses, and (iii) other specific matters, such as the cumulative effect of 
related projects.401 
 
The above provision gives an extensive range of factors that should be considered before arriving 
at the value of the land putting the nature of the land in question into consideration. This Act may 
be said to adopt the market value principle as in Expropriation Act to suit the context of Métis 
patented land. One cannot be said to arrive at the real value (or perhaps fair value) of the land 
without at least considering the physical, social, cultural, traditional and religious value of the land. 
 
MSA does not extend to explaining how the cultural value of land can be valued. But one would 
imply that it may vary depending on the particular nature of the land which may be deduced from 
the representations made by the occupants. There may be no monetary compensation that will 
absolutely satisfy the occupants. The whole essence of compensation in this instance is to place 
the occupants in a position (as far as money can go) they would have been had the surface order 
not been made. 
 
                                                          
400 MSA, supra note 393 at s 117 (c). 
401 Ibid at s 118 (emphasis added). 
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The procedure adopted in MSA (of course with developments) is worthy of emulation in the 
development of a formal legislative regime in the whole of Canada that should address amongst 
other things the valuation of compensation in upon infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada. 
 
2.9 First Nation Land Management Act (FNLMA) 
FNLMA is an Act that ratified the Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management 
between the Crown and a specified group of First Nations in relation to their land.402 FNLMA 
provides for factors similar to that of MSA in the event of expropriation of the First Nation interest 
in their land as follows:  
 
(a) the market value of the expropriated interest or right or of the land in which an 
interest or right has been expropriated; (b) the replacement value of any 
improvement to the land; (c) any expenses or losses resulting from a disturbance 
attributable to the expropriation; (d) any reduction in the value of any interest 
or right in First Nation land that is not expropriated; (e) any adverse effect on 
any cultural or other special value of the land to the First Nation; and (f) the 
value of any special economic advantage arising out of or incidental to the 
occupation or use of the land to the extent that that value is not otherwise 
compensated.403 
 
FNLMA further provides that where there is any conflict between the Expropriation Act and 
FNLMA, the latter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.404  
 
The MSA and FNLMA are obviously not legally applicable to the broader context of Aboriginal 
title; however, they may be said to give an insight as regards a workable approach for balancing 
the interests of the Crown, Aboriginal peoples and other societal interests in the valuation of 
compensation.405   
                                                          
402 Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management, 12 February 1996 (Entered into force on 17 June 1999). 
403 FNLMA, supra note 394 at s 31 (3).  
404 Ibid at s 33. 
405 This does not necessarily mean that the approaches in MSA and FNLMA are the most appropriate approaches. What 
in my view may be the most appropriate approach to the determination of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal 
title will be examined in chapter four of this work. 
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2.10 Conclusion 
What can be made out of the above analysis? The above analysis shows that Canada has principles 
for the determination of compensation with respect to infringements of Aboriginal title, deducible 
from several sources. Some of the legal sources discussed in this chapter are obviously not directly 
applicable to infringements of Aboriginal title. However, the principles deducible from them may 
be persuasive to courts in the determination of compensation. 
 
The current binding approach may not be sustainable as it is quite undeveloped.406 Undoubtedly, 
developing a certain balanced approach for the determination of compensation, which will take 
into contemplation the interests of the Aboriginal group affected, the radical title of the Crown and 
its fiduciary obligations and the broader interest of the society may not be an easy task. However, 
it is desirable that some form of certainty is attained in this area. 
 
Further to the above, the next Chapter will discuss the approach adopted in other jurisdictions and 
under international law, before making recommendations as regards the way forward in Canada. 
                                                          
406 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 380. 
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CHAPTER THREE: A SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPLES FOR THE DETERMINATION 
OF COMPENSATION FOR INFRINGEMENTS OF INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS AND 
INTERESTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the principles for the determination of compensation for infringements of 
the land rights and interests of indigenous peoples in Australia, Malaysia and under the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007 (UNDRIP). The previous chapter 
shows that although compensation regime for infringements on Aboriginal title in Canada centers 
on fiduciary principles, there are variations in the different sources examined. Thus, the essence 
of this chapter is to evaluate the situations in other similar jurisdictions to draw from their 
experiences for possible implementation in Canada. 
 
The choice of Australia and Malaysia stems from the similarities between the nature of indigenous 
land rights and interests in those states with Aboriginal title in Canada.407 A study of the 
jurisprudence on native rights in Australia shows that a number of the principles developed by 
Australian courts in that regard were drawn from the experience in Canada and vice versa.408 Hence 
exchange of principles on the rights of indigenous peoples between Australia and Canada has long 
been in existence. Apart from the similarities between the two systems, Australia has a legislative 
framework that established detailed principles for the determination of compensation for acts of 
the Crown which affect the rights and interests of an indigenous group in their lands.409 The purport 
of those principles has also been subjected to judicial scrutiny and interpretation. This part 
examines both the legal framework on compensation for acts that affect native title in Australia 
and the judicial authorities that interpret the relevant provisions of the enactment. 
 
Likewise, the development of native title in Malaysia was largely influenced by the concept of 
Aboriginal title in Canada and native title in Australia. The proposals to be made in this research 
                                                          
407 The nature of indigenous land rights in these jurisdictions which will be examined subsequently in this chapter 
shows the similarities they have with Aboriginal title in Canada. 
408 For this see Mabo & Ors. v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CRL 1. This case recognized the concept of native title 
in Australia before emergence of Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA). The High Court of Australia in the elucidation of 
the scope and content of native title in Australia drew from the already the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) decision 
in Calder v. British Columbia (AG) [1973] S.C.R. 313 
409 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA). 
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to both policymakers and the courts for the development of the existing legal regime on 
compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title are drawn from these jurisdictions 
 
The preliminary research before limiting the comparison to Australia and Malaysia explored other 
jurisdictions like New Zealand, the United States of America, South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria. I 
found the framework in Australia and Malaysia more helpful as some of the principles applied in 
their compensation regime for infringement of indigenous land rights answer some of the complex 
questions about the determination of compensation in the context of my contentions more than 
other jurisdictions.410      
 
Finally, the ongoing debate on the propriety or otherwise of the full implementation of UNDRIP 
in Canada has motivated the examination of the provisions of the Declaration that bear on the 
redress for violation of land rights. This chapter finds that the full implementation of UNDRIP will 
not automatically bridge the gap in the compensation regime concerning Aboriginal title in 
Canada. However, principles may be drawn from the content and character of UNDRIP for the 
development of a mechanism for the determination of appropriate compensation that is due to an 
indigenous group whose Aboriginal title has been infringed in Canada. 
 
3.2 The Experience in Australia  
 
3.2.1 Native Title in Australia (An Overview) 
The legal concept of native title which gives indigenous peoples of Australia rights and interests 
to their land was recognized in 1992 in the case of Mabo & Ors. v. Queensland (No. 2).411 In Mabo, 
the High Court of Australia412 held that the common law recognizes a native title which gives the 
indigenous inhabitants entitlements to their traditional lands in accordance with their laws and 
customs (in cases where such rights or interests have not been extinguished).413 The nature of 
native title was described by the court to be sui generis just like the Aboriginal title of Canada.414 
The content and origin of the native title come from the traditional laws and customs acknowledged 
                                                          
410 More so, this thesis has a limited scope that may not give room to extend the research to other jurisdictions. This 
informed the limitation of the research to the most helpful jurisdictions in the context of the issues raised herein. 
411 (1992) 175 CRL 1. 
412 The High Court of Australia is the supreme court in Australia and the final court of appeal. 
413 Mabo, supra note 408 at para 2. 
414 Ibid at paras 22 & 25. 
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and observed by indigenous groups who inhabit a territory.415 Thus, the connection of indigenous 
peoples of Australia with their land in accordance with their customs and tradition is the source of 
the native title.416 
 
While the interest of an indigenous group or clan in their land is recognized and protected, the 
Crown has a radical or underlying title in the native land.417 Consequently, native title is inalienable 
to persons that are not members of an indigenous group.418 However, such indigenous interest in 
land can voluntarily be surrendered (to the Crown) or extinguished by the Crown. In such a 
circumstance, the Crown becomes the absolute beneficial owner.419 
 
Following the recognition of native title in Mabo; native title in Australia was given a legislative 
recognition in Native Title Act (NTA).420 The main objects of the NTA are: 
a) to provide for the recognition and protection of native title 
b) to establish ways in which future dealings affecting native title may proceed and to set standards 
for those dealings 
c) to establish a mechanism for determining claims to native title 
d) to provide for, or permit, the validation of past acts, and intermediate period acts, invalidated 
because of the existence of native title.421 
 
The implication of the NTA was encapsulated in Western Australia v Commonwealth (Native Title 
Case)422 where the High Court of Australia held that NTA eliminates the common law defeasibility 
of native title and protects the indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of their lands.423 The protection of 
native title under the NTA was however held to be subject to three exceptions: “the occurrence of 
a past act that has been validated [by NTA], an agreement on the part of the native title holders, or 
the doing of a permissible future act.”424 NTA validates certain acts that took place before 1 January 
                                                          
415 Ibid at para 64. 
416 Lisa Strelein, Compromised Jurisprudence: Native title Cases since Mabo, 2nd ed (Acton: Aboriginal Studies Press, 
2009) at 11. 
417 Mabo, supra note 408 at para 51. 
418 Ibid at para 83. 
419 Ibid at 83. 
420 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA). 
421 Ibid at s 3. 
422 Western Australia v Commonwealth (Native Title Case) (1995) 183 CLR 373. 
423 Ibid at para 93. 
424 Ibid at para 93. 
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1994 (past acts) which would have ordinarily been invalid because of native title.425 
Notwithstanding the validation of these past acts, the NTA gives the indigenous group affected the 
right to compensation for those acts.426 Native title can also be validly extinguished by surrender 
or through future compulsory acquisition.427 These acts are also subject to compensation.428 
 
Further to the above, it is apparent that the native title in Australia shares some similarities with 
Aboriginal title in Canada. This shows why the High Court of Australia drew from the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia in the 
recognition of the concept of native title.429 Similarly, the SCC relied on the decision of Mabo in 
the clarification of the scope and content of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.430 
Some of the obvious similarities between native title in Australia and Aboriginal title in Canada 
are as follows: 
 
1. The nature of both Aboriginal title and native title are sui generis or unique, distinct 
from fee simple.431 
2. The indigenous peoples have a substantial connection to their lands.432 
3. Aboriginal title and native title are inalienable except to the Crown.433  
4. Both interests in land are compensable rights.434  
 
The two forms of interest in land also have dissimilarities. These differences may be the reason 
for the doubts expressed by the High Court of Australia in Fejo v Northern Territory435 about the 
relevance of decisions of other common law decisions (like Canada) where questions about native 
title arise.436  
                                                          
425 NTA, supra note 420 at s 13A. 
426 Ibid at s 17 & 20. 
427 Ibid at s 24MD (2) & (2A). 
428 Ibid at s 24AA (6). 
429 Mabo, supra note 408 at para 75. 
430 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 153. The SCC held as follows: “In Mabo, supra, the High Court of Australia set 
down the requirement that there must be “substantial maintenance of the connection” between the people and the 
land.  In my view, this test should be equally applicable to proof of title in Canada.” 
431 Mabo, supra note 408 at para 22 & 25. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 111. 
432 Ibid at para 153. 
433 Ibid at para 83. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 113. 
434 Ibid at para 12. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 203. 
435 Fejo v Northern Territory [1998] 195 CLR 96. 
436 Ibid at para 54. 
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One of the striking differences between the two forms of interest in land is the source. The focal 
point for the establishment of Aboriginal title is “occupation [of land] before assertion of British 
sovereignty.”437 On the other hand, the focus for the establishment of native title is “proof of native 
law and custom possessed by an indigenous group in connection to land.”438 
 
Another variance between the two forms of indigenous land rights is the issue of “extinguishment.” 
Canadian jurisprudence has established that since Aboriginal rights (including Aboriginal title) is 
protected constitutionally by Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Aboriginal rights can no 
longer be extinguished by post-1982 legislation (Section 35 does not revive already extinguished 
rights).439 Legislation can validly infringe Aboriginal title only if it passes the two tests of 
justification: “the legislation must further a “compelling and substantial” purpose and account for 
the “priority” of the infringed Aboriginal interest under the fiduciary obligation imposed on the 
Crown.”440 This position is quite different under the Australian legal regime as NTA gives room 
for future compulsory acquisition of native title which can be achieved without passing through 
the kind of justification test tenable in Canada.441  
 
The rights that native title in Australia confers may also differ from that of Aboriginal title in 
Canada. Richard H Bartlett argues that while native title in Australia does not amount to full 
beneficial ownership, Aboriginal title in Canada contemplates full beneficial ownership.442 He 
bases his argument on the decision of the High Court of Australia in Western Australia v Ward443 
where the court interpreted the provision of the NTA on the requirements for proof of native title.444 
The court held that there are two inquiries required by the NTA: “in the one case for the rights and 
interests possessed under traditional laws and customs and, in the other, for connection with land 
or waters by those laws and customs.”445 Bartlett argues that based on this decision, “native title 
                                                          
437 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 25. 
438 NTA, supra note 420 at s 223. See also Mabo, supra note 408 at para 66. 
439 Sparrow, supra note 251 at 1113-19. 
440 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 13. 
441 NTA, supra note 420 at s 24MD (2). 
442 Richard H Bartlett, Native Title in Australia, 3rd ed (Australia: LewisNexis Butterworths, 2015) at 310-313. 
443 Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
444 See NTA, supra note 420 at s 223. 
445 Ward, supra note 443 at 18. 
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rights and interests in Australia are limited by traditional laws and customs and cannot amount to 
full beneficial ownership.”446 
 
On the other hand, the position in Canada is that “uses [of Aboriginal title in Canada] are not 
confined to the uses and customs of pre-sovereignty times; like other landowners, Aboriginal title 
holders of modern times can use their land in modern ways, if that is their choice.”447This is 
however subject to the restriction that it cannot be developed, used or misused in a way that would 
prevent the future generation from using and it.448 Therefore Aboriginal title in Canada allows for 
full beneficial ownership of Aboriginal title unlike the position in Australia.449 
 
One may therefore argue that Aboriginal title in Canada regarding the uses it can be put may be 
more valuable than native title in Australia. Another view may be that this traditional restriction 
in Australia may not necessarily affect its value as it is a unique land right and interest, available 
to only one buyer, which is the Crown. More so, contending that the restriction reduces the value 
of native title in Australia may be akin to allowing the Crown to benefit from its wrong. The 
restriction exists precisely because of the Crown’s actions in the first place; the Crown is the only 
market for native title, and the Crown is also the infringer. I will make arguments along these lines 
while addressing the possible implications of the restrictions on Aboriginal title in Canada to its 
value in the next chapter.  
 
In Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia450  which the next section will examine in detail, the 
trial court did not treat the restrictions on native title as discounting factors. Rather, while granting 
compensation for extinguishment of native title, it only considered that the particular claim 
concerned a non-exclusive native title.451 Native title is exclusive where it gives the holders the 
right to possess the land to the exclusion of every other person. On the other hand, it is non-
exclusive where it gives the holders a bundle of rights which does not extend to the right to the 
exclusion of others.452 On appeal, the Federal Court reassessed the compensation granted by the 
                                                          
446 Bartlett, supra note 442 at 311. 
447 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 75. 
448 Ibid at para 108. 
449 Bartlett, supra note 442 at 313. 
450 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3) [2016] FCA 900 at para 197; Northern Territory of Australia v 
Griffiths [2017] FCAFC 106. 
451 Ibid at para 197. 
452 See generally; The Commonwealth v Yarmirr [2001] HCA 56. 
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trial court because the trial court did not take into cognizance the limitations on the land rights and 
interests while assessing compensation.453 
 
The trial court and the Federal Court seem to represent the different views on this point. The 
position of the trial judge however appears to be the better view and takes into consideration the 
peculiar nature of the native title. The next section will critically examine Griffiths and give reasons 
why the decision of the trial judge may be a better decision.  
 
3.2.2 Principles for Determination of Compensation under the NTA 
The NTA has detailed provisions as regards the entitlement of indigenous groups to compensation 
when their interests in the native title are violated.454 The effect of these provisions is that there is 
no longer uncertainty in the legal regime of Australia on whether or not native title is a 
compensable right.  Entitlement to compensation under the NTA extends to past, intermediate and 
future acts that affect the native title.455  
 
Succinctly, the acts that are compensable under the NTA are past and intermediate acts that are 
validated by the Act or future acts that are in line with the provisions of the Act. Past acts are acts 
that occurred before 1 July 1993 (if the act is legislation) or before 1 January 1994 (for acts other 
than legislation) which were inconsistent with native title rights and interests and could have 
ordinarily been invalid under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).456  NTA validates certain 
past acts of the Commonwealth and also allows the states and territories to validate certain past 
acts.457 
 
Intermediate acts under section 232A of the NTA are acts that took place between 1 January 1994 
and 23 December 1996 before the  High Court’s decision in Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 
CLR 1. NTA also validates certain intermediate acts of the Commonwealth and allows the states 
and territories to validate same.458 
                                                          
453 Northern Territory of Australia v Griffiths [2017] FCAFC 106 at para 129 [Griffiths 2]. 
454 NTA, supra note 420  at ss 17, 20, 23J, 48, 49, 50, 51, 51A, 52, 52A & 53. 
455 Ibid at preamble; s 4 (2) & (3).  
456 Ibid at s 228. The Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)  protects holders of native title from discriminatory 
extinguishment or impairment of their land rights and interests. 
457 Ibid at 13A. Past acts are grouped into categories A, B, C and D. For this see NTA, supra note 420 at  ss. 229-232. 
458 Ibid at s 21. 
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Finally, for the future acts to be compensable under the NTA, it must be a valid future act.459 Invalid 
future acts are ordinarily remedied under the general law and not necessarily under the NTA.460 
Such remedies may take forms other than compensation: like restitution of land, reallocation of 
land with the same size and quality, etc. This does not, however, preclude a native group’s 
entitlement to compensation in appropriate circumstances for such invalid acts under the general 
law. 
 
Although past and intermediate acts that are not or cannot be validated under the NTA are not 
compensable under the Act, they should be ordinarily compensable under the Racial 
Discrimination Act. The Racial Discrimination Act protects holders of native title from 
discriminatory extinguishment or impairment of their land rights and interests.461 The Act 
guarantees equality before the law with respect to the provisions of International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.462 The NTA does not preclude entitlement 
to compensation under the Racial Discrimination Act.463 It only precludes multiple compensations 
for acts which are essentially the same.464 Thus, holders of a native title whose rights and interests 
are infringed cannot be compensated both under the NTA and Racial Discrimination Act. A claim 
under the Racial Discrimination Act becomes significant where there is no entitlement under the 
NTA. 465 
 
For an act to be compensable under the NTA, it must affect the native title, and this may take 
different forms. An act affects native title if it is inconsistent (wholly or partly) with the continued 
existence, enjoyment or exercise of the native title rights and interests or if it extinguishes those 
rights and interests.466 These acts may come in the form of legislation; grant of licences, permits 
                                                          
459 Ibid at s 50.   
460 Ibid at ss. 50 and 213. 
461 Bartlett, supra note 442 at 780. 
462 Ibid at 780. See also Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) section 10; The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) [CERD]. 
463 Ibid at 782. 
464 Ibid at 782. See also NTA, supra note 420 at s 49. It is worthy of note that pursuant to section 7 of the NTA, 
provisions of NTA are subject to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. However, that provision does not affect the 
validation of acts under the NTA. 
465 Ibid at 782. 
466 NTA, supra note 420 at s 227. 
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or variation of same; a creation, extinguishment or variation of any interest in land or waters; the 
exercise of executive power of the Crown; etc.467 
 
Division 5 of the NTA is dedicated to the principles to be used in the determination of 
compensation.468 The standard of compensation in accordance to the NTA is that compensation 
must be on just terms and it must cover any loss, diminution, impairment or any other impact on 
the native title rights and interests.469 However, the total compensation payable assuming the act 
totally extinguishes all the native title must not exceed the total amount payable for compulsory 
acquisition of freehold estate in land or waters.470 Consequently, where the act does not totally 
extinguish the native title rights, the amount of compensation payable will not be up to the amount 
payable for compulsory acquisition of freehold estate in land. Another factor that may limit 
compensation from getting to the amount payable for compulsory acquisition of a freehold estate 
is the extent of the interest(s) of the indigenous group affected. The interest (s) of an indigenous 
group may be exclusive or non-exclusive.471 Section 51A (1) of NTA (which places a limit to the 
amount payable) does not expressly reflect that the amount payable reduces to a fraction of the 
total amount payable for a freehold estate where the compensable act affects a non-exclusive 
interest. However, this appears to be the approach of the courts in Australia.472  Perhaps, this comes 
with a presumption that s 51A (1) envisages that the maximum amount is only payable to exclusive 
interests. 
 
The best explanation given to what compensation on just terms might mean under the NTA is that 
it must cover any loss, diminution, impairment or any other impact on the native title rights and 
interests.473 This leaves a clearer explanation to judicial interpretation. What compensation on just 
terms might mean may be seen in the cases of Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 
                                                          
467 Ibid at s 226 (2). 
468 Ibid at ss 48, 49, 50, 51, 51A, 52, 52A & 53. 
469 Ibid at s 51 (1). 
470 Ibid at s 51A (1). 
471 Native title is exclusive where it gives the holders the right to possess the land to the exclusion of every other 
person. On the other hand, it is non-exclusive where it gives the holders a bundle of rights which does not extend to 
the right to exclusion of others. Such bundle of rights could be rights to possess the land, fish etc. See The 
Commonwealth v Yarmirr [2001] HCA 56. 
472 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3) [2016] FCA 900 at para 197; Northern Territory of Australia v 
Griffiths [2017] FCAFC 106. 
473 NTA, supra note 420 at s 51 (1). 
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3)474 & Northern Territory of Australia v Griffiths.475 The former is a decision of the Federal Court 
of Australia (FCA), and the latter is the decision of the Full Court (FC) of the FCA acting in its 
appellate jurisdiction in the same matter. As at the time of writing this thesis, the case is pending 
before the High Court of Australia.476   
 
The compensation claim in Griffiths was with respect to the extinguishment of non-exclusive 
native title rights and interests. The total compensation claim was for 53 acts on 39 lots and four 
public roads.477 Based on the peculiar nature of native title, the trial court took a bifurcated 
approach in the determination of compensation. The approach was to determine the compensation 
payable for the economic losses and non-economic losses differently, using different principles. 
The economic losses are tangible losses, while the non-economic losses are intangible losses 
emanating from the spiritual component and the special connection that the native group has in the 
land.478 The bifurcated approach used by the trial judge is not a mandatory approach under the 
NTA. It was an approach employed by the parties in their pleadings for convenience.  However, 
the character and content of the NTA allow the approach. 
 
Compensation for Economic Losses. 
The trial court was urged by the Northern Territory (NT) to follow the conventional approach of 
assessing compensation in expropriation cases as expounded in Spencer v Commonwealth.479 The 
conventional test expressed in Spencer for the determination of compensation is “the value which 
would be paid by a willing but not anxious purchaser from a willing but not anxious 
vendor.”480 However, the trial judge declined to follow the test in Spencer because in his view, 
native title is inalienable and cannot be sold in an open market.481 Thus, it is inappropriate to apply 
the Spencer test to native title because doing so would be tantamount to treating native title as 
freehold estate.482 He further held that the available market for native title could only be the NT or 
the Commonwealth (who happens to be the infringer). Therefore, it was held that the focus should 
                                                          
474 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3) [2016] FCA 900 [Griffiths 1]. 
475 Northern Territory of Australia v Griffiths [2017] FCAFC 106 (Griffiths 2). 
476 D3/2018 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia & Anor. 
477 Griffiths 2, supra note 475 at para 13.  
478 Ibid at para 42. 
479  Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418 at 432. See Griffiths 1, supra, note 474 at para 196. 
480 Griffiths 1, supra, note 474 at para 211. 
481 Ibid at para 211. 
482 Ibid at para 216. 
 90 
 
be on what has been obtained by the presumed willing buyer (NT and Commonwealth).483 This 
approach makes the calculation of compensation to be based on the gain of the infringer and not 
necessarily the loss of the native group. The learned trial judge was also of the firm view that the 
inalienability of native title does not make it less of value than freehold estate.484 
 
In assessing compensation, the learned trial judge took cognizance of the fact that the native rights 
and interest are non-exclusive. He held that if an exclusive native title in line with NTA is valued 
in about same as freehold title, a non-exclusive native title should ordinarily be less than a freehold 
title.485 Consequently, he held that the appropriate valuation of compensation is 80% of the 
freehold value.486 This conclusion was reached after his findings via evidence that the degree of 
the non-exclusive interest was high. This is because the non-exclusive rights and interest gave the 
native group the right to prevent any further activity in the land except the existing tenures.487He 
further granted a pre-judgment interest by the simple interest of the market value from the date of 
the compensable acts to the date of judgment calculated in line with the practice note of the Federal 
High Court of Australia.488 
 
On appeal by the NT, although the Full Court did not adopt a different approach, they cast doubt 
on the effectiveness of the bifurcated approach adopted by the parties at the trial 
court.489Consequently, the court held that a better approach would have been a holistic approach 
which will signify an all-inclusive compensation that will take cognizance of both the economic 
and non-economic losses without assessing them differently.490 The Full Court held further that 
the holistic approach was more contemplated by s 51 (1) NTA.491 
 
The Full Court reviewed the decision of the trial court as regards its assessment of the 
compensation payable for economic loses as follows: 
                                                          
483 Ibid at para 215. 
484 Ibid at para 216. 
485 Ibid at para 197. 
486 Ibid at para 232. 
487 Ibid at para 232. 
488 Ibid para 463. 
489 Griffiths 2, supra note 475 at para 42. 
490 Ibid at para 142. 
491 Ibid at para 142. 
 91 
 
1. The trial judge erred by declining to follow the conventional approach as in Spencer for 
the assessment of compensation.492 
2. The inalienability of native title makes it of less value than a freehold estate. Hence, the 
trial judge erred by not considering that fact in his assessment.493 
3. By failure of the trial judge to follow the conventional test of Spencer, he included non- 
economic components of spirituality in the assessment of economic losses.494 
 
Further to the above, the Full Court reassessed the economic value of the non-exclusive rights and 
interests of the Claim Group to be 65% of the freehold value.495 The Full Court consequentially 
reduced the interest payable for the acts.496 However, the court agreed with the trial judge that 
although the NTA does not preclude the calculation of interest by compound interest in appropriate 
circumstances, the interest payable based on the circumstances of that case should be on a simple 
interest basis.497 
 
Compensation for Non-Economic Losses. 
Valuation of compensation for non-economic losses appeared to be more complex as the court had 
no precedent of a mathematical formula to rely on or to adapt to the circumstances of the case, 
having regard to the sui generis nature of native title.498 Undoubtedly, the spiritual losses and the 
loss of a Claim Group’s connection to their land is compensable under the NTA, however, the Act 
does not provide any formula for assessing them. Non-economic losses are compensable because 
they are ordinarily part of the “loss, diminution, impairment or any other impact on the native title 
rights and interests” that must be compensated for under the NTA.499 
 
                                                          
492 Ibid at paras 109. 
493 Ibid at para 115. 
494 Ibid at paras 111 & 112. 
495 Ibid at paras 139. 
496 Ibid at para 465. 
497 Ibid at paras 199 & 213. 
498 Valuation of compensation for non-economic losses of an indigenous group entails the assessment in perhaps 
monetary form, the spiritual content of native title as well as the degree of the Claim Group’s connection to their land. 
499 NTA, supra note 420 at s 51 (1). 
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Faced with the challenge of calculating the intangible, the trial court sought assistance from cases 
of compensation in areas of copyright, defamation, and other like claims that have intangible 
interests, but found little help because those claims were for personal and not for communal loss.500 
 
Further to the difficulty in determining the appropriate value of the intangible losses of a native 
title for compensation for acts of the government, the trial judge held that such compensation 
should be granted by way of solatium. He describes solatium to be the compensation component 
that represents the loss or diminution of connection or traditional attachment to land, and not 
necessarily the value.501 The trial judge set out what may be said to be the principles for the 
determination of solatium as follows: 
 
1. Solatium must be assessed having regard to the particular nature of native interest (whether 
it is exclusive or non-exclusive interest).502 
2. It must reflect the loss or impairment of traditional attachment to land arising from the 
particular extinguishment or interference in question (rather than from earlier or subsequent 
events or effects).503 
3. The area of land affected must be assessed.504 
4. Also, the spiritual and usufructuary significance of the land must be considered.505  
 
The figure to be finally arrived at as solatium appears to be discretionary. Of course, the above 
factors seem to be the principles a judge is to bear in mind while exercising his discretion judicially 
and judiciously. This is because the primary judge held that the assessment of solatium is intuitive 
rather than being a product of careful calculation.506 The lack of careful calculation is not based 
on lack of interest to do so but because of the complexity (or perhaps the impossibility) of 
mathematically giving a figure to the exact value of spiritual connection to land.507 Further to the 
                                                          
500 Griffiths 1, supra note 474 at para 307. See also Milpurrurru v Indofurm Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240; Cubillo v 
Commonwealth (2000) 103 FCR 1; Trevorrow v South Australia (No 5) (2007) 98 SASR 136. 
501 Ibid at para 300. 
502 Ibid at para 301. 
503 Ibid at para 301. 
504 Ibid at para 302. 
505 Ibid at para 302. 
506 Ibid at para 302. 
507 Ibid at paras 302, 313 & 383. See also Crampton v Nugawela (1996) 41 NSWLR 176. 
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above, the trial judge assessed the compensation for non-economic losses to be $1.3 Million.508 
The Full Court affirmed this assessment.509 
 
3.2.3 Reflections on Griffiths 
Before the decision of the FCA and FC in Griffiths, there were several comments and speculations 
as regards the possible implications of the compensation provisions of the NTA.510 The decisions 
of the FCA and FC give an insight on the implications of those provisions as we await the final 
decision of the High Court of Australia.  
 
That said, the approach of the FCA seems to reflect a better strategy to solving the problematic 
calculation of compensation for native title and the broader issue of the complexities of 
measurement of compensation as regards an indigenous land interest in other similar jurisdictions. 
The bifurcated approach of the FCA reduces the somewhat complexity in the valuation of the 
compensation for impairment of indigenous interest in their land. That approach presupposes that 
the economic losses are tangible and calculable while the non-economic losses are not. At least, 
this demystifies the complication in the calculation of compensation. This is because the economic 
losses may be said to be calculable with a mathematical formula (of course depending on the facts 
and circumstances of each case). In my opinion, the bifurcated approach is far better than a holistic 
approach where the whole indigenous interest in their lands is treated as incalculable.  
 
Then, as regards the non-economic losses which is incalculable, the FCA first admitted that it is 
very difficult if not impossible to have a scientific formula to arrive at a monetary value. Therefore, 
to recompense of the affected indigenous group and in the interest of justice, the court leaves it in 
the intuition of the court which is to be exercised judicially and judiciously, having regard to the 
factors earlier pointed out. 
 
The FCA and FC appear to differ on the formula to be adopted for the calculation of the economic 
losses. Again, the approach of the FCA might arguably be a better approach. Relying on the 
                                                          
508 Ibid at para 383. 
509 Griffiths 2, supra note 475 at para 420. 
510 Brian Keon-Cohen, “Compensation and Compulsory Acquisition under the Native Title Act 1993” (2002) 28 
Monash U. L. Rev. 17 at 18. See also Sam Adkins et al, “Calculating the Incalculable: Principles for Compensating 
Impacts to Aboriginal Title” (2016) 54 Alta. L. Rev. 351 at 372-373. 
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conventional “market value” principles as set out in Spencer may be inappropriate as native title 
is not available in the open market. The FC held that the FCA should have applied the Spencer test 
by basing their calculation on a “hypothetical marketplace.”511  
 
The problem with the approach of the FC is that “hypothesis” should be used in a situation where 
“reality” is lacking. In other words, the whole essence of creating a “hypothesis” to solve a 
particular problem is in a situation where an explanation is not tenable based on limited evidence. 
This is not the situation as far as native title is concerned. Native title is such that it has only one 
marketplace: in that particular case the NT or the Commonwealth (the government). Hence, there 
is no need to create a marketplace “hypothetically” where in reality there is only one marketplace 
which is tenable.  The case of Commonwealth v Arklay512 relied upon by the FC deals with the 
assessment of compensation for acquisition where wartime controls fixed price for the sale of 
land.513 This kind of situation is clearly distinguishable from the limitation placed on native title. 
The limitation placed on native title is not as regards its value in terms of price, but as regards the 
available market for alienation.  
 
Perhaps, the FC’s application of Arklay stems from their presumption, albeit erroneously that the 
inalienability of native title reduces its value when compared to a freehold estate. The FC’s 
decision provides no justifiable reason for their position that the inalienability of native title is a 
discounting factor in its value.514 They supported their position with the case of Geita Sebea v 
Territory of Papua.515 On the contrary, that case gives reasons to support the position that the 
inalienability of native title does not reduce its value. It was held in that case as follows: 
 
The question whether the provision of the Land Ordinance restricting the rights of 
the appellants [natives] to sell or otherwise deal with the land affects its value 
should be answered in the negative.  The Ordinance, sec. 3, provides that save as 
thereinafter provided a native shall have no power to sell, lease, or otherwise deal 
with, or dispose of, any land, and any contract made by him to do so shall be 
                                                          
511 Griffiths 2, supra note 475 at paras 120-121. 
512 Commonwealth v Arklay (1952) 87 CLR 159 
513 Griffiths 2, supra note 475 at para 121. 
514 Ibid at 115. 
515 Geita Sebea v Territory of Papua (1941) 67 CLR 544. 
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void.  But the Government may in certain cases purchase or lease native lands (sec. 
5).  The Lands (Kila Kila Aerodrome) Acquisition Ordinance 1939, however, 
disposes of the matter.  It enables the Government to acquire the lands in question 
here and prescribes for payment of compensation to the natives or persons entitled 
thereto.516  
 
Having identified that the only market available for native title is the Crown, the approach of the 
FCA wherein it deduced the value of the economic interest of indigenous peoples in land from the 
benefit of the Crown makes sense. This was the approach adopted in Geita Sebea.517A contrary 
argument would be that if that approach is adopted, the indigenous group affected may be left 
uncompensated where the Crown makes no gain. This argument may actually not be correct, 
because the gain that is to be assessed should be the gain that the Crown would ordinarily make 
from such extinguishment or impairment and not necessarily the actual gain that the Crown has 
made. The approach adopted by the FCA happens to be a very practical and logical-mathematical 
formula for the calculation of the economic loss occasioned by the infringement of a native title. 
Furthermore, the pre-judgment interest calculated by simple interest from the day of the act, of 
course, makes sense and portrays fairness. 
 
As regards the non-economic loss, the trial judge was also very practical. He first admitted the 
impossibility of placing a figure on the spiritual connection to land. His reason is obviously that 
apart from the fact that such connection is intangible, it has no market value. Hence, the sole 
essence of compensation in such a situation is not to pay back the indigenous group for the 
deprivation of the connection, but to recompense for the deprivation. That said, he left that area to 
be uncertain and dependent on the intuition of the judge after consideration of requisite factors. 
This shows the beauty of a bifurcated approach to the calculation of compensation. If not for that 
approach, the whole of a native title may be taken as incalculable. 
 
Canada may draw from Australia for the development of their compensation regime as follows: 
 
                                                          
516 Ibid at 555 (Emphasis Added). 
517 Griffiths 1, supra, note 474 at para 215. 
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a) The first thing that Canada can draw from Australia is the need for the enactment of a 
legislative framework that will set out the principles for the determination of compensation 
for both past and future infringements.  Such a legislative regime will increase certainty 
and structure in this area and of course, clarify the different variations that are existent in 
Canada.518  
b) Another principle that is key is the bifurcated approach of the FCA. This approach as I 
have earlier submitted shows that the native title (and Aboriginal title) is not as incalculable 
as has been thought.  
c) The approach in Geita Sebea which was accepted by the FCA in Griffiths that the 
inalienability of native title does not reduce the value of native title when compared to a 
freehold seems to be a good principle to be adopted in Canada. In fact, this appears to be 
the position of the law in Canada.519 However, some scholars in Canada have made a 
contrary argument that the inalienability of Aboriginal title reduces its market value.520 
This position is not anchored on any strong legal principle. Hence it is pertinent to be clear 
that inalienability does not reduce its value. 
 
The importation of the experience in Australia should be in such a way that will make it adapt to, 
clarify and develop the already existing Canadian approach to compensation and should not be a 
total replacement. For instance, the emphasis of the FCA on the gain of the Crown may be used in 
Canada, however not in all circumstances. This is because as demonstrated in chapter two, the way 
fiduciary principles of compensation work depend on the circumstances of each case. Sometimes 
it seeks to access the actual loss of an indigenous group based on the creation of an expectation by 
the Crown as in Guerin v. The Queen.521 Other times, it may strive for the restitution of the gain 
of the infringer due to the existence of unjust enrichment.  
 
 
 
                                                          
518 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 380. 
519 Tsilhqot’in Nation supra note 6 at para 73. The SCC held that “Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to 
those associated with fee simple, including:  the right to decide how the land will be used; the right of enjoyment and 
occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-
actively use and manage the land.” If Aboriginal title confers all these rights, consequently, its inalienability like in 
Geita Sebea should not be a discounting factor. 
520 Isaac, Aboriginal Title supra note 93 at 47-48. 
521 [1984] 2 R.C.S. 335. 
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3.3 The Experience in Malaysia  
 
3.3.1 Native Title in Malaysia (An Overview)  
The development of native title in Malaysia was largely (if not wholly) influenced by Aboriginal 
title in Canada as expounded in Calder and native title in Australia as established in Mabo. The 
indigenous people in Malaysia may be said to include the Malays, natives of Sabah and Sarawak 
and the Orang Asli as indigenous peoples.522 The recognition of the rights and interests of 
indigenous peoples of Malaysia to their native title is credited to the cases of Adong Kuwau & Ors 
v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor (Adong)523 and Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor 
& Ors (Sagong Tasi).524 In Adong the High court formally established that the Malaysian 
jurisprudence recognizes native title, therefore making Malaysia be in line with other 
Commonwealth nations like Canada and Australia.525  Subsequent cases have gone further drawing 
from the principles set in Adong to explain the nature and content of native title in Malaysia.526 In 
the recent case of Sangka Chuka & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Mersing, Johor & Ors527 the 
High Court of Malaya summarized the nature, scope, and content of native title in Australia as has 
been recognized by Adong and Sagong Tasi as follows: 
 
1. The indigenous peoples have a right to their ancestral land provided there is a continuous 
and unbroken occupation and enjoyment of rights to the land.528 
                                                          
522 S. Robert Aiken & Colin H. Leigh, “Seeking Redress in the Courts: Indigenous Land Rights and Judicial Decisions 
in Malaysia” (2011) 45:4 Modern Asian Studies 825 at 829. S. Robert Aiken & Colin H. Leigh suggest that these 
groups are not recognized in the same way. For instance, they point out that the Orang Asli people are recognized 
“grudgingly” as indigenous peoples. Some other scholars suggest that ‘indigenous peoples’ does not include nationally 
dominant majority peoples like the Malays.  For this see Kirk Endicott, ‘Indigenous Rights Issues in Malaysia’ in 
Bartholomew Dean and Jerome M. Levi, eds, At the Risk of Being Heard: Identity, Indigenous Rights, and Postcolonial 
States, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003) at 145. Thus, it appears there may still be some issues with 
respect to the definition of indigenous peoples in Malaysia which happen not to be within the scope of this research.  
523 Adong Kuwau & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor [1997] 3 MLRH 95 (Court of Appeal Kerajaan Negeri 
Johor & Anor v. Adong Kuwau & Ors [1998] 1 MLRA 170). 
524 Sagong Tasi & Ors v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors [2002] 1 MLRH 161 (Court of Appeal Kerajaan Negeri 
Selangor & Ors v. Sagong Tasi & Ors [2005] 1 MLRA 819). 
525 Aiken & Leigh, supra note 522 at 825. 
526 Nor Anak Nyawai & Ors v. Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd & Ors [2001] 1 MLRH 304 (Court of Appeal 
Superintendent of Lands & Surveys Bintulu v. Nor Anak Nyawai & Ors and another Appeal [2005] 1 MLRA 580) and 
Madeli Salleh v. Superintendent of Lands & Surveys & Anor [2005] 1 MLRA 599 (Federal Court Superintendent Of 
Lands & Surveys Miri Division & Anor v. Madeli Salleh [2007] 2 MLRA 390). 
527 Sangka Chuka & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Mersing, Johor & Ors [2017] 2 MLRH 286. 
528 Ibid, at para 30(i). 
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2. Native title pre-dates the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954 of Malaysia (which only 
complements and does not extinguish native title).529 
3.  Native title is sui generis, and it is inclusive of the right to live on the land, move about 
freely without disturbance or interference.530 
4. Native title is inalienable. It is a form of proprietary right within the scope of Section 13 of 
the Federal Constitution of Malaysia531 and thus enjoys constitutional safeguards against 
deprivation of native interests without compensation. Its extinguishment can only be on 
the grounds of public purposes by a clear provision of legislation and after payment of 
adequate compensation.532  
5. The test of occupation for native title is the existence of exclusive occupation. However, 
actual physical presence is not mandatory.533 
6. The Federal and State governments owe a fiduciary duty to protect the land rights of 
indigenous peoples of Malaysia.534 
 
The above features show that the nature of native title in Malaysia is more in line with the 
Aboriginal title of Canada than the native title of Australia, especially where it comes to the 
requirements for establishment. For Canada and Malaysia, the focal point for the establishment of 
native title is occupation whereas Australia emphasizes on proof of native law and custom 
possessed by an indigenous group in connection to the land.  
 
3.3.2 Principles for Determination of Compensation upon extinguishment of Native Title 
in Malaysia  
Malaysia may not have a compensation regime as organized as that of Australia, but their 
jurisprudence shows that efforts have been made to develop principles for determination of 
adequate compensation where native title is extinguished.  
 
                                                          
529 Ibid, at para 30(ii). This is akin to the position in Canada by virtue of Calder; that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
affirms the existence of Aboriginal title, but it does not create it. 
530 Ibid, at para 30(iii). 
531 Federal Constitution of Malaysia (Federal Constitution), 1957.  
532 Sangka Chuka, supra note 527 at para 30(iv). 
533 Ibid, at para 30(vi). 
534 Ibid, at para 30(ix). 
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The case of Adong established that there is a mandatory requirement of adequate compensation in 
line with Article 13 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia to be paid to a native group for the 
losses of their usufructuary rights.535Article 13 of the Federal Constitution is a general provision 
that states that nobody should be deprived of property compulsorily in accordance with the law 
without adequate compensation.536This provision is not specifically meant for native title, and it 
did not set out the factors that will determine when compensation becomes adequate. In Adong, 
the government ejected some native families from their lands to build a dam to supply water to the 
Republic of Singapore.537 The indigenous group affected filed an action claiming compensation 
for deprivation of their native title under the common law and proprietary rights provisions under 
Article 13 of the Federal Constitution.538 The High Court per Justice Sidin awarded compensation 
only for the produce on the land.539 He declined to award compensation for the land itself or for 
cultural or heritage reasons as it was impossible to do so in his opinion.540The Court of Appeal of 
Malaysia affirmed the same decision, and the Federal Court of Malaysia541also upheld the decision 
of the High Court.542    
 
A different approach was taken in Sagong Tasi in the assessment of compensation. In that case, 
the High Court held that for compensation of deprivation of the proprietary rights of a native group 
under Article 13 of the Federal Constitution to be adequate, it has to be assessed in accordance to 
the provisions of the Federal Land Acquisition Act (LAA).543 LAA is an Act generally made for the 
acquisition of land, assessment of compensation where land is compulsorily acquired and other 
incidental matters.544 Thus, this Act is akin to an expropriation law for fee simple and not 
specifically enacted for native title. However, the High Court applied the Act to native title by 
giving a purposive interpretation to its section 2 which defines “land.”545 By that section, land to 
which the Act applies are “alienated land within the meaning of the State land law, land occupied 
                                                          
535 Anuar Alias & Md Nasir Daud, Saka: Adequate Compensation for Orang Asli Native Land (Johor: Pejabat Penerbit) 
at 61. A usufructuary right gives the bearer a right to property to use and draw from same profits, utility or any good 
it may produce provided that the substance of the property remains unaltered. 
536 Federal Constitution, supra note 531 at Art 13 (2). 
537 Adong, supra note 523 at 423-424. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Ibid at 436. 
540 Ibid at 436. See also Aiken & Leigh, supra note 522 at 856. 
541 The apex court in Malaysia. 
542 Aiken & Leigh, supra note 522 at 856-857. 
543 Land Acquisition Act, Act 486, 1960 (LAA). See Sagong Tasi, supra note 524 at 619. 
544Ibid at Long title. 
545 Sagong Tasi, supra note 524 at 619. 
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under customary right and land occupied in expectation of title.”546 The Act does not define “land 
occupied under customary right”, however, the court adopted a purposive interpretation extending 
it to native title to ensure that a group whose interest in land is acquired (wholly or partly) are 
granted adequate compensation.547 The Court held that for compensation to be adequate, it must 
follow the provisions of LAA.548 This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal of Malaysia.549 
 
Succinctly put, the factors to be considered under the LAA in the assessment of compensation are 
the market value of the land and the damage, if any, sustained or likely to be sustained by the 
person interested; whose interest in land is acquired.550 To get the market value, land is assessed 
by a qualified valuer who will have regard to the prices paid for the recent sales of land of similar 
characteristics, situated within the vicinity of the acquired land.551 The court was silent in Sagong 
Tasi on the mechanism to be used in applying the provisions of LAA to native title having regard 
to its peculiarities. The expectation is that in the application of LAA, the provisions will be 
interpreted to align with the peculiar circumstances surrounding native title. For instance, Section 
40A of LAA provides as follows: 
 
Where the objection before the Court is in regard to the amount of the 
compensation, the Court shall appoint two assessors (one of whom shall be the 
valuation officer employed by the Government) for the purpose of aiding the Judge 
in determining the objection and in arriving at a fair and reasonable amount of 
compensation. 
 
This provision takes cognizance of the fact that a judge may not be versed in the valuation of land 
with diverse characteristics in different cases that may arise. Hence, the provision presupposes that 
the assessors to be appointed would have something of value to deliver to the court which is 
predicated on their knowledge and experience with the kind of land under consideration. Where 
native title is the subject matter of the suit, the two assessors to be appointed should ordinarily be 
knowledgeable in the characteristics of the particular nature of the native title under consideration. 
                                                          
546 LAA, supra note 543 at s 2 (Emphasis added).  
547 Sagong Tasi, supra note 524 at 619. 
548 Ibid at 622. 
549 Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors v. Sagong Tasi & Ors [2005] 1 MLRA 819. 
550 LAA, supra note 543 at Art 2 of 1st Schedule. 
551 Ibid at Article 1 (1A) of 1st Schedule. 
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Also, as one of the assessors is to be appointed by the government (who is a party to the suit), the 
other should ordinarily be appointed by the native community affected. This will ensure balance, 
fairness and further imbue the confidence of the indigenous group in the fair evaluation of 
compensation. 
 
Where the assessors arrive at a decision, they are to make reports to the judge which will form the 
basis of the judge’s final decision. If there is a conflict between their reports, then the judge shall 
elect the decision to take having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.552These 
provisions were not invoked in Sagong Tasi however since the case orders a full application of the 
provisions LAA, in native title compensation cases, the use of assessors who are versed in the 
knowledge of the nature of native title should be a better mechanism towards ensuring adequate 
compensation.  
 
3.3.3 Reflections on the Malaysian Compensation Regime  
Irrespective of the fact that Sagong Tasi may be an improvement from the earlier provision in 
Adong, legal scholars in Malaysia are still dissatisfied with the approach adopted in Sagong Tasi. 
This is premised on the fact that the approach does not consider the cultural and spiritual 
deprivation (intangible losses) occasioned dispossession of a native group’s interest in their 
land.553 Hence, contrary to the position in Australia that adopted a bifurcated approach where the 
tangible and intangible (economic and non-economic) losses are valued disjunctively, the 
Malaysian approach is restricted to the economic losses of land. However, in the calculation of the 
economic value of native land in Malaysia, there is no contention on whether or not the 
inalienability of native land makes it of less value when compared to freehold title. In fact, the 
position in Malaysia appears to be that the market value given to a freehold title remains the 
starting point for compensation where native title is involved.554  This is because LAA is a general 
expropriation law originally meant for freehold estate before Sagong Tasi extended same to native 
title. The language of the Act may actually suggest that same can be adapted to the peculiarities of 
native title where the need arises. In addition, nothing in LAA precludes the calculation of non-
economic interest of land. 
                                                          
552 Ibid at s 40D (1) & (2). 
553 Aiken & Leigh, supra note 522 at 865. 
554 Alias & Daud, supra note 535 at 99. 
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Although the compensation regime of Malaysia may not look quite developed, there are some 
mechanisms that Canada could draw from in the development of their framework. The first has 
already been emphasized earlier: the inalienability of Aboriginal title should not be a discounting 
factor in the assessment of the economic value. That said, it makes sense to argue that the freehold 
market value of a freehold estate should be the starting point to the calculation of the economic 
limb of the compensation.555  
 
Another important lesson that can be adopted from LAA into the Canadian system is the need to 
appoint assessors where issues of compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title are raised. 
This area of law may never be entirely certain owing to the nature of Aboriginal title and the 
complex situations that can arise from varying circumstances. However, it will be a step in the 
right direction to involve experts in this field to be involved in such an evaluation.  
 
One may argue that the position of assessors may not be necessary as the court could always rely 
on the testimonies of expert witnesses. Well, in response to the anticipated argument, the position 
of assessors and their reports under the LAA will in my respectful view have more probative value 
and are more compelling than any expert witness may have.556 Of course, the assessors in the 
Canadian context will not be restricted to the valuation of the tangible losses. They may extend to 
non-economic losses. It may be difficult, if not impossible for assessors to calculate the intangible 
monetarily but their role as regards the intangible losses will be to help the court exercise its 
discretion judicially and judiciously as regards the appropriate figure to be considered as solatium. 
This can be done by assessing the factors that should guide the judge in coming up with a solatium. 
These factors as in a Canadian context include the particular nature of the Aboriginal title, the 
nature of the infringement, the severity of infringement and the extent of accommodation of 
Aboriginal interest.  
 
The use of assessors may be a good way to bring in Aboriginal perspective in the determination of 
compensation. The qualification should ordinarily be that the persons should have a track record 
                                                          
555 Ibid. 
556 The use of assessors will not preclude the parties from calling experts as witnesses if they so wish. In fact, the 
assessors, based on their requisite knowledge and background on the subject matter of the suit are even in a better 
position to evaluate the weight of the testimony of the experts (if they are called). 
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which shows expertise in issues concerning Aboriginal title, especially relating to the particular 
nature of the subject matter of the suit. Also, to ensure that Aboriginal perspectives are employed 
in the determination of compensation, strong efforts should be made to appoint indigenous peoples 
as assessors. 
  
It is a truism that the use of assessors cannot be adopted unilaterally by the courts without an 
enabling statute. The next chapter makes a case for the use of assessors to form part of the 
legislative framework that the chapter proposes. The proposal in the next chapter shows why in 
my view the use of assessors may be desirable in the determination of compensation for 
infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada. 
 
3.4 Determination of Compensation for Violation of Indigenous Land Rights under the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) 2007. 
 
3.4.1 Redress for Infringement of Land Lights Under UNDRIP 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP)557 adopted by the 
UN General Assembly universally consolidates the rights of indigenous peoples.558More 
importantly, the Declaration makes copious provisions on the land rights of indigenous peoples.559 
UNDRIP has been described as an instrument characterized by a hard content because it exhibits 
an extensive list of rights of indigenous peoples and imposes a lot of state obligations.560 More so, 
its extended protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights has been argued to touch upon state 
territorial sovereignty.561 Thus, the potential conflict between the territorial sovereignty of states 
and the protection of the land rights of indigenous peoples seems to be the reason for the reluctance 
in the implementation of the contents of the Declaration in several states.562  
 
                                                          
557 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 13 September 2007, A/RES/61/295. 
558 Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors, 2nd ed (Boston: 
Brill Nijhoff, 2016) at  7.  
559 UNDRIP, supra note 557 at Arts 26-32. 
560 Mauro Barelli, “The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The Case of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2009) 58 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.  957 at 972.  
561 Gilbert,supra note 558 at 10. 
562 Ibid at 10. 
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Canada was one of the four states that voted against the adoption of the Declaration owing to its 
character and content.563 However, on 12 November 2010, Canada issued a statement endorsing 
the UN Declaration.564 Later, on 9 May 2016, Canada officially endorsed the Declaration and 
removed their objection.565 It is worthy of note however that the adoption of the Declaration by 
Canada does not in itself make it binding as it is a Declaration adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations and therefore a non-binding soft law.566 Since the adoption of the Declaration 
by Canada, the state has been working and deliberating on its implementation. This has generated 
a debate on the potential impact the character and content of UNDRIP may have on the already 
existing framework for the protection of the rights of indigenous people in Canada.  
 
Currently, there is a Bill before the Senate of Canada for the implementation of UNDRIP.567 
However, Dwight Newman contends that the effect this Bill may have on the Canadian legal 
system if it is passed is uncertain.568 Thus, he argues that there are chances that the Bill may 
actually “cause enormously negative unintended consequences.”569 This argument, of course, is 
not only based on the content of the Declaration but also on the content of the Bill. 
 
Further to the above and in the context of this thesis, it is pertinent to examine the compensation 
provisions in UNDRIP to see the effect they might have in Canada if Bill C-262 (or a similar Bill 
that bears on the implementation of UNDRIP) gets passed. On the other hand, where the Bill (or a 
similar Bill) does not get passed for the implementation, it is equally important to examine 
UNDRIP. This is because although UNDRIP is a non-binding soft law, it has gained international 
                                                          
563 Barelli, supra note 560 at 957. Other states that voted against the adoption of UNDRIP are Australia, the United 
States of America and New Zealand. 
564 Blaine Favel & Ken S. Coates, “Understanding UNDRIP: Choosing Action on Priorities over Sweeping Claims 
about the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2016) Online: 10 Canada and Resource 
Economy Series, Macdonald Laurier available at <https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/MLI-10-
UNDRIPCoates-Flavel05-16-WebReadyV4.pdf > at 1. 
565 Ibid  at 1. 
566 Gilbert, supra note 558 at 7. 
567 Bill C-262, An Act to ensure that the laws of Canada are in harmony with the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. As of 8 June 2018 is at second reading in the Senate. 
568 Dwight Newman, “Re Bill C-262 (An Act to ensure that the laws of Canada are in harmony with the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples)” (Written Brief to House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs to Accompany Oral Submission, 17 April 2018) at 3. 
569 Ibid at 1. 
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momentum.570 Thus, its provisions may in the nearest future be a strong persuasive authority for 
the determination of indigenous rights in diverse jurisdictions including Canada.  
 
Article 28 which addresses the issue of redress for violation of the land rights of indigenous peoples 
under UNDRIP states as follows: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution 
or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied 
or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged 
without their free, prior and informed consent.  
 
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation 
shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal 
status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress. 
 
Generally, the rights of indigenous peoples over land may be categorized into past, present, and 
future.571 To properly understand the scope of the redress provision of Article 28, it is important 
to understand the scope of indigenous land rights under UNDRIP.572 Article 26 provides as 
follows: 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which 
they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired. 
 
2.  Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, 
territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership or 
other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise 
acquired.  
 
                                                          
570 For this see Barelli, supra note 560 at 966-968. Barelli argues that “The non-binding nature of the Declaration does 
not negatively affect the value of the document. Rather than limiting its potential universality, it actually enhanced it.” 
571 Jérémie Gilbert & Cathal Doyle, “A New Dawn over Land: Shedding Light on Collective Ownership and Consent” 
in Stephen Allen & Alexandra Xanthaki, eds, Reflection on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing Limited, 2011) 289 at 294. 
572 This is based on the premise that remedies are products of rights. 
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3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and 
resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, 
traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
There is an ongoing debate on the scope of the above provision. Some scholars are of the view that 
the provision recognizes and protects the indigenous peoples’ right to use own, develop and control 
their present-day land and does not extend to lands which are not presently occupied by indigenous 
peoples.573 Some scholars that adopt this view argue that the word “traditional” used in Article 26 
implies “practice” and does not in any way mean history.574 On the other hand, some other scholars 
submit that Article 26 is a clear provision that could be used to activate the redress of restitution 
of land not presently in occupation by indigenous peoples.575 The scope of the land rights provision 
of Article 26 is important because it may equally define the scope of the redress provision of 
Article 28.576  
 
Article 26 may not be as ambiguous as scholars may have argued it to be. The somewhat ambiguity 
that the provision portrays only comes to light where ordinary dictionary meanings are not given 
to the provisions because of perhaps the extensive nature of rights created therein and the impact 
they might have to the territorial sovereignty of states.  Considering the legal status of UNDRIP as 
a non-binding instrument, the better approach may be to give the literal interpretation to such 
provisions, so that when states are adopting same into their legal systems, they may adopt it with 
qualifications that will better suit the circumstances of such states. That said, the phrase 
“traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired” clearly in my view shows that the 
land rights may extend to lands that are not presently occupied by indigenous peoples. Credence 
may be given to this contention when one interprets Article 26 bearing in mind the purpose of the 
Declaration as set out in its preamble. One of the primary concerns that informed the passing of 
the Declaration is the historic injustices suffered by indigenous peoples as a result of 
“dispossession of their lands, territories, and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in 
                                                          
573 Gilbert & Doyle, supra note 571 at 294; Stephen Allen, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
and the Limits of the International Legal Project” in Stephen Allen, Alexandra Xanthaki, eds, Reflections on the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oxford: Hart Publishing Limited, 2011) 225 at 240. 
574 Allen, supra note 573 at 240. 
575 GN Barrie, “The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People: Implications for Land Rights and 
Self-Determination” (2013) 2 TSAR 292 at 298. 
576 Chapter one argues that rights and remedies are intrinsically linked, and the scope of remedies is always based on 
the character, scope and content of rights sought to be redressed.  
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particular, their right to development in accordance to their own needs and interests.”577 The phrase 
“in accordance to their own needs and interests” signifies their “tradition.” Hence, Article 26 
emphasizes their right to the lands that indigenous peoples occupied in the past; which they 
developed according to their tradition (traditionally owned); which they have been dispossessed 
of as a result of colonization or invasion. Thus, UNDRIP became necessary to redress the injustice 
of dispossession by affirming the rights and giving a redress which includes restitution of land 
where possible. 
 
Also, it is worthy of note that Article 26 is not an “unqualified right.” Where Article 26 is read 
together with the redress provision of Article 28, one would understand that the land rights given 
by Article 26 would not continue with lands which were taken with the free, prior and informed 
consent of indigenous peoples. Hence, the lands which the indigenous peoples surrendered by 
treaties are not ordinarily covered by Article 26. This is because the redress provision of Article 
28 does not extend to lands “freely surrendered” by an indigenous group. Another qualification of 
the rights can be seen in Article 46 (2) which makes the rights in the Declaration to be subject to 
the respect of the non-discriminatory human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. This 
qualification should ordinarily extend to the property rights of bona fide holders of a freehold 
estate in land. 
 
Further, the essence of Article 28 is to provide redress for indigenous peoples who were, are and 
may be victims of deprivation or dispossession of their land rights which they have not surrendered 
by their free, prior and informed consent. The choice of redress will depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case. That article provides for two categories of redress: restitution of land 
and compensation. Jérémie Gilbert contends that the use of the word “redress” in the article dilutes 
the possibility of “restitution.578 This is because Article 27 of the Draft Declaration which due to 
opposition could not make it to the final Declaration expressly provides for the right to restitution 
and not redress.579 Notwithstanding that argument, the fact remains that restitution of land is still 
a viable remedy and the first option of redress to be considered under UNDRIP. Thus, under Article 
28, compensation is of last resort where restitution of land is impossible. The situations that may 
                                                          
577 UNDRIP, supra note 557 at Preamble (Emphasis added). 
578 Gilbert, supra note 558 at 167. 
579 Ibid at 167. 
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make restitution of land to be impossible may include instances where domestic legislation has 
provisions to that effect; justifiable infringements or where the lands are occupied by bona fide 
purchasers of land for value who currently hold land in fee simple. 
 
3.4.2 Principles for the Determination of Compensation Under UNDRIP 
UNDRIP is very clear that infringements of the land rights of indigenous peoples are compensable 
where restitution of lands prove impracticable. Further to this, Article 28 provides some factors 
that will determine the appropriate compensation for violation of indigenous land rights. 
 
First, for there to be a valid compensation, it must be just, fair and equitable.580 These are general 
principles of law that should be the expectation or minimum standard of every compensation. 
However, what amounts to a just, fair and equitable compensation will always depend on the nature 
of the right being protected and other factors that may affect the measure of compensation. The 
provision of Article 28 (1) is akin to the provision of NTA that compensation must be in just terms. 
UNDRIP further explains what might amount to just compensation for deprivation or 
dispossession (wholly or partly) of the indigenous land rights and interests. It provides that 
compensation may be in the form of “lands, territories, and resources equal in quality, size and 
legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress” unless otherwise freely 
agreed upon by the peoples concerned.581 
 
The forms of compensation that UNDRIP provides in line with meeting the standard of being “just, 
fair and equitable” is the replacement of the land with another land of similar quality, size and 
legal status. “Similar quality” should ordinarily encompass the non-economic component of 
indigenous lands; “size” alludes to the economic component of the land while the “legal status” of 
the land should ordinarily touch both the economic and non-economic component. Getting a land 
which will have a similar nature, size, as well as legal status of a dispossessed land which equally 
is not occupied by a third party or another indigenous group (or subject to negotiation or dispute), 
might be a complex task. Thus, in practical terms, monetary compensation which appears to be of 
last resort from the order of Article 28 may be the most realistic compensation. 
 
                                                          
580 UNDRIP, supra note 557 at Art 28 (1). 
581 Ibid at Art 28 (2). 
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The Declaration does not provide a mathematical method for the determination of just, fair and 
equitable compensation but, it should ordinarily reflect the size, quality, nature and legal status of 
the land as other compensation options in Article 28. Thus, the task here will now be to decipher 
the method by which monetary compensation will signify the size, quality, nature and legal status 
of a deprived land right. The Declaration does not provide a methodology for assessing the 
appropriate compensation, perhaps because the instrument lays more emphasis restitution of land 
or reallocation which may appear to be impossible in a lot of circumstances.  
 
That said, it appears that the full implementation of UNDRIP in Canada will not cure the 
speculation and variations as regards the principles for determination of compensation upon 
infringement of Aboriginal title. However, one thing appears to be clear: UNDRIP makes allusions 
to compensable economic and non-economic components of indigenous land rights. The 
recognition of the spiritual and cultural component of indigenous land rights runs through different 
provisions of UNDRIP, first of which is the preamble that states that the Declaration recognizes 
the urgent need to respect the cultural and spiritual traditions of indigenous peoples, especially 
their rights to their lands and territories.582 Subsequently, Article 28 shows that compensation 
extends to the quality of the land and its legal status. The intangible component of the indigenous 
lands is subsumed in those factors.  
 
Since UNDRIP does not provide a procedure for the measurement of just, fair and equitable 
compensation, it leaves the state parties with the duty to design an appropriate methodology for 
same. This shows that the full implementation of UNDRIP in Canada will not bridge the gap in 
the compensation regime for infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada. As far as UNDRIP is 
concerned, the methodology used for measurement of compensation may not matter once it meets 
the minimum standard of being just, fair and equitable. In my view, the ideal procedure for the 
measurement of both the economic and non-economic losses occasioned by the dispossession or 
deprivation of the land rights of indigenous peoples should be the bifurcated approach as applied 
in Griffiths. The reasons for this have already been explored earlier in this chapter. Also, the 
character and content of UNDRIP accommodate that approach once an indigenous group whose 
rights have been deprived receive just, fair and equitable compensation.  
                                                          
582 Ibid at Preamble. See also Art 25. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The pertinent question to ask at this juncture is; what has this jurisdictional comparison achieved? 
The survey of the of the experiences in Australia and Malaysia gives a direction to mechanisms 
for the determination of compensation for infringement of indigenous land rights, some of which 
may stand as persuasive authority to courts in Canada. Of course, the application of these principles 
in Canada may be adapted with necessary changes to suit the peculiar nature of Aboriginal title in 
Canada. 
 
The analysis in this chapter shows that the measure of compensation for infringements on 
indigenous land rights and interests may not be incalculable especially where the bifurcated 
approach applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Griffiths is adopted. That approach 
demystifies the somewhat complexity in the assessment of compensation for dispossession or 
deprivation of the land rights of indigenous peoples. The approach independently calculates the 
calculable tangible losses occasioned by dispossession or deprivation of an interest in land (wholly 
or partly); then grants a solatium for the incalculable intangible losses. The solatium is based on 
the intuition of the judge after a consideration of requisite factors. 
 
Further, the Malaysian experience shows that the freehold estate market value of native title is the 
starting point in the calculation of compensation. Although the compensation regime in Malaysia 
is not as developed when compared to that of Australia, the provision for assessors under the LAA 
is worthy of emulation to ensure a due assessment of the nature of native title and other factors 
necessary to ensure fair compensation. 
 
Finally, UNDRIP emphasizes that the standard for adequate compensation is that it must be just, 
fair and equitable. It makes this provision without stating a specific mechanism for the 
actualization of that standard. This gives state parties room to develop a procedure that will ensure 
that compensation is just, fair and equitable.  
 
The preceding appraisal also shows that none of the three systems considered is independently 
flawless or fully certain on the principles for the calculation of compensation. However, a 
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combination of suitable concepts from the different jurisdictions may be used for purification of 
the situation in Canada. 
 
That said, while making recommendations, the next chapter will show how the suitable concepts 
in Australia, Malaysia, and UNDRIP could be used to develop the appropriate legal principles for 
the determination of compensation upon infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 Summary of Findings 
The legal survey so far shows that the legal principles for the determination of compensation for 
the infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada are undeveloped. The uncertainty in this area stems 
from the fact that Aboriginal title is a unique concept of land right and Canada is yet to establish 
definite rules that address the determination of compensation when it is infringed. It is not to say 
that Canada is completely void of some principles that touch upon compensation, however, the 
existing principles are filled with variabilities that leaves the legal regime uncertain. The reason 
for the existence of variabilities in different circumstances may be because some of those sources 
do not directly address the issue of compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada.  
 
It is pertinent to emphasize again at this juncture that not all the laws examined in chapter two of 
this work are legally applicable to Aboriginal title.583 Apart from the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
the Indian Act584 and perhaps the variabilities that stem from Delgamuukw585other sources 
discussed either have a limited application or legally inapplicable. For example, modern treaties 
are specifically negotiated agreements that are binding to the parties; Specific Claims Tribunal Act 
(SCTA) affects the rights of a First Nation where the First Nation chooses to file a claim in the 
Specific Claims Tribunal;586and expropriation law principles are not legally binding in cases of 
infringement of Aboriginal title. However, these sources are appraised because some of the 
principles deducible from them might serve as persuasive authorities for the courts. This may be 
in line with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in Nation where it was held 
that the usual remedies applicable for breach of interest in other lands might apply to Aboriginal 
title land cases in so far as the principles that inform the remedies are adapted to suit the nature of 
Aboriginal title.587   
 
                                                          
583 Chapter two examines the extant legal principles for the determination of compensation for infringement of 
Aboriginal title in Canada. 
584 Indian Act, RSC 1985. 
585 Delgamuukw supra note 2 at para 169. 
586 SCTA, supra note 325 at s 5. 
587 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 90. 
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The standard for evaluation of the fairness of the Crown’s dealings with Aboriginal peoples 
including decisions and acts that affect Aboriginal title seems to be the honour of the Crown.588  
This presupposes that for an action, decision or omission of the Crown concerning Aboriginal 
rights to be valid, it must be of such that meets the honour and good faith of the Crown.589 
Invariably, the standard for fair and sufficient compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title 
should be in line with the honour and good faith of the Crown. This standard, unfortunately, does 
not in practical terms clarify the formula to be used for the calculation of compensation.  
 
A case that arguably shows what meeting the honour of the Crown might mean with respect to 
compensation is Guerin v. The Queen. Guerin anchored compensation to the fiduciary obligation 
of the Crown. Thus, having regard to the fiduciary obligation owed an Indian band by the Crown 
and the particular circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) applied the 
principles for the valuation of damages for breach of trust in the assessment of compensation for 
a breach of the terms of surrender of an Indian reserve.590  The aim was to discover the actual loss 
of the Indian band as a result of the breach and remedy same by way of compensation. 
Consequently, the damages should have ordinarily reflected protection of the expectation interest 
appraised in chapter one of this work.591 This is because considering the facts and circumstances 
of that case the Crown specifically created an expectation for the Band which the Crown breached. 
Hence, the actual loss should ordinarily be recompensed on the basis of the expectation created.592 
 
However, there may be a lack of connection between the reasoning of the SCC and the actual 
damages awarded. The damages awarded to the affected Indian band seem to represent the 
protection of a hypothetical reliance interest which does not reflect the expectation of the Band. 
This is because the SCC found no error in principle in the decision of the trial court that approached 
damages “on the basis of lost opportunity for residential development.”593  The trial court in that 
case assessed the loss of the Band on speculation of what they might have suffered in a hypothetical 
                                                          
588 For this see the introductory section of chapter one. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 203 where the SCC 
held that compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title should not be equated with the price of a fee simple rather 
it “must be viewed in terms of the right and in keeping with the honour of the Crown.” 
589 McCabe, supra note 175 at 53. 
590 Guerin, supra note 123 at 357. 
591 See chapter one for the nature and theory of remedies; the various interests remedies seek to protect are examined 
there. 
592 For the full discussion and appraisal of the Guerin, see chapter two of this research. 
593 Guerin, supra note 123 at 363. 
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situation rather than what they actually suffered in reality. Thus, the trial court may have aimed to 
hypothetically put the Indian band in a position they would have been had the infringement not 
occurred. 
 
This work applauds the reasoning of the SCC in that case as regards the principles for the 
determination of compensation, but makes a critique of the court's application of the principles 
they already expounded. This is because their assessment of the damages did not reflect the actual 
loss of the Indian band. More so, the actual loss of the Indian band as a result of the omission of 
the Crown in that particular case could have been discovered by a mathematical formula which the 
SCC did not apply.  This may make the application of the principles as set out in Guerin more 
complex where complicated cases of compensation arise. It is one thing to say that the 
compensation due to an Aboriginal group is the actual loss of the affected group, but it is entirely 
another task to calculate that loss. The complication lies in the latter.    
 
The above critique is based on the particular facts and circumstances in Guerin where a specific 
expectation was created. In other circumstances where the Crown does not make any specific 
promise (expressly or impliedly) that creates an expectation, determination of compensation based 
on the reliance interest may actually recompense as far as money can go the actual loss of the 
Aboriginal group affected.  
 
The valuation of Aboriginal title has over time proven to be complex.594 The first reason for this 
seems to be that it is extremely difficult to place a monetary value on the spiritual, cultural and 
social impact of Aboriginal title. Secondly, Aboriginal title is inalienable except to the Crown. 
Thus, unlike in fee simple, where upon expropriation, for instance, compensation is based on an 
imaginary market value of the land where there is a willing buyer and seller, Aboriginal title has 
only one possible market, and that is the Crown. Hence, it is unclear whether the inalienability of 
Aboriginal title makes it of less value than fee simple or higher.  
 
What might seem to be possible approaches for the valuation of the economic dimension of 
Aboriginal title are seen in Musqueam Indian Band v. Glass where the SCC was divided as to the 
                                                          
594 Mainville, supra note 19 at 105. See also Sam Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 354. 
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meaning of “current land value” of an Indian reserve.595Determination of the value of Aboriginal 
title is very crucial to the determination of compensation because compensation should ordinarily 
reflect the value of the right infringed. The approaches in that case only help for the determination 
of the economic dimension of Aboriginal title. Some of the justices of the Supreme Court valued 
the Indian reserves through the lens of a hypothetical fee simple value of the land discounted by 
50 percent.596Others held that the “current land value generally means fee simple value, and 
common industry practice is to value land by assessing what land would be worth on the open 
market.”597 This approach was based on the particular interpretation of the lease agreement in 
issue. 
 
However, this research endorses the approach of the Bastarache J who held that the land should 
not be treated as fee simple or valued as such.598This appears to be the position of the SCC in 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia599 where it was held that fair compensation for infringement of 
Aboriginal title (which ordinarily should reflect the value) should not be equated with the price of 
a fee simple, rather it must be viewed in terms of right and in keeping with the honour of the 
Crown.600  
 
This statement by the SCC is only clear to the extent that what amounts to fair compensation for 
Aboriginal title should not follow the hypothetical market value as in fee simple expropriation 
cases. However, it leaves uncertain whether the compensation should be higher or lower when 
compared to a fee simple. Different interpretations could be given to that statement. One could be 
that Aboriginal title is lower than a fee simple and should not be equated with the price of a fee 
simple. Another could be that Aboriginal title is higher than the price of a fee simple. The last 
which may be a more compelling argument is that “it depends on the circumstances of the case.” 
                                                          
595 For the full discussion of this, see chapter two. It is pertinent to state that in that case, there was no issue raised as 
regards the valuation of the non-economic component of the Indian reserve. Hence, the valuation approaches in that 
case only bear on the economic component. 
596 See the majority decision of Gonthier, Major, Binnie and LeBel JJ in Musqueam Indian Band, supra note 235 at 
para 53. 
597 See the dissenting decision of McLachlin C.J. and L'Heureux-Dubé, Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. in Musqueam Indian 
Band, supra note 235 at para 18. This is without prejudice to their view that generally speaking, fee simple and Indian 
reserves are dissimilar land concepts which should not be compared for the purpose of valuation of the latter. 
598 See the judgment of Bastarache J in Musqueam Indian Band, supra note 235 at para 68. 
599 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 169. 
600 Ibid at para 203. 
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Thus, the compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title may be higher or lower than the price 
of a fee simple, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.   
 
Further to the above, Delgamuukw sets out four factors that may make compensation for 
Aboriginal title vary; which is discussed in Chapter two.601 After setting out these factors, the SCC 
declined to address them because the issue of damages was severed from the principal 
action.602This leaves uncertain the possible implication those variabilities may have in practical 
circumstances.  
 
Also, some scholars argue that modern treaties give an insight to the factors that should determine 
appropriate compensation that will meet with the honour and good faith of the Crown.603 This 
thesis analyzes the compensation aspect of some of the modern treaties to make a recommendation 
(if found appropriate) for a broader application where Aboriginal title is infringed. Some of the 
modern treaties list factors to be considered for adequate compensation. Those factors include 
tangible and intangible factors. What remains uncertain is the implication of those factors in 
practical circumstances. It is one thing to list factors that may be considered where the issue of 
compensation arises; it is another to have a mechanism to apply those factors where different 
situations arise. Hence, it may be difficult to say the implications of the various factors listed in 
the different modern treaties for the calculation of compensation. However, the factors listed by 
those treaties touch upon both economic and non-economic components of Aboriginal title.  
 
The examination of Expropriation Act shows the mechanism for the calculation of compensation 
upon expropriation of fee simple. Although it is established in Canada that compensation for 
Aboriginal title in Canada is not to be equated with the price of fee simple, it is necessary to 
examine the approach adopted for fee simple to adapt and apply same in the context of Aboriginal 
title if possible. The focal point for the determination of compensation for expropriation of land 
rights and interests under fee simple is the market value that a willing buyer might pay a willing 
seller in an open market.604 The market value principle as defined under the Expropriation Act will 
not augur well with the nature of Aboriginal title because of its inalienability. Its inalienability 
                                                          
601 Ibid at para 169. 
602 Ibid at para 169. 
603 Adkins and et al, supra note 10 at 365. 
604 Expropriation Act, supra note 378  at s 26 (2). 
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makes it available to only one possible market, and that is the Crown. Hence, unless the definition 
of market value is changed to take into consideration the nature of Aboriginal title, the principles 
set the Expropriation Act may not be useful to the calculation of compensation for Aboriginal title.   
 
Other Acts that touch upon the relevant principles that may help in the determination of 
compensation are the Métis Settlement Act605 and First Nation Land Management Act.606 Again, 
these Acts outline pertinent factors that bear on both the economic and non-economic components 
of Aboriginal title, just like the modern treaties. However, as has earlier been emphasized, knowing 
the factors to consider is only one limb of the task; having a mechanism to apply same makes the 
equation balance. It is uncertain how those factors when adopted in a broader context will play out 
in the calculation of compensation. 
 
Therefore, one can safely conclude that there is a need for the establishment of appropriate legal 
principles for the determination of compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title in Canada. 
Such principles should be of such that will take into account the peculiar nature of Aboriginal title 
and different circumstances that may arise with a particular Aboriginal title. Also, the principles 
should be of such that would not defeat the purpose of Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 
which is the reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples and to foster a positive 
long-term relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities.607  
 
Having identified the need for these principles in Canada, this thesis examines the indigenous land 
rights’ compensation mechanisms in Australia, Malaysia and under the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP).608 After the examination of these 
jurisdictions, it is found that there are potential solutions to the complex issue of valuation of 
compensation for infringement of indigenous land rights. Perhaps, it depends on the approach used 
to analyze compensation. Where one sees compensation as a remedy that tends to replace a right 
which has been infringed, then the value of indigenous land rights and interests may be 
incalculable. However, where one sees compensation as a device to recompense a victim of 
                                                          
605 Métis Settlement Act, RSA 2000, c M-14 (MSA). 
606 First Nation Land Management Act, SC 1999, c 24 (FNLMA). 
607 Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation,[2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 at para 10. 
608 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 13 September 2007, A/RES/61/295. 
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infringement and not necessarily replace an infringed right, then compensation for infringement 
of Aboriginal title is calculable. The latter seems to capture the aim of compensation.  
 
Finally, it is hoped that the proposals made in this work will be adopted not only in Canada but in 
other jurisdictions that may have similar issues. Jurisdictions like Nigeria and some other countries 
in Africa are also yet to develop appropriate principles for the determination of compensation upon 
the infringement of indigenous land rights. Hence, this thesis might help lay a framework for 
potential solutions to issues along these lines in several other jurisdictions. 
 
4.2 Possible Framework for the Determination of Compensation for Infringement of 
Aboriginal Title in Canada. 
This part makes a proposal both to policymakers and the courts for the approaches that should be 
adopted by Canada to develop the appropriate legal principles for the determination of 
compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada. The recommendations here take into 
cognizance the general nature of Aboriginal title in Canada and the existing principles underlining 
the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Also, the proposals reflect the need 
to uphold the underlying spirit of Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 which is reconciliation. 
However, for there to be true reconciliation in the particular context of compensation for 
infringements of Aboriginal title, compensation must be on just terms, duly calculated to reflect as 
far as money can go the actual loss of the Aboriginal group affected. That said, the 
recommendations are drawn from Australia, Malaysia, UNDRIP and the existing circumstances in 
Canada.  
 
4.2.1 Development of a Legislative Scheme 
One of the ways to bring legal certainty is through legislation. A seemingly inexhaustible 
uncertainty in a particular area of law can be made clear by legislation. Lon Fuller posits that legal 
system will fail if the following exist: where the legal system fails to achieve rules; fails to 
publicize the rules; fails to make rules understandable and the enactment of contradictory rules or 
introducing frequent changes in the law.609 His eight principles of law suggest that for a legal 
system to succeed, the law has to be certain to all and sundry including the judges. Unambiguous 
                                                          
609 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1969) 21. 
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rules made public in advance enables parties to predict how the government’s power will be 
exercised and also the actions of other private parties.610 This enhances making of necessary plans 
by the parties.611 Some legal realists see the law as a prediction of the action of a governmental 
agency or other agency under a given circumstance.612Thus, for there to be the rule of law in their 
opinion, there should be a comprehension of how judges will give a decision to a given 
circumstance within the scope of the law.613 It is pertinent to state however that the existence of 
legislation does not in itself bring legal certainty. For the legislation to bring legal certainty, it 
should be unambiguous. 
 
The existence of a formal legislative scheme, similar to Australia will increase the certainty and 
structure as far as compensation is concerned.614 The idea is not to have a legal framework that is 
the exact carbon copy of that Native Title Act (NTA)615 in Australia; rather such legislation should 
address the issues of determination of compensation peculiar to Canada. Although I will propose 
that Canada should adopt some of the principles of the Australian regime, the examination of the 
compensation provisions of the NTA shows that it is not wholly certain. The implication of those 
provisions to native title in Australia will perhaps be made clear by the forthcoming decision of 
the High Court of Australia in Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia & Anor.616However, 
lessons that are worthy of emulation, in my opinion, has already been expounded by the Federal 
Court of Australia in Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia(No 3)617. These principles will be 
outlined below. This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of drawing from other principles 
that may be established by the High Court of Australia upon hearing the case.  
 
The legal framework I propose should be legislation as specific as the SCTA but with different 
content. The flaws of the SCTA were examined in chapter two. First, the Act does not provide a 
procedure for calculation of compensation. It mandates the Tribunal to follow the principles of 
                                                          
610 Malcolm Lavoie and Dwight Newman, “Mining and Aboriginal Rights in Yukon: How Certainty Affects Investor 
Confidence” (2015) Online: Fraser Institute 21 available at https://www.fraserinstitute.org/studies/mining-and-
aboriginal-rights-in-yukon-how-certainty-affects-investor-confidence at 17. 
611 Ibid at 17. 
612 Wilfrid E Jr Rumble, “American Legal Realism and the Reduction of Uncertainty” (1964) 13 Journal of Public 
Law, Emory Law School, 45 at 73. 
613 Ibid at 73. 
614 Adkins et al, supra note 10 at 380. 
615 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (NTA). 
616 D3/2018 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia & Anor. 
617 Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3) [2016] FCA 900. 
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compensation applied by the courts (which this work has shown is undeveloped). Second, the 
Tribunal cannot grant compensation for the non-economic dimension of indigenous land rights. 
Other flaws of the Act were explored in chapter two. 
 
Before delving into the content of the legislative scheme, which will be proposed subsequently, it 
is important to ponder briefly about how the scheme may come about and the approach it will use 
to address the issue of compensation. First, it is pertinent to state that the question of constitutional 
jurisdiction of provinces to infringe and regulate Aboriginal and treaty rights has been a 
reoccurring theme both between scholars and the courts since the constitutional protection of those 
rights.618This is not part of the investigation of this research as same might lead to broader 
questions that are beyond the scope of this work. 
 
That said, Mainville is of the view that the power to make this sort of legislation should be within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal legislature as it touches upon matters relating to the core 
of “Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” under section 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 
1867.619 Thus, a law that is to establish the principles for the determination of compensation for 
the infringement of Aboriginal title should be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the parliament.620  
 
Further, he suggests that rules to be set for the determination of compensation should apply 
uniformly in Canada.621This submission is made on the basis that it may be difficult to reconcile 
the honour of the Crown where the principles for the determination of compensation vary across 
provinces.622This proposal should be applauded. However, the uniform rules should be of such 
that will accommodate the variance that could be encountered with the particular nature of different 
lands subject to Aboriginal title. This is because the actual loss of an Aboriginal group affected by 
an infringement may not be appropriately assessed where the particular nature of the Aboriginal 
title is not taken into contemplation. 
                                                          
618 For this see Kathryn L. Kickbush & Debbie Chan, “Provincial Jurisdiction to Infringe Aboriginal Rights” (2005) 
63:6 The Advocate 881; Thomas Isaac, “Provincial Jurisdiction, Adjudicative Authority and Aboriginal Rights: A 
Comment on Paul v. B.C. (Forest Appeals Commission)” (2002) 60:1 The Advocate 77. See also Delgamuukw, Supra 
note 3 at para 181; Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission) [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585. 
619 Mainville, supra note 19 at 115. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 181; Paul v. British Columbia 
(Forest Appeals Commission) [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585. 
620 Ibid at 115. 
621 Ibid at 115. 
622 Ibid at 115. 
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The subsequent proposals shall state principles that should form the contents of the proposed 
legislative scheme. However, even if the government does not adopt the proposal for a legislative 
framework, the subsequent proposals are potential solutions to the issue of compensation which 
judges may still follow as persuasive authority. The only suggestion that may need a legislative 
action is the proposal for the use of assessors in the determination of compensation which is 
discussed below. 
 
4.2.2 Bifurcated Approach of Calculation of Compensation 
This forms the core of my proposal for the appropriate principles to inform the compensation for 
infringement of Aboriginal title. The adoption of this approach separates the incalculable 
component of the value of Aboriginal title from the calculable component. The danger of a holistic 
measurement of the value of the infringed rights and interests in land subject to Aboriginal title is 
that the rights and interest become wholly incalculable. Hence, in practical terms, the solution to 
that danger is to separate the calculable component from the incalculable component; calculate the 
value of the calculable component and grant a solatium for the incalculable component. 
 
This approach was the approach adopted by the trial court in Griffiths, and it may appropriately be 
applied in Canada. Aboriginal title contains a tangible economic element which I will make the 
case that it is calculable where the principles I will expound subsequently are followed. 
Furthermore, it has a non-economic dimension in the light of its cultural and spiritual significance. 
Undoubtedly, the non-economic component is a right and should not be left “not remedied.” 
However, the complication is that the value is incalculable. The bifurcated approach suggests that 
for the purpose of compensation, the economic loss is calculated differently from the non-
economic loss. I shall proceed to propose how this will be done in a Canadian context. 
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a) Economic Component  
It is pertinent to draw the line with respect to where the economic component of Aboriginal title 
stops for the purpose of calculating the economic loss. This is important in order not to conflate 
economic losses with some aspects of non-economic losses. The economic component of 
Aboriginal title signifies its tangible component which can be deduced from the tangible rights it 
confers. It has gone beyond arguments that “Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to 
those associated with fee simple, including:  the right to decide how the land will be used; the right 
of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to the economic 
benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use and manage the land.”623 
 
For the economic component of Aboriginal title, Canadian jurisprudence analogizes it with that of 
a fee simple. Consequently, one can propose that the calculation of the economic loss occasioned 
by the infringement of Aboriginal title should follow the rules of compensation for expropriation 
of fee simple. On the contrary, adoption of the exact approach for compensation in cases of 
expropriation of fee simple may be counter-productive as same is not compatible with general 
nature of Aboriginal title. The core for the calculation of compensation in expropriation fee simple 
cases in Canada is the market value of the interest expropriated which is the amount a willing 
seller might be willing to pay for such property in the open market.624It has been emphasized in 
chapter two and three of this work that Aboriginal title is inalienable; consequently, it is not 
available to an open market. The only market for Aboriginal title is the Crown.  
 
Further to the above, the market value principle used for calculation of compensation in fee simple 
will not augur well with Aboriginal title. The solution to this complication may reasonably be 
straightforward. The definition of market value under the Expropriation Act refers to the kind of 
market that fee simple is open to. In line with that, market value principle will be compatible with 
the situation of Aboriginal title where it is defined with respect to its only market. Therefore, the 
definition of market value concerning the economic loss occasioned by the infringement of 
Aboriginal title should focus on the value reasonably obtainable (not necessarily obtained) by the 
Crown from such infringement. This was the approach adopted by the trial judge in 
                                                          
623 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 73. 
624 Expropriation Act, supra note 378 at s 26 (2). 
 123 
 
Griffiths.625Adoption of this approach will also make the argument of “whether or not the 
inalienability of Aboriginal title is a discounting factor to its worth” irrelevant. The real market 
value of Aboriginal title could be said to be the best use the Crown in fulfilling its fiduciary 
obligation could have put a land subject to Aboriginal title assuming if it is surrendered by the 
group involved. In some circumstances, the best use may be sale of the land. 
 
Different factors could make the compensation for economic losses vary in different 
circumstances. This is not just peculiar to Aboriginal title. The factors that will affect the 
compensation for economic losses are the same as those that will affect its market value; in this 
case, the factors that will either increase or decrease the value obtainable by the Crown. These 
factors may include size, location, developments on the land, etc. Another factor that will, of 
course, affect compensation is the degree of infringement. The degree of infringement can be said 
to be directly proportional to the loss. Thus, the higher the infringement, the higher the loss and 
consequently, compensation should be higher.   
 
It is pertinent at this juncture to address the potential effects the restrictions on Aboriginal title 
might have on its market value and consequently compensation. My respectful view as I have 
argued in several parts of this thesis is that the restrictions should not be discounting factors to the 
value of Aboriginal title. It is important to emphasize this point here and clarify the reasons for my 
contention. 
 
 As earlier discussed in chapter one, Aboriginal title come with some restrictions: 
 
1. It can only be held communally, not only for the present generation but also for all 
succeeding generations.626  
2. It is inalienable except to the Crown627  
3. It cannot be developed, used or misused in a way that would prevent the future generation 
from using and it.628 
                                                          
625 Griffith 1, supra note 474 at para 215. 
626 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 74. 
627 Ibid at para 74. 
628 Ibid at para 74. 
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Since I hold the view that the above restrictions are not discounting factors, I shall address the 
effects of the restrictions jointly rather than disjunctively.  
 
The majority decision of the SCC in Musqueam Indian Band held that the legal restrictions on an 
Indian reserve should affect its market value.629 This decision is principally based on two reasons. 
First, the Musqueam land is not available in any actual market and secondly, in line with the 
appraisal of freehold property practice in Canada, to determine the value of land, legal restrictions 
should be considered.630 
 
Application of principles applicable to freehold property to Aboriginal title without adapting it to 
the peculiarities of the latter may not be the best approach for developing principles that should 
govern Aboriginal title. Aboriginal title should not just be said to be sui generis in principle only 
for the usual principles of freehold to be applied to it in practical circumstances.  
 
In 1996, the National Native Title Tribunal of Australia posed pertinent questions which may be 
instructive to the ongoing discussion: 
 
…[I]t would be conceptually difficult and, on the evidence in this case, practically 
impossible to express the actual nature of the native title rights as a percentage of 
freehold. Conceptually, it is difficult to adequately compare the nature of native 
title rights with free simple rights. For example, if an integral component of 
ordinary fee simple title is the right of the owner to alienate the land and if an 
integral component of native title is that it cannot be alienated (or that it can only 
be transferred in limited circumstances to a limited class of transferees)…how can 
such a comparison be made? By reference to those components alone, is native title 
said to be more valuable, as valuable as or less valuable than fee simple title? That 
question is merely indicative of the difficulties inherent in a comparison of unalike 
rights and interests.631 
 
                                                          
629 Musqueam Indian Band, supra note 235 at paras 47, 65 & 53. 
630 Ibid at paras 47 & 49. The SCC relied on the Appraisal Institute of Canada, The Appraisal of Real Estate, 
Canadian ed.  (Winnipeg:  The Institute, 1999). 
631 Western Australia v. Thomas (1996) 133 FLR 124 at 202. See also Bartlett, supra note 442 at 792. 
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Comparison of principles between two unlike rights and interests may not in itself be erroneous 
but such must be done circumspectly taking into consideration the peculiarities of the different 
rights and interests. If this is not done, the comparison may have an erroneous outcome. For 
instance, the majority in the SCC in Musqueam Indian Band took the view that Musqueam land is 
not available in any actual market. This view may seem to make sense when one defines “market” 
through the lens of the conventional market tenable for freehold properties. However, upon 
consideration of the peculiarities of indigenous land rights and interests, one will discover that the 
view may not be accurate. This is because, as I have argued earlier, the Crown is the special market 
for lands subject to Aboriginal title and different rules should apply for this special market. More 
so, the Crown playing the role of a fiduciary should ordinarily put the land to the best use on behalf 
of the Aboriginal group affected. It is the value for such use that should be the market value of the 
economic component of Aboriginal title. Thus the restriction on the alienation of Aboriginal title 
except to the Crown should not be a discounting factor in the determination of the value. 
 
A similar issue came up in the Geita Sebea v. Territory of Papua632 before the High Court of 
Australia in 1941. The issue before the court was whether the provision of the Land Ordinance 
1911—935 restricting the rights of an indigenous group to sell or deal with the land affects its 
value.633 The court answered in the negative.634 This was the case that the primary court in Griffiths 
relied upon.  
 
The remaining restrictions on Aboriginal title should not also be discounting factors in its 
valuation. There are two reasons for this contention. What might seem to be the weaker reason is 
a question. Would it have made any difference if there were no further restrictions? It worthy of 
note while pondering on this question that the rights Aboriginal title confers extend to the right to 
decide how the land will be used including modern usages; the right of enjoyment and occupancy 
of the land;  the right to possess the land; the right to the economic benefits of the land; and the 
right to proactively use and manage the land.635 The view that the remaining restrictions are 
discounting factors raises a more complex question; what in particular is to be discounted? One 
may argue that the restrictions may limit the developments the lands can be put to and consequently 
                                                          
632Geita Sebea v. Territory of Papua (1941) 67 CLR 544. 
633 Ibid at 555. 
634 Ibid at 555. 
635 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 6 at para 73. 
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reduce the value. Well, in as much as this line of argument might seem to make sense, it is quite 
speculative, as all Aboriginal title lands are not the same. And what might amount to use or misuse 
in a way that would prevent the future generation from using a land subject to Aboriginal title in a 
particular circumstance may not amount to same in another circumstance. Chapter one of this 
thesis has argued that that the scope and content of the cultural limit on Aboriginal title are 
uncertain. Hence, the better approach to the valuation of Aboriginal title is to consider the 
particular nature of an Aboriginal title land which may vary and not hold the rigid view that the 
restrictions are discounting factors to its value. 
 
The stronger reason for my contention is “fairness.” Contending that the restrictions are 
discounting factors to the value of Aboriginal title is like allowing the Crown benefit from its 
wrong. These restrictions exist precisely because of the Crown’s actions in the first place; the 
Crown is the only market for Aboriginal title, and the Crown is also the infringer. 
 
That said, the market value principle, when defined to address the peculiar nature of Aboriginal 
title as illustrated above, is ideal for situations of justifiable infringements or past unjustified 
expropriation of rights and interests in land subject to Aboriginal title. However, there are instances 
that other valuation principles may be ideal in deciphering the economic loss of an affected 
Aboriginal group. A good example of such circumstance is the experience in Guerin where the 
Crown breached the terms of surrender of an Indian reserve. This kind of situation is different 
because it is akin to a contract (although not necessarily one) where the Crown through its express 
or implied promise creates an expectation of economic benefits on the minds of the Aboriginal 
group. Consequently, the valuation for compensation in such an instance should be to the extent 
of the expectation created. In this kind of situation, the fact that the expectation created by the 
Crown is unreasonably higher than the “market value” of the land should not be a defence. For 
this to work there should be three tests to activate measurement by expectation principle: 
 
1. It must be in a situation of voluntary surrender of rights and interests in land subject to an 
Aboriginal title. 
2. The Crown must have expressly or impliedly made a representation to give the indigenous 
group affected an expectation of economic benefits. 
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3. The Aboriginal group must have relied on the express or implied representation of the 
Crown to make the surrender. 
 
The analysis under this section shows that the compensation for economic losses should either 
seek to protect the reliance interest or in appropriate circumstances as outlined above seek to 
protect the expectation interest.  The market value analysis seeks to ascertain the value of loss so 
as to award compensation that will as far as money can go recompense for the actual loss. This 
represents the reliance interest because it looks back to as far as money can go put the Aboriginal 
group affected in a position they would have been had the infringement not happened. It does not 
necessarily look at the gain of the infringer. The reference to the “value reasonably obtainable by 
the Crown from such infringement” does not necessarily mean looking at the gain of the infringer. 
That allusion is used for the ascertainment of the market value of the Aboriginal title as the Crown 
is the only available market for it. 
 
b) Non-Economic Component  
The non-economic component of Aboriginal title is the intangible spiritual and cultural connection 
that Aboriginal groups have in their lands.636 It is extremely complex to assess the value of the 
losses probably because it is not available in both open and closed markets. The value can only be 
deciphered by its significance to Aboriginal groups, and same cannot be readily converted to 
currency. However, this component of Aboriginal title is a right which is compensable. The 
essence of the compensation is not to replace the infringed intangible right (because it cannot); 
rather it is a monetary recompense to make amends for the harm done.  
 
The approach adopted by the trial court in Griffiths is worthy of emulation. The court awarded 
compensation by way of solatium. It describes solatium to be the compensation component that 
represents the loss or diminution of connection or traditional attachment to the land, and not 
necessarily the value.637 In a Canadian context, the factors that should ideally be considered by the 
courts in the grant of solatium are the particular nature of Aboriginal title, the nature of the 
infringement, the degree of infringement and the degree of accommodation. The factors to be 
considered to inform the solatium should be restricted to the intangible component of Aboriginal 
                                                          
636 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 129. 
637 Griffiths 1, supra note 474 at para 307. 
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title. For instance, when considering the particular nature of Aboriginal title in this context, it 
should be restricted to perhaps the degree of connection that a group has in their lands. Hence, the 
higher the degree, the higher the solatium. Again, there might be no compensation that will replace 
the slightest degree based on its significance; but the essence of the compensation is for 
recompense and not necessarily replacement. 
 
The kind of amount that may be awarded as solatium will vary depending on the circumstances of 
the case. This may be a complex issue as it may be difficult to find a particular refrence that has 
the attributes of the non-economic component of indigenous land rights and interests to draw from. 
However, the experience in Australia gives an insight on the varying circumstances that may affect 
solatium. 
 
In Griffiths, the solatium of $1.3 Million was awarded after considering the particular nature of 
indigenous interest and the degree of spiritual and usufructuary significance of the land.638 In that 
case, the particular nature of the indigenous rights and interest in land was non-exclusive. The 
amount granted should have ordinarily been higher had the interest been exclusive. Also, in 
awarding the solatium, the court in Griffiths considered the size of the land.639 This presupposes 
that the larger the area of land infringed, the higher the solatium. 
 
In Canada, for Aboriginal title to be established, the occupation of the land before the assertion of 
European sovereignty must be sufficient, continuous (where present occupation is relied on) and 
exclusive.640 Therefore, Aboriginal title in Canada is an exclusive interest in land and quite 
distinguishable from the situation in Australia where native title may be non-exclusive. Drawing 
from the experience in Griffiths, the award of solatium in Canada should ordinarily be higher than 
the award in Griffiths for land of similar size. 
 
The complexities that may arise in the determination of appropriate solatium gives rise to a need 
for the appointment of assessors who are versed in the nature of Aboriginal title to be involved in 
                                                          
638 Ibid at paras 301 to 302. 
639 Ibid at paras 301. 
640 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra 6 para 25. 
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the determination of compensation for infringements of Aboriginal title. This will be addressed in 
below. 
 
The analysis in this section shows that compensation for the non-economic loss is more in line 
with compensation based on the reliance interest.  
 
4.2.3 Assessors  
The bifurcated approach expounded above shows how economic losses and non-economic losses 
occasioned by an infringement are to be valued disjunctively. The missing piece to the puzzle is 
the mechanism to be used to arrive at the appropriate value in each case. This is premised on the 
ground that judges or the government (in negotiated compensation) may not be versed in the 
particular nature of the Aboriginal title. A plausible way to fill this gap is to appoint assessors who 
are versed in the nature of Aboriginal title to aid the judges or the government in the assessment 
of both the economic and non-economic losses occasioned by the infringement. This approach 
should form part of the legislative framework earlier proposed. 
 
The principle of using Assessors is drawn from Federal Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 
Malaysia.641The role of the assessors is to sit with the trial judge, hear the case with him and make 
reports that will inform the court’s decision. Assessors play a different role from expert witnesses.  
 
The attachment of assessors to judges is an approach that belongs to the broad category of the 
concept of “lay participation in the administration of justice.”642 There are other types of lay 
participation; the most prominent example is the jury system where a group of people is chosen at 
random to decide a case.643 Assessors function differently, as they do not get to give the decision 
in the case. They only guide the judges to arrive at their decisions. 
 
Unlike expert witnesses, assessors sit in a judicial capacity. They form part of the decision making 
body as their reports may inform the decision of the courts. Hence, they see things from the 
perspective of judges but this time with the requisite knowledge of the particular nature of 
                                                          
641 Land Acquisition Act, Act 486, 1960 (LAA) at s 40A.  
642 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, “Exploring Lay Participation in Legal Decision-Making: Lessons from Mixed Tribunals” 
(2007) 40:2 Cornell International Law Journal at 429. 
643 See Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1966) at 5. 
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Aboriginal title. The advantage is that persons with the requisite knowledge of the economic and 
non-economic components of Aboriginal title are sitting in a judicial capacity. The appointment 
of assessors will not disrupt the normal course of events in the court. On the contrary, it 
complements the procedure in the court into ensuring that the right decision is arrived at. The 
assessors will not be saddled with the responsibility of the judge (to give the final decision). Their 
duty will be restricted to sitting with the judge and making of reports after that. The reports may 
inform the decision of the court.  
 
The use of assessors will promote community values and local knowledge in the administration of 
justice and consequently ensure justice and equity.644It may be a good way to bring in Aboriginal 
perspective in the determination of compensation. 
  
The appointment of the assessors (ideally not less than two in number) should be made by the 
Court on the recommendation of the parties. The qualification should ordinarily be that the persons 
should have a track record which shows expertise in issues concerning Aboriginal title, especially 
relating to the particular nature of the subject matter of the suit. Also, to ensure that Aboriginal 
perspectives are employed in the determination of compensation, strong efforts should be made to 
appoint indigenous peoples as assessors. 
 
It is pertinent to say that the reports of the assessors should not be automatically binding until the 
judge officially adopts it into his decision. More so, the judge may adopt the reports with such 
modifications, addition or subtraction as may be necessary to ensure that compensation is on just 
terms. Finally, if there is a conflict between the reports of the assessors, the judge should give his 
decision by adopting the report (or aspects thereof) which better serves the interest of justice.  
 
There may also be the need for assessors during out of court negotiations for compensation 
between the government and the affected Aboriginal community. Their duty in this instance will 
be to make reports to the government that will inform the appropriate level of compensation for 
infringement of Aboriginal title. 
 
                                                          
644 Ivkovic, supra note 642  at 431. 
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4.2.4 Fiduciary Principles 
Robert Mainville suggests that compensation should be determined with a mechanism that takes 
cognizance of the principles of fiduciary law.645This suggestion is made because the framework of 
compensation for expropriation of private land rights is inappropriate to address the sui generis 
nature of Aboriginal title.646 
 
It appears that the position of the law in Canada already is that expropriation principles used for 
compensation in fee simple are not directly applicable to Aboriginal title. The SCC made this clear 
in Delgamuukw where it was held that compensation should not be equated with the price of a fee 
simple rather it must be viewed in terms of the right and in keeping with the honour of the 
Crown.647  It also appears (although not codified) that the extant principle for the determination of 
compensation for infringement of Aboriginal title in Canada centers on fiduciary principles as 
expounded in Guerin.648 This is based on the general fiduciary obligation that the Crown owes 
Aboriginal peoples in its dealing with them. 
 
That said, Chapter two of this work shows that the award of remedy using “fiduciary principles” 
is very broad. Thus recommending that compensation should be based on fiduciary principles is 
apt. However, if a definite explanation is not given concerning the practical mechanism to be used 
to decipher the appropriate compensation where “fiduciary principles” are used, the situation will 
still be uncertain. It has earlier been submitted in chapter two that the general options available for 
remedy anchored on fiduciary principles may be the implementation of a constructive trust, 
monetary restitution, an award of equitable damages or an accounting for profits (or a combination 
thereof).649 For instance, where a fiduciary makes a wrongful gain as a result of his position, the 
victim of wrong may claim for restitutionary remedies, even where he suffers no loss.650 For 
compensation however and in general terms where fiduciary relationships concern real property, 
                                                          
645 Mainville, supra note 19 at 104. 
646 Ibid at 105. 
647 Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para 203. 
648 See also Semiahmoo Indian Band , supra note 232 at 25; Osoyoos Indian Band v. Oliver (Town), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 
746, 2001 SCC 85; Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344.  
649 Ibid at 25. 
650 Canadian Aero Service Limited v. O’Malley [1974] SCR 592 at 621-622. 
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the measure of compensation is the actual loss caused to the estate without a need for proof of 
foreseeability and causation.651 
 
The objective of the preceding recommendations is to design a mechanism for the determination 
of the actual loss of an Aboriginal community whose rights and interests in their land are wholly 
or partly infringed. Therefore the proposals for the establishment of a legislative scheme, use of a 
bifurcated approach and the appointment of assessors are all to fulfill the objective of 
measurement of compensation in line with the actual loss of the affected Aboriginal community. 
It is obvious that the actual loss may be incalculable, especially as it relates to the non-economic 
component of Aboriginal title. However, the objective is to determine compensation that will as 
far as money can go recompense the actual loss of the affected Aboriginal community. That said, 
the proposals made here do not in any way preclude the application of fiduciary principles; they 
actually clarify the mechanism for the application of fiduciary principles into the actualization of 
the appropriate compensation as situations arise. 
  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
651 Fales v. Canada Permanent Trust Co. [1977] 2 SCR 302 at 320. See also David Hayton, Paul Matthews and Charles 
Mitchell, Underhill and Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees, 18th ed. (London: LexisNexis, 2010) at 1113. 
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